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Abstract
The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the new field of happiness economics
which over the past several decades has substantially enhanced our understanding of
cognitive judgment, human behavior, and the nature of happiness. Chapter 1 starts
with a discussion of the subjective approach to measuring well-being and lays the
foundation for the empirical work that follows in chapters 2 and 3. This approach
has a strong appeal because ancient and modern cultures, and a long tradition in
philosophy, view achieving happiness as the ultimate goal of human existence. It
also recognizes that humans are the best judges of their own condition. In this
first chapter, I discuss some common ambiguities related to the term happiness and
outline some of the most common ways in which subjective well-being (SWB)data
is measured. Next, I discuss how reliable subjective well-being data is and what
are some of its strengths and weaknesses in the context of economic research. Some
major insights from the growing literature on happiness economics are also provided
and alternative approaches to measuring quality of life (and well-being) are suggested
in the last section.
One puzzle in the happiness economics literature has been that although real in-
comes have substantially improved over the past 40 years, happiness levels in the
United States have stagnated. In chapter 2, I show that the rising level of income
inequality in the United States since the 1970s can explain the stagnating happiness
levels of Americans. First, using subjective well-being data from the General Social
ix
Survey, I estimate the concavity of the utility function within a neo-utilitarian frame-
work of welfare analysis and calculate the Atkinson index of inequality. Although the
estimates suggests that Americans have become increasingly more inequality-averse
over time, the results suggest that the concavity of the utility function alone cannot
explain the happiness patterns observed in the past several decades. Once I account
for the negative external cost from economic inequality, however, the empirical anal-
ysis implies that economic growth has not been sufficient to compensate for the loss
of subjective well-being associated with the rising level of inequality. This is consis-
tent with the findings of several different surveys on subjective well-being. Finally, I
evaluate the equality-efficiency trade-off in the US, and discover a small and positive
trade-off.
Chapter 3 considers another important policy topic in recent years – the increasing
cost of college tuition and the scrutinized value of higher education. Using subjective
well-being data, I show that higher education has a large non-monetary (happiness)
return that goes beyond the benefit of finding a better paid and more satisfying job.
A person with a high school degree, for instance, would have to earn $41,683 more
per year to be equally as happy as somebody with a college degree that has a similar
socio-economic background. This large non-monetary return is associated with better
marriage, health, and parenting choices, and stronger social networks that translate
into higher levels of interpersonal trust. The lion’s share of this non-monetary re-
turn is earned in college while the majority of the returns from graduate school are
associated with higher salary. This return varies among the different subgroups of
the population. Women, for example, benefit twice as much from a college education
as men, and this non-monetary return has slightly increased over time. This may
explain, at least partially, the increase in demand for college education over the past
30 years, and the unprecedented rise in the price of college tuition. It is hypothesized
that one way in which education works is to change the attitudes, values, and behavior
x
of students. Higher education, for example, makes students more open-minded, tol-
erant, and risk-averse. Evidence in support of this hypothesis is found by estimating
the coefficient of risk (and inequality) aversion. Finally, using subjective well-being
data from the European Value Study, the average non-monetary return from higher
education is also calculated for Europeans and compared to that in the United States.
Although higher education is also found to have a positive effect on happiness in Eu-
rope, the non-monetary returns are much larger in the United States. Furthermore,
contrary to the United States, the direct effect of education on happiness in Europe
is substantial, while the indirect effect is negligible.
xi
Chapter 1
The Economics of Happiness
“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as
well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right
and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their
throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort
we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and
confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality
he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognizes
this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of
which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems
which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead
of reason, in darkness instead of light.”
Jeremy Bentham (1789, p.1)
“The care of human life and happiness and not their destruction is the only
legitimate object of good government.”
Thomas Jefferson (1809, p.359)
1
1.1 Introduction
Few people would disagree with Bentham that maximizing pleasure and minimiz-
ing pain, or the principle of utility, is what ultimately governs human behavior. Over
two centuries ago, for instance, the American colonies declared the pursuit of happi-
ness, along with life and liberty, to be an unalienable right. Maximizing happiness is
also in the core of economic analysis which is deeply rooted in a long philosophical
tradition that starts with the works of ancient hedonistic philosophers, passes through
the utilitarian tradition that evolved out of the works of Jeremy Bentham and John
Stuart Mill, and today is realized in the models of modern economists who maximize
utility and social welfare functions. This approach has a strong appeal to most people
because of the universal view that the ultimate goal of human existence is to make
people “happy” and “satisfied” with their life.
Yet, measures of material standards of living such as gross domestic product
(GDP), or household and individual income, have dominated national debates about
social and economic progress. Such measures have been used by economists as a proxy
for well-being despite of their limitations which have long been recognized by social
scientists.1 GDP, for example, does not take into account environmental externali-
ties and the depletion of natural resources; it does not recognize social inequalities,
or the value of nonmarket work such as raising a child or volunteering; it increases
after a natural disaster, during crime waves, and health epidemics as infrastructure
is renewed, burglar alarms installed, and new patients diagnosed. More generally,
GDP is a poor measure for quality of life because it does not account for the crucial
dimension of psychological well-being, or utility.
The measurement of social and economic progress, however, is undergoing a fun-
1For a comprehensive overview of the limitations of GDP see Bergh (2009). The author also
explains why GDP has been traditionally used as a measure of social performance regardless of the
overwhelming criticism that it is not a good measure for quality of life.
2
damental change. Some have call it a revolution (Frey, 2008), and others have called
for a revolution (Layard, 2006). In 2008, for example, the French president, Nicolas
Sarkozy, formed a commission of twenty-five members, including five Nobel Prize lau-
reates, which produced the most comprehensive study on measuring quality of life2
to date (Stiglitz et al., 2009). The so-called Sarkozy Report, a 292-page document,
represents a “remarkable breakthrough in economist’s thinking about the direction
in which economic measurement needs to go” (Easterlin et al., 2010, p. 1). The
commission recognizes that quality of life is a much broader concept than economic
production and living standards which are currently used to assess how well economies
are doing in both the developed and developing world. The key message of the re-
port is that there must be a shift from measuring economic production to measuring
people’s well-being.
Such shift is now happening and gathering momentum. In Britain, for example,
a coalition led by David Cameron is starting to measure general well-being (GWB)
by asking people how happy, anxious, and satisfied they are with their lives and how
worthwhile are the things they do. For the past couple of years, the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has published an index on well-
being, Your Better Life Index, which includes eleven different dimensions for quality
of life – housing, income, jobs, community, education, civic engagement, environment,
health, work-life balance, safety, and life satisfaction. Most of these categories are
constructed using both objective measures (e.g., life expectancy) and subjective ones
(e.g., self-reported level of health).
Similarly, the New Economic Foundation, a London based think-tank, is producing
a happiness index, The Happy Planet Index, which takes into account concerns about
sustainability and subjective well-being. Gallup is now conducting surveys in 140
2One of the key motivations for the formation of the commission by Sarkozy is the huge discrep-
ancy between standard measures of socioeconomic performance such as economic growth, inflation,
and inequality and the widespread perceptions of the population about the quality of life.
3
countries around the world that ask people about their life-evaluation and emotional
states. In the United States, the Rockefeller Foundation launched a project in 2010,
The State of USA, which aims to create a national dataset of key indicators that go
beyond GDP. And while there is still considerable debate whether these new measures
of (subjective) well-being are more meaningful than traditional indicators, the fact
is that the economic literature on happiness has exploded exponentially in the past
decade and the subjective approach to measuring well-being is becoming increasingly
accepted.
In this chapter, I overview the concept of subjective well-being, its multidimen-
sional nature, and how it is measured. I further discuss whether happiness data
is meaningful and can be collected in a reliable manner, and identify some of the
methodological stumbling blocks with respect to economics research. Finally, I dis-
cuss some basic insights from the happiness economics literature and suggest some
alternative approaches to measuring well-being.
1.2 Decision vs Experienced Utility
For a long time economists have assumed that utility cannot be measured. More
importantly, they have assumed that utility need not be measured directly because
it can be inferred from the choices that people make which reveal their preferences.
This more objective approach to measuring well-being has come to dominate mod-
ern (neoclassical) economic theory which assumes that individuals derive utility only
from the consumption of tangible goods and services as well as leisure. Within this
tradition, subjective well-being data, usually collected from surveys, is seen as highly
suspicious and often regarded as unscientific.
This objectivist approach to measuring well-being, however, has been challenged
in recent years as research in psychology and economics has pointed out that there
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are large discrepancies between how people feel and what they value and how they
actually behave in real life. A large literature in behavioral economics, for instance,
has demonstrated inconsistencies in the axioms of revealed preference starting with
the seminal work of Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961). A particularly influential
critique of the expected utility theory as a descriptive model of human behavior under
risk is Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory. In their paper, Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) demonstrate that decision making under uncertainty is subject
to several pervasive biases that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory.
These biases, for example the bias to underweight outcomes that are merely probable
in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty, has implications for
risk-aversion and ultimately may lead people to make choices that do not maximize
their utility. Many other studies have also demonstrated that people have “bounded
rationality,” do not always act in a way consistent with maximizing behavior, and
that their judgment is subject to many systematic mistakes. For example, people
overestimate the degree to which their future tastes will resemble their current ones
(Loewenstein et al., 2003), which leads them to make less than optimal choices in
the long-run. Thus, behavioral psychologists and economists have started drawing
a distinction between decision utility and experienced utility (e.g., Kahneman and
Thaler 2006). Decision utilities are the utilities that describe (determine) our choices
within the revealed preference tradition. Experienced utilities, on the other hand,
measure utility directly and are the subject of interest for happiness research.
Measuring experienced utility provides an alternative hypotheses, and in many
ways it is a complementary approach to testing economic assumptions and ultimately
understanding the world. It is particularly useful for testing standard economic as-
sumptions and discovering systematic deviations between predicted behavior (decision
utility) and experienced behavior. Its greatest strength is its simplicity: “relying on
people’s own judgments is a convenient shortcut and potentially provides a natural
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way to aggregate various experiences in a way that reflects people’s own preferences.
Further, this approach makes it possible to reflect the diversity of people’s views
about what is important in their lives” (Stiglitz et al., 2009, p.145).
1.3 The Multi-Dimensional Nature of Happiness
The terms “happiness,” “subjective well-being,” and “life-satisfaction” are often
used interchangeably in common language (and by economists) which has caused some
ambiguities. Like well-being, however, which has many different dimensions – being
healthy, having strong social connections, and economic opportunities – happiness is
a multi-dimensional concept too. Diener (1984), for example, identifies three separate
aspects of well-being:
• life-satisfaction (i.e., person’s overall life evaluation at a point in time)
• the presence of positive feelings or affect (i.e., positive emotions such as feeling
of happiness and joy, or a sense of vitality and energy)
• absence of negative feelings of affects (i.e., feelings of anger, sadness, stress,
etc...)
The first one, life-satisfaction, is a reflective assessment which involves evaluative
judgment of one’s life, and requires an effort to remember and evaluate past experi-
ences. The latter two aspects of subjective well-being, positive and negative affects,
represent hedonic experiences which are experienced in real time. These dimensions
of subjective well-being are distinct. For example, it is possible for a person to expe-
rience positive affects (perhaps because his favorite football team just won the Super
Bowl) and at the same time report low life satisfaction. Similarly, the presence of
positive affects does not necessarily imply the absence of negative affects. A person
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could feel stressed at work and at the same time enjoy the respect of his colleagues. It
is not clear in the literature which aspect of subjective well-being is more important.
Throughout this study, the terms “happiness,” “subjective well-being,” and “life
satisfaction” are used interchangeably although they reflect cognitive assessment of
one’s overall happiness from life. It has to be noted, however, that to derive a more
comprehensive understanding of one’s happiness, each one of these three dimensions
of well-being has to be measured and evaluated separately. In the next section I
review how data on subjective well-being is typically collected.
1.4 Measuring Subjective Well-Being
Data on life-evaluation has been collected by representative surveys for several
decades. In the United States, for example, subjective well-being data is available
since 1972 from the General Social Survey (GSS). Internationally, data is available
from the World Value Survey since the early 1980’s and covers more than 80 coun-
tries that represent 80 percent of the world’s population. Other sources such as the
Latinobarometer, European Value Survey, Eurobarometer, and Gallup have also been
conducting surveys on life satisfaction for some time.
A common way to collect such data has been to rely on questions with qualitative
responses such as feeling “fairly” or “pretty” happy about my life. In the US General
Social Survey, for example, subjective well-being data is measured with the following
question: “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days - would you
say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” Similar questions are
also found in the World Value Survey, the European Value Survey, and the Latino-
barometer. The Latinobarometer, for instance, uses the following modification: “In
general terms, would you say that you are satisfied with life? 1 = Very satisfied; 2 =
Pretty satisfied; 3 = Not very satisfied; 4 = Not satisfied at all.”
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Another approach has been to use a visual scale (ladder-of-life), which explicitly
defines visual reference points with 0 “dissatisfied” and 10 “satisfied.” For example,
the World Value Survey uses the following question to collect subjective well-being
data: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these
1‘days? Please use this card to help with your answer.”
Both approaches measure how people evaluate their life as a whole rather than
their current feelings. Thus, they reflect an evaluative judgment in which life cir-
cumstances and conditions are important for subjective well-being. Both approaches,
however, have been criticized that they are vulnerable to interpersonal and cross
country comparability because even if questions do not change across countries and
over time, reference points and definitions of happiness do (Deaton, 2008).
Hedonic experiences, on the other hand, are measured in real time (or shortly
after an event has occurred) and thus measure emotional states. Because of their
relatively high cost, they are far less common than life-evaluation surveys, although
this does not necessarily imply that they are less preferred or useful. The two most
common measures are the Experience Sampling and the Day Reconstruction Method,
but neither one has been applied to a representative portion of the population (Stiglitz
et al., 2009).
The only survey data that captures both hedonic experiences and life-evaluation
is available from the Gallup World Poll which is a nationally representative survey in
around 140 countries. In this survey, questions about life evaluation are based on the
0-10 ladder scale, and questions on hedonic experiences measure multiple dimensions
of positive and negative experiences from the previous day – feeling happy, sad, tired,
stressed, etc... Based on the Gallup Poll, for instance, the average life satisfaction
in the OECD countries is 6.7. This score, however, varies across member countries –
Hungary, Turkey, Portugal and Greece, for instance, have relatively low satisfaction
scores of 5.5 while countries such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden have scores above
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the 7.5 mark. In addition, 80% of people in the OECD countries report having more
positive experiences than bad ones, with Turkey, Estonia, and Hungary showing the
lowest level of hedonic happiness. (OECD Factbook, 2010).
1.5 How Reliable Is Happiness Data?
Measuring feelings can be very subjective. It is therefore important to check if
individuals provide meaningful answers to survey questions on happiness. An impor-
tant criticism of subjective well-being data is that it is not interpersonally comparable.
Answers to survey questions may depend on many different factors: cultural interpre-
tation of the scale that is used, the order and wording of the questions, the mood of
the respondent when the survey is taken, and many others. This is less of a problem
when subjective well-being data is used to estimate “averages” across a homogeneous
population, and more of a problem when data is compared across countries and over
time as definitions of happiness may change.
Another inherent problem with subjective well-being data is that external events
may influence survey answers. Making general evaluations of life involves cognitive
effort to remember and reflect on past events, which may be influenced by many
different factors such as time of the day, how the survey is carried out, etc. Most
importantly, answers about overall satisfaction from life may reflect current moods.
The main use of happiness data, however, is to identify the determinants of happiness
and not to compare levels between different individuals in the absolute sense. In this
case, it is not necessary to make the assumption that happiness data is cardinally
measurable or that it is interpersonally comparable. (Frey, 2010).
Self-reported data, by its nature, cannot be validated. However, an extensive
literature exits that attempts to validate such data indirectly. Below I provide a short
overview of the main arguments why happiness data is reliable, valid, consistent, and
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can be used in economic analysis.
First, self-reported happiness tends to be consistent with other meaningful mea-
sures of utility. For example, people that report themselves happy smile more often
during social interactions (Fernandez-Dols and Ruiz-Belda, 1995). Happy people are
also more likely to be rated happy by friends and family (Sandvik et al., 1993) and by
their spouses (Costa and McCrae, 1988), and less likely to commit suicide (Helliwell,
2006).
Second, happiness data tends to move in an expected manner with many external
factors such as unemployment and marriage. For example, unemployed people report
lower levels of happiness and so do those who are recently divorced. On the other
hand, work promotion and marriage are associated with higher self-reported happiness
(Kahneman, 1999). Similarly, happiness data tends to move in a predictable way
with many macroeconomic variables such as GDP per capita, the general level of
unemployment, and income inequality (e.g., see Di Tella et al., 2003; Alesina et al.,
2006). Richer countries tend to report higher levels of mean happiness, and countries
with high levels of income inequality tend to have, on average, lower levels of life-
satisfaction.
A third important validation comes from neuropsychological studies that measure
electrical changes in brain activity and heart rate. These changes tend to be signif-
icantly correlated with a variety of hedonic experiences and the subject’s self-report
(Davidson 1992, 2000; Davidson et al., 2000). Finally, a principal axis factor analysis
of self- and non-self-reported subjective well-being measures reveals a single unitary
construct underlying the measures(Sandvik, Diener and Seidlitz, 1993).
Thus, despite its many shortcomings, a growing body of evidence suggests that
it is possible to collect subjective well-being data in a reliable, consistent, valid, and
meaningful way. Although such data has many limitations, it nevertheless reveals
important information about quality of life that is often not found in traditional
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indicators such as income. Subjective well-being studies (Oswald, 1997), for example,
suggests an U-shape relationship between life-satisfaction and age which tends to be
the opposite conclusion if income is all that matters to maximizing utility.
1.6 Methodological Issues
There are several methodological issues, however, that make causal inferences
especially difficult in the context of subjective well-being data. Here I review some of
these major stumbling blocks.
(i) Spurious correlations: A great deal of analysis in the happiness literature
is based on simple bivariate regressions (e.g., see Easterlin 1974, 1995, and 2010).
Happiness, however, depends on a large number of personal characteristics and so-
cioeconomic variables. Answers to survey questions may also depend on many other
internal and external factors such as cultural interpretation of the scale that is used,
the mood of the respondent when the survey is taken, and many others. Data is
rarely available for all of these variables, which limits the researchers’ ability to con-
trol for all of these important factors and may cause omitted variable bias or spurious
correlations.
(ii) Multi-level analysis: Often the relevant hypotheses in the literature are related
to the effect of variables at the both the individual and aggregate level. For example,
to assess the effect of personal unemployment and the general level of unemployment,
we need to control for both micro and macro level variables. Similarly, evaluating the
effect of the general level of inequality involves controlling for personal income and
one’s relative position in society.
(iii) Reverse causation: Perhaps one of the most difficult problems in happiness
studies is to distinguish between causes and correlates. For example, the reason why
divorced people report lower life-satisfaction may be because the experience of be-
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ing divorced lowers their life evaluation as a whole. In this case, divorce causes less
happiness. But it is also possible that people who report lower satisfaction with life
are more likely to get divorced, in which case cognitive evaluations cause divorce. A
third possibility is that people who experience depression are more likely to report
lower life satisfaction and to be divorced. In this case a third variable determines the
relationship between life evaluation and divorce. Thus, it is not clear whether out-
comes such as divorce affect happiness, or happiness affects many of these outcomes.
This is especially true for variables like marriage, friendship, unemployment, and job
satisfaction, but may also affect variables such as income. It seems apparent that
the self-reported level of happiness (or health) will be correlated systematically with
one’s outlook of life. These problems, however, are persistent in most econometric
studies. The happiness literature is rather new and limited research has been done
to determine the direction of causality.
(iv) Adaptation (the “hedonic treadmill”): If people adapt rapidly to their new
environment, then cross-sectional data may overstate the long-run effect of some vari-
ables on happiness. Lottery winners, for example, experience a spike in their baseline
happiness but then quickly adjust to their new wealth (Smith & Razzell 1973; Brick-
man et al. 1978). Similarly, severe physical trauma and permanent physical disability
are associated with a sharp decline of subjective well-being, but then victims gradu-
ally recover their happiness and even return to their pre-trauma levels (Brickman et
al., 1978).
One popular view is that each person has a genetically determined happiness
“set point.” According to this view, short-run changes in happiness are possible,
but in the long-run, adaptation always forces individuals back to their set-point.
An important implication of this view is that public policy can do very little to
improve happiness. This view, however, has been challenged over the past decade.
For example, Diener et al. (2006) show that the happiness of some people can,
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and does, change over time. Similarly, Inglehart et al. (2008) argue that economic
development, democratization, and increases in social tolerance over the past thirty
years have increased the subjective well-being of millions of people around the world.
Thus, “most proponents of this set-point view now seem to be leaning towards the
view that adaptation is less than complete” (Stiglitz et al., p.148).
While adaptation is not an inherent problem with the measurement of happiness,
and may very well reveal a fundamental aspect of human nature, the presence of adap-
tation has two important implications for happiness research. First, life satisfaction
may not be a sufficient measure for evaluating well-being as individuals constantly
adjust their expectations and desires. For example, it is possible to be less satisfied
with a better life if, for instance, you have higher aspirations which remain unful-
filled. Similarly, as the standard of living improves, social standards may adjust so
that happiness levels will stay relatively stable at different levels of socio-economic
development. Second, data on happiness is almost always cross-sectional. Cross-
sectional data do not allow one to take into consideration adaptation effects, which
means that cross-sectional studies will almost always overstate the long-run effect of
the determinants of happiness. As Helliwell and Putnam (2008) suggest, longitudinal
data and quasi-experimental methods will be necessary to resolve these uncertainties.
1.7 What Can Happiness Research Teach Us?
Perhaps the most promising aspect of happiness research is to provide a better un-
derstanding of the determinants of happiness. If the ultimate goal of human existence
is to be happy or satisfied with life, then understanding what objective conditions
(e.g., income, health, or education) make people happier, and to what extent, can
help individuals and society pursue this goal. In this respect, one of the most impor-
tant insights from happiness research so far has been that non-economic factors such
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as the frequency of interaction with others, the quality of personal relationships, civic
engagement, and self-mastery and independence are crucial determinants of human
happiness. Although economists have traditionally acknowledged the importance of
leisure, the implications of these findings are that society may be facing a much larger
trade-off than commonly believed. In fact, research in happiness economics has shown
that people often overestimate the satisfaction from higher income and material con-
sumption and underestimate the satisfaction from non-monetary aspects of their life
such as friendships, hobbies, and work (Frey, 2010). As a result of these systematic
mistakes in decision making people often find themselves less satisfied with their lives
in the long run.
Happiness research has also allowed economists to measure utility directly, al-
though not perfectly, and to test the robustness of the assumptions and predictions
of standard economic models. Neoclassical theory, for example, does not distinguish
between expected utility and experienced utility. Individuals are often caricatured
as lightning fast calculators that always maximize their utility given the available
information. In this framework, errors are made in random ways. Studies in happi-
ness economics, on the other hand, show that individuals do not always know what
their preferences will be in the future, that they are prone to making systematic
mistakes when choosing between alternatives that involve uncertainty and risk, and
ultimately fail to maximize experienced utility. A large number of studies in the last
several decades have discovered that people are prone to variety of cognitive biases
when forecasting future utility (for summaries see Kahneman, 1994; Loewenstein and
Schkade, 1999; and Kahneman and Thaler, 2006).
One of the most pervasive biases in human decision making, for example, is the
impact bias – the tendency to overestimate the hedonic impact of positive and nega-
tive events in the future. This bias is explained by the remarkable ability of humans
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to adjust quickly to their life circumstances, known as hedonic adaptation, which has
been a great advantage during ice ages, plagues, and wars. Many people, for example,
tend to overestimate the happiness that positive life events such as marriage will bring
them in the long run, which can lead to premature decisions, perhaps revealed in the
high rate of divorce around the world. Similarly, individuals tend to overestimate
how much unhappiness negative events such as the loss of a job or divorce may cause
them in the future. Yet, the mere expectation for unhappiness in the future may
exacerbate current life-evaluations and depress one’s mood. Some psychologists have
argued that individuals who understand these cognitive mistakes are better able to
cope with adaptation and achieve a happier life (Lyubomirsky, 2013)
Decisions may also be influenced by current emotional states. When aroused by
hunger, sex, or anger, for example, people often mispredict how they will feel in the
future when they will be in a “cool” state. Similarly, when in a cool state people mis-
predict the hedonic impact of arousal in the future. For example, “hungry shoppers”
are more likely to buy more and less healthy food (Gilbert et al.,1998). Heroin ad-
dicts who had not yet received a dose of a heroin substitute Buprenophrine (BUP) are
more likely to be willing to pay higher prices to receive an extra dose of BUP five days
later (Badger et al., 2004). The idea that forecasts of future hedonic experiences are
anchored in current emotional states is known as “projection bias” (Loewenstein et
al., 2003). Current emotional states may also influence how people remember events,
which may influence their decisions later.
For the early economists – Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill –
the concept of utility was related to experienced utility. John Stuart Mill, for example,
believed that intellectual pleasures outweigh physical ones, and Francis Edgeworth
explicitly defined utility as the temporal integral of the momentary joy derived from
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consumption (Kahneman and Thaler, 2006). Since the beginning of the twentieth
century, however, the use of term utility as a hedonic experience has been lost. The
basic assumptions of contemporary economic models is that utility cannot be mea-
sured, and, even more importantly, that it need not be measured because it is revealed
in people’s choices. Thus, utility is used in a rather abstract way to reflects the con-
sistency of people’s choices. Research in happiness economics, however, has renewed
interest in the nature of experienced utility. It is now understood that happiness
is multi-dimensional. On the one hand, happiness involves cognitive evaluations of
one’s life, but on the other hand, it also has an emotional component – positive and
negative feelings, also known as affects, that are related to a variety of different emo-
tions encapsulating pleasure and pain. These two dimensions of happiness are not
necessarily related to each other. People may choose to maximize their short run
hedonic experiences at the expense of their long-term life-satisfaction. It is not clear,
however, which aspect of happiness is more important.
In addition, psychologists have pointed out that humans derive pleasure not only
from outcomes (higher income), but also from processes (work). This may help ex-
plain the otherwise paradoxical observation that although work is often considered
by economists as a burden, unemployed people, even after accounting for their loss of
income, are still more likely to experience lower levels of satisfaction with life. Such
observations suggest that the standard approach to incentivize (and understand) work
performance may be mistaken. Institutions, for example, that allow people to expe-
rience greater autonomy at work may increase both productivity and life-satisfaction
(Pink, 2011). Indeed, people’s behavior may sometimes be motivated by variety of
reasons. Previous studies, for example, have emphasized the importance of emotions
(Elster,1998), mastery and meaning (Lowenstein, 1999), intrinsic motivation (Olster-
loh and Frey, 2000), altruism, cooperation, and reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt, 2003),
duties (Leven, 1996), and status (Frank, 1999). Some studies have even suggested
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that human behavior is sometimes rather impulsive (Lewin, 1996).
1.8 Alternative Approaches
There are other approaches that can be used to measure well-being. One alterna-
tive approach to measuring quality of life, identified by the Sarkozy report, is based
on the notion of capabilities. This approach views people’s life as:
[A] combination of various “doings and beings” (functionings), and of the
freedom to choose among these functionings (capabilities). Some of these ca-
pabilities may be quite elementary, such as being adequately nourished and
escaping premature mortality, while others may be more complex, such as hav-
ing the literacy required to participate actively in political life. The foundations
of the capability approach, which has strong roots in philosophical notions of
social justice, reflect a focus on human ends and on respecting the individual’s
ability to pursue and realize the goals that he or she values; a rejection of the
economic model of individuals acting to maximize their self-interest heedless
of relationships and emotions; an emphasis on the complementarities between
various capabilities; and a recognition of human diversity, which draws atten-
tion to the role played by ethical principles in the design of the “good” society
(Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2009, p.42).
A third approach is developed within the economics tradition, and is based on the
notions of fair allocations. This approach is common in welfare economics and re-
quires weighing the non-monetary dimensions of quality of life (beyond the goods and
services traded on the market) in a way that respects people’s preferences.
The capabilities and fair allocations approach favors measurement of people’s ob-
jective conditions and the opportunities available to them. Although these objective
features can be instrumental to one’s happiness, both of these conceptual approaches
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consider the expansion of people’s functionings and freedoms as intrinsically valuable.
And while the list of objective features depends on value judgments, there seems to
be a universal agreement across individuals, cultures, and times about the most im-
portant aspects that determine quality of life. The Sarkozy Commission identifies
eight dimensions important to quality of life: health, education, economic well-being,
work, political voice, personal relationships, environment, and security (Stiglitz et al.,
2008, p.45-58). Finally, the Commission recommends that each dimension of quality
of life should be evaluated on the basis of inequality across people, socio-economic
groups, and generations.
1.9 Conclusion
Although happiness measures are still in their infancy, and certainly not ideal,
they are nevertheless an important complement to traditional measures of quality
of life such as income. Happiness data can be collected in a reliable and consistent
way and provides meaningful information about human behavior. At the least, the
subjective well-being approach presents an opportunity to inform policy debates from
a unique point of view that is often not found in standard measures of socio-economic
progress.
The empirical analyses that follow in Chapters 2 and 3 rely heavily on the use of
subjective well-being data. The results from this study, of course, should be taken
with a grain of salt due to the shortcomings of happiness data. These estimates
should be viewed as a first order approximation. They do provide an idea about the
order of magnitude of the relationships that are studied, which is better than the
plain assumptions that economic theories often make.
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Chapter 2
Income Inequality and Economic
Growth – Are Americans Better
Off?
2.1 Introduction
Recent studies in the field of happiness economics suggest that creating a more
egalitarian society and increasing the absolute level of personal income can promote
a happier society. Yet, as Okun (1975) pointed out, fairly dividing the pie and raising
the living standards are to a great extent mutually exclusive. While the US economy
has grown, on average, 2.8 percent per year since the 1970s, income inequality has
rapidly increased too. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 in the Appendix to Chapter 2 show the
evolution of top income shares in the US from 1920 to 2010.1 The share of national
income concentrated in the top 1 percent of the US population, for example, has
1Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez (2003) provide one of the most comprehensive studies on
the topic in which they document the pattern of income inequality in the US from 1913 to 2002
(while the actual paper covers the period from 1913-1998, updated series can be found on the website
of Emmanuel Saez, Table A.3).
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increased from less than 8 percent in the late 1970s to almost 19 percent in 2008.
This level of income inequality is the highest level since the creation of the federal
income tax in 19132. Parallel with this trend, resentment over economic inequality
has also grown more vocal, culminating in the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011.3
Are Americans better off today, then, as a result of the growth in national income,
even if this growth has come at the expense of its more equal distribution? Or is
the growing gap between the rich and the poor one of the reasons that explain the
stagnating happiness levels of Americans, which, as Stevenson and Wolfers (2008)
point out, remains a “puzzling outlier”?
To answer these questions, I use subjective well-being data from the General
Social Survey (GSS) to estimate the parameter of inequality aversion, ε, within a
neo-utilitarian framework of social welfare analysis (Atkinson, 1970). This allows me
to calculate the Atkinson index of inequality with precision and compare how social
welfare has evolved over time while accounting for inequality aversion that is inherent
in the concavity of the utility function. The results suggest that economic growth has
been sufficient to raise average happiness in the US since the 1970s despite the rising
level of income inequality.
I find, however, that the increase in the general level of income inequality has
an adverse effect on happiness that goes beyond the direct loss associated with the
concavity of the utility function. I hypothesize that this external negative cost is
related to increase in positional consumption, deterioration of physical and mental
health, corrosion of social capital, and decay of political and democratic structures
that may lead to loss of personal liberty. Once I account for this external cost, I find
that the majority of Americans have been made worse off from the increasing level
2With the exception of 1928 when the share of income concentrated in the top 1 percent of the
population reached 28 percent
3Figure 2.3 shows that the number of books written on the topic of income inequality has more
than tripled since the 1970s.
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of income inequality since the 1970’s. This is true, however, only if one assumes that
income inequality has been generated solely from economic growth. But, even after
I account for a possible trade-off between equality and efficiency, I find that only the
top two income quintiles have benefited from economic growth while everybody else
has been made worse off.
The results should be interpreted with caution due to several philosophical and
empirical shortcomings of happiness research.4 Nevertheless, this study advances the
growing literature on happiness economics in a number of ways. First, and foremost,
it links the existing literature to a tradition in economics that discusses the trade-off
between equality and efficiency. Thus, it suggests an additional trade-off that policy
makers and researchers should consider.
Second, the parameter of inequality aversion, ε, is found to be close to 0.5, which
indicates that the majority of happiness studies are overestimating the concavity of
the utility function by using a log-linear form. Although this parameter is broadly
consistent across groups, there still exist some meaningful differences. For example,
Republicans tend to be much less inequality averse than the average person. People
with a graduate degree, on the other hand, are found to be extremely inequality averse.
Most importantly, ε has steadily increased over time, which may be a reflection of
the growing discontent with economic inequality in the past couple of decades.
Third, the results in this Chapter are consistent with most previous studies that
examine the relationship between economic inequality and subjective well-being (Gra-
ham and Felton, 2006; Smith and Qian, 2008, and Oishi et al., 2011). They come,
however, in stark contrast to the findings of Alesina et al. (2004) who show that,
unlike Europeans, most Americans are insensitive to economic inequality. One pos-
sible explanation is the updated dataset that covers the past couple decades when
resentment over inequality has been especially pronounced.
4For a thorough discussion on the shortcomings of happiness research see Booth, 2012.
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Fourth, this study provides support for the observation made by Oishi et al. (2011)
that economic inequality affects subjective well-being through the channels of social
trust and the perception of fairness. However, I show that the cost of inequality
extends beyond the corrosion of social cohesion. Even after controlling for social
capital, relative income, and inequality aversion, income inequality has a negative
effect on subjective well-being.
Fifth, the model investigates the interaction between the variables of inequality
and personal income and finds evidence that as income goes up, the negative external
cost of inequality diminishes. Beyond a personal income of $362,616, income inequal-
ity does not seem to have any adverse effects on well-being. This suggests that a
vast majority of the US population has been affected negatively by the rising level of
income inequality over the past several decades.
Finally, this study suggests a method of more precisely quantifying the relationship
between income inequality and happiness in a more meaningful way by estimating the
marginal rate of substitution between market inequality and personal income while
accounting for the concavity of the utility function.5
2.2 Theoretical Considerations
2.2.1 Economic Growth and Happiness
2.2.1.1 The Income-Happiness Paradox
The question whether economic growth leads to greater happiness has been widely
debated in the economic literature. One popular view, expressed by Easterlin (1974,
5Usually the typical study reports the beta coefficients from an ordered probit (or logit) model
which are interpreted as the change in the probability of “the event” (e.g. reporting oneself in the
highest happiness category “very happy”) for every 1-unit increase in X (e.g. additional year of
schooling), where the probability is determined by a z-score for a cumulative normal distribution
(e.g., Pr(z < 1.645) = .55). While such results are informative about the general relationship, they
provide little advice to policy makers who may want to compare different policy alternatives using
more straightforward measures.
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1995, 2010), is that economic growth does not improve the subjective well-being
of individuals. This view is based on the empirical observation that although real
incomes have substantially increased over the past fifty years, there have been no cor-
responding gains in reported levels of happiness. In his earlier work, Easterlin (1974,
1995) showed that this relationship holds for a list of developed nations including
the United States, Japan, and nine developed countries in Europe. His most recent
work (Easterlin, 2010), however, points out that is also true for a large number of
less developed countries in Asia, Latin America, and some transitional economies in
Europe. Short-run gains in happiness are possible, but over the longer run, usually
more than 10 years, both rich and poor are stuck on a “hedonic treadmill.” In the
United States, happiness levels have stagnated since the 1970s despite of the fact that
real income per capita has almost doubled (Figure 2.5).
One argument explaining this observation is that beyond some “subsistence” level
of income, money does not buy happiness. Frey and Stutzer (2000) find this “sub-
sistence” level to be as low as $10,000 while Kahneman and Deaton (2010) find it
to be close to $75,000.6 Beyond $75,000, Kahneman and Deaton argue, “higher
income is neither the road to experienced happiness nor the road to the relief of
unhappiness or stress, although higher income continues to improve individuals life
evaluations”(Kahneman and Deaton, 2010).
Yet, a large body of economic literature shows that income is one of the strongest
determinants of happiness within and across countries. For example, panel studies
that control for country specific fixed-effects find that the level of self-reported hap-
piness moves predictably with macroeconomic variables such as GDP per capita (see
Di Tella et al., 2003). In addition, panel studies that control for unobserved individ-
6It is important to note that Kahneman and Deaton acknowledge that happiness is multi-
dimensional and differentiate between emotional well-being, or hedonic experiences, and life-
satisfaction, or life evaluation. Although money is not a good predictor of emotional happiness
beyond $75,000 of annual household income, it is significantly and positively correlated with higher
life satisfaction even beyond this level of earnings.
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ual fixed-effects (such as different personality traits) find that the income variable is
positively correlated with life-satisfaction. Figure 2.7 in the Appendix shows that the
average self-reported happiness in the United States increases with income. Similarly,
Figure 2.8 indicates that the same relationship is true across countries. All of these
findings, which seem inconsistent with the observations made by Easterlin, suggest
that income plays an important role in determining individual happiness. Hence, a
great deal of the happiness literature in the past couple of decades has been dedicated
to solving this income-happiness paradox.
2.2.1.2 Income Comparisons and Adaptation
An answer to the income-happiness paradox that is also consistent with the find-
ings of the above literature comes from Clark et al. (2011). The authors reconcile both
views using the notion of income comparisons. For example, consider the following
utility function, which is an adaptation of Clark’s model:
U = U(u1(y), u2(y/y
∗), u3(Z)) (2.1)
where total utility, U , is determined by the combinations of the sub-utilities u1, u2,
and u3. In this function, y is individual income, and u1(y) is the classic textbook
utility function, which is increasing, but at a decreasing rate. Thus, depending on
the concavity of u1(y), additional income brings gradually less additional happiness.
It is often assumed in the happiness literature that the relationship between U and
y is log-linear. This implies, for example, that a person with $10,000 of income will
experience five times more utility from an additional dollar of earnings than someone
with an income of $50,000. The second subutility function u2(y/y
∗) reflects the idea of
income comparisons. In this function y∗ is often called the “reference group,” and the
ratio y/y∗ is known as “relative income.” The reference can be internal, e.g., to one’s
own past or expected income (adaptation), or external, e.g., to the income of some
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specific demographic group (social comparison). In the latter case, u2(y/y
∗) is called
the “status return” from income (or the consumption of some positional good). The
early economists Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, and Thorstein Veblen all
emphasized the social nature of consumption. Finally, the sub-utility function u3(Z)
picks up the effect of leisure and other socioeconomic and demographic variables.
The empirical implementation of this function is:
Ui = β1lnyi + β2(yi/y
∗
i ) + Z
′
iγ + εit (2.2)
where yi is some measure of real income, y
∗
i is a reference group (usually median
country income), and Z
′
i is a vector of demographic variables.
An important characteristic of u2(y/y
∗) is that it is homogeneous of degree zero,
i.e. u2(ay/ay
∗)=u2(y/y∗), which implies that status is unaffected by proportional
increases in y and y∗. The main implication of this model is that the gradient between
income and happiness will be steeper in a country at a point in time than over time.
This is because status does not have an effect on the aggregate level of happiness
in a country – it is a zero sum game, i.e. what individuals with above average
income growth gain in status happiness is lost by those with below average income
growth. At a point in time, then, those individuals within a country that have higher
incomes enjoy higher status and are happier, but over time, as everyone becomes
richer, and the amount of status is fixed, the only benefit to the country is from
higher consumption, which approaches zero as countries become richer.
2.2.1.3 The Importance of Absolute Income
Diener et al. (2006), however, show that the happiness of some people can and
does change over time. Sacks et al. (2010) find that within a given country richer
individuals report higher levels of life-satisfaction, across countries richer ones have
higher levels of life satisfaction, and as countries become richer the aggregate level of
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happiness tends to go up. Their estimations reveal that the gradient of the relation-
ship between income and happiness is roughly the same across all three comparisons,
which indicates that absolute income plays a large role in determining subjective
well-being and that social comparisons alone cannot explain the Easterlin paradox.
Inglehart et al. (2008) show that economic development, democratization, and
increase in social tolerance over the past thirty years have increased the subjective
well-being of millions of people around the world. It is true that as society becomes
richer, economic gains have decreasing importance to human happiness. Economic
growth, however, is important even beyond some basic level of development because
it allows people to maximize their free choice in other realms of life:
Under conditions of scarcity, people focus on survival needs, giving top priority
to economic and physical security. Economic development increases people’s
sense of existential security, leading them to shift their emphasis from survival
values toward self-expression values and free choice which is a more direct way
to maximize happiness and life satisfaction. This model proposes that human
development shifts emphasis from the pursuit of happiness through economic
means toward a broader pursuit of happiness by maximizing free choice in all
realms of life (Inglehart et al, 2008, p.266).
Figure 2.9 provides evidence for Inglehart’s model of human development. Be-
yond some level of economic development more money may not buy more happiness
directly. However, the belief that one has free choice and control over one’s life is
strongly correlated with happiness (Johnson & Krueger, 2006). In a recent study,
for example, Paolo Verme (2009) shows that a variable that measures freedom of
choice and the locus of control is found to predict life satisfaction better than any
other known factor such as health, employment, income, marriage or religion across
countries and within countries. This effect is as strong for developing countries as it
is for developed ones. If absolute income plays an important role in determining life
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satisfaction, yet no corresponding gains in happiness have been experienced in the
United States, then the observation that average happiness in the United States have
stayed flat remains a puzzle.
An implicit assumption of the model in (1) is that economic growth affects only
consumption levels and has no effect on the distribution of income. Yet, if economic
growth causes inequalities in income, then as inequality in a country increases, the
aggregate level of happiness can decrease. This follows directly from the concavity
of utility function. For example, consider Figure 2.10 where W is the social welfare
function (or one can think of it as the aggregate level of happiness), which is deter-
mined by the sum of individual utility functions, so that W =
1
n
∑
ui(yi). If the
marginal utility of income is declining with one’s earnings, i.e., richer people gain
less utility from an additional dollar of income than poorer people, then the social
welfare function (W) will be concave. In this case, it is possible for mean national
income to increase and average happiness to decline if most of the income gains go to
the people at the top of the income distribution and those at the bottom are made
worse off. Figure 2.10 presents one such possible scenario in which the gains from
additional income at the top of the income distribution will be more than offset by
the loses of income (and happiness) at the bottom of the income distribution. Thus,
the aggregate level of happiness will depend on the relationship between economic
growth and income inequality. Most income gains in the United States have been
to the top income quintile with real incomes declining for the bottom 40 percent of
income earners, and stagnating for those in the middle of the income distribution
(Figure 2.11 in the Appendix at the end of chapter 2).
2.2.1.4 Inequality Aversion
Since Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776), the idea that self-interest is the
primary drive of human action has become the cornerstone of economic theory. But
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in the Theory of Moral Sentiments(1759), Smith also points out that there are a
multitude of psychological motives, such as compassion for others and a sense of
propriety, that are also inherent in human nature:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles
in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their
happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the
pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion we feel
for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in
a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrows of others,
is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this
sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means
confined to the virtuous or the humane, though they perhaps may feel it with
the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator
of the laws of society, is not altogether without it (Smith, 1759, p.1).
A vast amount of experimental and empirical literature since Smith provides evi-
dence that people are not only driven by selfish motives, but are often concerned for
the well-being of others. Formal theories have been developed that take into consider-
ation these preferences. Within this literature, one of the most popular is the theory
of inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). One
conclusion from this literature is that individuals are often willing to sacrifice some
of their income to obtain a more equitable distribution. Another implication is that
additional income may bring less utility if it comes at the cost of higher inequality.
Thus, inherent in the concavity of the utility function is the direct effect of inequality
aversion. A possible explanation comes from Aknin et al.(2011). In making judgments
about the ideal income distribution, people draw not only on their moral instincts
about right and wrong, but also on their intuition about the relationship between
income and happiness. Most people realize that increases in income at the top of the
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income ladder are not going to provide as much happiness as equal increases at the
bottom.
Perhaps not surprisingly, as income inequality in the US has increased over the
past 40 years, resentment over economic inequality has become more vocal. The recent
Occupy Wall Street movement has seen millions of Americans protest on the street
with the campaign slogan “We are the 99%,” which expresses the popular discontent
with the current level of inequality in the US. These observations are consistent with
survey data that examines attitudes toward economic inequality. A recent study by
Norton and Ariely (2011), for example, finds that most Americans, regardless of their
political affiliation and wealth status, prefer to live in a country with a far more
equitable distribution of wealth than the one that characterizes the current state of
affairs.
2.2.2 The Price of Inequality
A large literature in economics, psychology, sociology, and epidemiology has emerged
over the past 30 years showing that income inequality causes large social welfare loses
that go beyond the direct loss from inequality aversion inherent in the concavity of
the utility function. This is to say that income inequality can reduce social welfare
through variety of indirect channels. These channels are related to increase of posi-
tional consumption, deterioration of mental and physical health, corrosion of social
capital, and the erosion of political and democratic institutions. Below I describe
some of the main arguments advanced in this literature.
2.2.2.1 Positional Arm Races
Although standard economic models often ignore concerns about social status,
most economists agree that such considerations are an important aspect of economic
decision making. Many of the early economists, including Adam Smith, John Stuart
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Mill, Karl Marx, and Thorstein Veblen, pointed out that a great deal of consump-
tion is motivated by concerns for displaying social status. Adam Smith (1759), for
example, noted:
To what purpose is all the toil and bustle of the world? What is the end of
avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and preeminence? Is
it to supply the necessities of nature? The wages of the meanest labourer can
supply them. ... From when, then, arises that emulation which runs through
all the different ranks of men, and what are the advantages which we propose
by that great purpose of human life which we call bettering our condition? To
be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, compla-
cency and approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive
from it. It is the vanity, not the ease or the pleasure that interests us. But
vanity is always founded upon the belief of our being an object of attention and
approbation (Smith, 1759, p.108).
In his book, The Theory of the Leisure Class, Thorstein Veblen (1899) further
argued that people pursue social status often with no regard to their own long-term
happiness. Most people try to emulate the consumption and lifestyle of the rich to
achieve a higher social status within their own group. This behavior, however, can
lead to wasteful consumerism or to conspicuous consumption7 and leisure that do not
contribute to the material productivity required for the healthy functioning of society.
Using Veblen’s ideas, for example, Robert Frank (1999, 2003, 2011) argues that
income inequality can lead to an expenditure arms race focused on positional goods.
As society grows richer, everyone spends furiously to keep up with the Joneses. The
result, resources diverted from non-positional to positional goods cause large welfare
losses – financially and socially. As cars and houses grow bigger and more expensive,
7Conspicuous consumption refers to the idea that money and resources are spent on goods that
are used only to display higher social status. Since the primary purpose of these goods is to display
one’s success in society, they must be of publicly observable
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consumers spend more time at work and less time enjoying family and friends. They
save less and borrow more. On a personal level, such behavior is rational. If everybody
pursues such behavior, however, society as a whole is made worse off.
Veblen further argued that there is an appropriate level of conspicuous consump-
tion associated with one’s rank in society, and this social reference point increases
with one’s rank and as society grows richer. One implication of this observation is
that even if the absolute level of income increases, there will be no corresponding gains
in social welfare unless everyone benefits equally from economic growth. Higher mean
income will increase the social standard (or reference point) and may cause various
feelings of resentment and envy if there are no corresponding gains in income. Thus,
Pareto improvements in income which involve small gains for the poor and large gains
for the rich may decrease social welfare. Income inequality feeds and exacerbates this
vicious cycle of positional consumption.
Finally, economic inequality may lead to inequality of opportunity as people below
some social reference point experience positional discrimination in many different
aspects of their life such as education, socializing with friends, and obtaining some
forms of employment (Harold et al., 1992; Thurow,1980).
2.2.2.2 Deterioration of Mental and Physical Health
It is also often argued that economic inequality causes deterioration of mental and
physical health. Low social status and lack of autonomy over one’s life and workplace
decisions lead to stress and low self-esteem which are associated with higher levels
of stress hormones such as cortisol. These hormones are linked with depression and
hypertension. For example, the famous Whitehall studies (I and II) found that people
with low social status are more likely to experience a number of risk factors such
as obesity, smoking, reduced leisure time, lower levels of physical activity, higher
prevalence of underlying illness, higher blood pressure, and shorter height. But even
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after controlling for these risk factors, people with low social status are still more likely
to have a cardiovascular disease. In a follow-up study, twenty years later, Marmot et
al. (1991) discovered that social status may be related to a wide range of diseases in
addition to heart disease: some cancers, chronic lung disease, gastrointestinal disease,
depression, suicide, job sickness absence, back pain and general feelings of ill-health.
A recent study by Pickett and Wilkinson (2010) is a good representation of this
literature. The authors argue that higher GDP does not translate to better quality
of mental and physical life. Instead, the root cause of social ills is found in large
income inequalities. The gap between the rich and poor, the authors argue, is the
strongest predictor of the functioning and health of a nation. They show that high
income inequality correlates with spikes in homicide, obesity, drug use, mental illness,
anxiety, teenage pregnancies, high school dropouts, and even incidents of playground
bullying.
Greater inequality, Pickett and Wilkinson (2010) argue, heightens people’s so-
cial evaluation anxieties by increasing the importance of social status. Social status
carries the strongest message of superiority or inferiority. It is one of the most pow-
erful sources of stress together with lack of friends and stress in early life that is
seriously detrimental to health and longevity. Developed countries have experienced
substantial rises in anxiety and depression which may be linked to a growing level of
inequality. The American psychologist Jean Twenge (2000), for example, observed
that anxiety levels in the US have substantially increased since the 1970s. This has
been accompanied by increases in the frequency of behavioral problems including
crime, alcohol, and drug abuse among younger adults.
2.2.2.3 Corrosion of Social Capital
Income inequality may also cause corrosion of social capital. A recent study by
Oishi et al., (2011), for example, suggests that income inequality affects happiness in-
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directly through lowering interpersonal trust and established social norms of fairness.
As the gap between the rich and the poor grows, people perceive the world as being
less fair. In addition, inequalities in income cause community members to separate
which decreases social trust. Both a lower level of interpersonal trust and a perception
of a less fair society affect subjective well-being negatively. Figure 2.12 shows that
happiness, trust, and perceptions of fairness, have followed similar patterns since the
1970s.
In addition, Helliwell and Putnam (2004) find that social capital, measured by the
strength of family, neighborhood, religious, and community ties are all independently
and robustly correlated to life satisfaction – both directly and through their impact on
health. Norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness are a nearly universal concomitant
of dense social networks so that that the belief that others around you can be trusted
is one of the strongest predictors of social capital at the aggregate level. High levels
of social trust in the context of dense social networks provides the crucial mechanism
through which social capital affects aggregate outcomes.
2.2.2.4 Political Inequality and Democracy
Over a century ago, Karl Marx (1867) argued that capitalism leads to concen-
tration of economic power and class struggle that will eventually lead to its demise.
Although Marx’s prediction did not come to fruition, his ideas have provided useful
insights into the functioning of the capitalistic system. One implication of Marx’s
theory is that as economic inequality increases, the political and economic system be-
comes highly insensitive to the welfare of the poor and highly sensitive to the welfare
of the rich which eventually leads to social conflict.
Similar arguments have been advanced by Stiglitz (2010) who contends that much
of the economic inequality in the US was not created by abstract market forces, but
was generated by the political process. His argument is rooted in a long tradition of
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the public choice literature on rent-seeking first developed by Gordon Tullock (1967).
As economic power becomes more concentrated, the incentive to extract rents from
the political system increase. Thus, it becomes more profitable for large corporations
to invest their resources in lobbying and lawsuits that create a favorable business
environment than on pursuing productive market activities that ultimately increase
the wealth of society. In the The Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson (1982)
traces the historic consequences of rent-seeking and finds that as countries become
increasingly dominated by interest groups they lose their economic vitality and fall
into decline.
According to Stiglitz, rent-seeking has been the primary cause of income inequality
in the United States. High levels of rent-seeking not only generate more inequality,
but are also costly to economic growth. Likewise, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
admit that although economic inequality is not a problem in itself, it can lead to
political inequality, which in the long run may reduce public investment in physical
and human capital and hurt economic growth and development.
Finally, Bartels (2010) demonstrates that elected officials are highly responsive to
the views of the aﬄuent, but ignore the views of the poor. He shows that much of the
economic inequality in the US has been the result of carefully chosen political agendas.
High levels of economic inequality, then, may have corrosive effects on political and
democratic institutions and lead to even greater inequalities and the loss of personal
and economic liberty.
One can think of these adverse effects as a negative externality associated with
the general level of income inequality that can shift down the social welfare function
(W) from Figure 2.10. Figure 2.13 illustrates this idea. In this case, even though real
incomes increase for majority of the population, the negative external costs associated
with the growing level of inequality shifts the social welfare function down and no
overall gains in happiness are achieved.
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Recent studies have also confirmed that people who live in less equal societies
tend to report lower levels of subjective well-being. This is true for developed nations
(Alesina et al., 2004; and Oishi et al., 2011 for the US and Europe), and for develop-
ing ones (see Smyth and Qian, 2008 for China; Graham and Felton, 2006 for Latin
America).
2.2.3 The Trade-off Between Equality and Efficiency
If raising the absolute level of income or creating a more equal society improves the
subjective well-being of individuals, then the relationship between economic growth
and happiness will be determined by the relationship between economic growth and
income inequality. As Scully (2002, p.1) notes: ”The single most important political
question of modern times is how to fabricate government policy so that the standard
of living advances and all income classes benefit.”
Yet, as Arthur Okun (1975) observed a long time ago, efficiency is often bought at
the price of greater inequality. This trade-off is a product of an inescapable conflict be-
tween the political principles of democracy and the economic principles of capitalism.
On the one hand, Okun argued, democracy proclaims all citizens equal and provides
universally distributed rights and privileges. On the other hand, capitalism relies
on market-determined outcomes to promote efficiency. Economic inequality serves
an important efficiency role because it provides incentives to channel productive en-
ergies into experimentation and innovation. Higher rewards generate productivity
that makes society richer, but the newly created wealth is inevitably distributed un-
evenly across the different income classes as some do better than others. Moreover,
some of the winners of the economic race use their newly acquired wealth to obtain
a head start in the economic race which creates even greater inequalities and makes
opportunities more unequal.
Policies designed to reduce the scope of inequality, however, distort market in-
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centives and cause inefficiencies. As Okun noted, transfers are made with a “leaky
bucket.” Thus, society is facing an uneasy trade-off – more equality at the expense of
efficiency or higher efficiency at the expense of equality.8
Since Okun’s seminal work, a very large literature has emerged that explores the
relationship between economic growth and inequality.9 Indeed, the question of how
to generate economic growth and at the same time reduce poverty has been the center
of attention for development economics. The theoretical and empirical predictions,
however, have been mixed. Barro(2000), for example, summarizes the theoretical
literature into four major arguments that favor either a positive or negative rela-
tionship:(1) credit-market imperfections, (2) political economy, (3) social unrest, and
(4) savings rate. At the empirical level, the relationship between economic growth
and inequality is also unclear. Although earlier studies suggested a negative corre-
lation between growth and income inequality (Benabou, 1996; Alesina and Rodrik,
1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Perotti, 1996), these results have been rather sen-
sitive to robustness checks and suffered serious problems with measurement error.
On the other hand, Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) find a positive short-run
relationship between income inequality and growth. Additionally, Barro (2000) found
that the relationship between income inequality and economic growth depends on the
level of economic development. In poorer countries income inequality impairs eco-
nomic growth, but in richer countries a higher level of income inequality is associated
with faster growth rates.
Although the view that economic growth comes at the expense of income inequal-
ity is widely debated, the data from the US shows that growth in national income
since the 1970s has been accompanied by a steady increase in market inequality.
8As Duflo (2011) argues, the trade-off can come from a possible influence of growth on the
distribution of wealth or from a possible influence of the distribution of wealth on growth. A third
possibility is that some policies that favor growth can have an increase in inequality as a direct by-
product and that policies that favor equity could have a decrease in growth as a direct by-product.
9For a review of the literature see Banerjee (2010).
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Figures 2.14 and 2.15 in the Appendix to Chapter 2 show the strong and positive
correlation between the log of real GDP per capita and income inequality, measured
by the Gini coefficient, from 1970-2010.
The sharp rise in earnings inequality and the virtual stagnation of the average real
wage in the United States since the early 1970’s have been explained by a large number
of arguments including neo-liberal tax policies, globalization and outsourcing of labor,
corporate governance and regulation (or lack thereof), decline in unionization (Harvey,
2007; Stiglitz, 2010; Wolff, 2012), skill-based technological change, and education
(Johnson, 1997; Goldin and Katz, 2010), and rent-seeking activity (Stiglitz, 2010;
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; and Bartels, 2010). Overall, the evidence supports
Okun’s (1975) observation that some inequality is inherent in the free market system
while the rest of it is generated by the political system. If the rising level of income
inequality in the US is largely a socio-political phenomenon, generated by policies such
as lower marginal tax rates that favor the rich, then policy changes can reduce some,
although not all, of the inequality. Understanding the effect of economic inequality
on subjective well-being is critical for determining the optimal policy.
2.3 Data
Data on personal characteristics and subjective well-being were collected from
the nationally representative General Social Survey (GSS) conducted by the National
Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. Macroeconomic variables were
collected from variety of sources. Table 2.1 in the Appendix provides description and
sources for all variables, and Table 2.2 and 2.3 show summary statistics.
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2.3.1 Subjective Well-Being
The dependent variable in this study is the self-reported level of happiness, which
was collected using the following question: “Taken all together, how would you say
things are these days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or
not too happy?”10 The data was then recoded so that the answers correspond to
the following numerical values: (1) ‘not too happy’, (2) ‘pretty happy’, and (3) ‘very
happy’. For justification of using subjective well-being data see Frey & Stutzer (2002),
Kahneman & Kruger (2006), and Di Tella & McCulloch (2003). These studies argue
that subjective well-being data passes different validation tests and moves predictably
with other external variables (such as income, marriage, and unemployment or growth
in GDP) and is thus valid, reliable, and comparable.
2.3.2 Income Inequality
Data on income inequality came from the historical income tables of the U.S.
Census Bureau. Specifically, data on the gross Gini ratios can be found in Table
IE-2: Measures of Individual Earning Inequality, and data on mean quintile income
in Table F3: Mean Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Households.
Data on net gini ratios were obtained from the Standardized World Income Inequality
Database (Solt, 2009). Data on top income shares came from Picketty and Saez
(2003). The period between 1974 and 2010 is characterized with an exceptional
increase in income inequality which provides a lot of variation in the data and makes
this study even more attractive from a statistical standpoint.
10A small fraction of responses “Don’t know” and “No answer” are ignored by the analysis.
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2.3.3 Personal Income
The independent variable on income from the GSS, conrinc, is constructed from
categorical data, and represents inflation adjusted personal income before taxes (in
constant 2005 dollars).11 This variable has been widely used in the social sciences
and previous research has successfully applied it in estimating the return from college
education with results that do not deviate significantly from what hundreds of other
studies on this topic uncover (see Card, 1999).
2.3.4 Background Variables
The GSS dataset also provides a number of background variables at the individual
level. The ones that are used as controls in this study are well known in the happi-
ness literature to affect the individual level of subjective well-being, and include age,
gender, race, educational level, marital status, and personal unemployment.
2.3.5 Other Variables
Other macroeconomic variables used in this study include the general level of
unemployment, government size, gross capital formation, percent of population with
college degrees, female labor force, the KOF index of globalization, and immigration
and were obtained from a variety of sources.
2.4 Model and Empirical Strategy
The empirical analysis consists of three parts. First, I estimate the parameter on
inequality aversion, ε, using SWB data from the GSS. Next, I calculate the Atkin-
son index of inequality. The main analysis follows where I estimate the effect of the
11For details refer to GSS Methodological Report No. 101 (Holt, 2004)
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general level of inequality on SWB by accounting for the diminishing marginal util-
ity of income (direct inequality aversion). Finally, I use the results to calculate the
marginal rate of substitution between personal income and inequality and to deter-
mine if economic growth has been sufficient to offset the negative effect associated
with the general increase of income inequality in the US since the 1970s.
2.4.1 Theoretical Model
My goal is to evaluate the equity efficiency trade-off in the US from the early 1970s
to 2010. Measures such as the mean level of income ignore the problem of economic
inequality and measures such as the Gini coefficient do not consider the importance
of personal income.12 This makes it difficult to evaluate different states of socio-
economic development which may embody a trade-off between economic growth and
equality.
In the first part of this section, I turn to a neo-utilitarian social welfare analysis
which was developed by Atkinson (1970). In particular, I am interested in estimating
the Atkinson Index of inequality which takes into consideration the trade-off between
income and inequality. The index is related to a class of additive welfare functions:
W =
1
n
∑
ui(yi) (2.3)
where social welfare, W , is aggregate utility, a function of personal income, yi.
13 To
incorporate the idea that additional income may bring greater marginal utility to
12For example, two societies may have the same level of general inequality and thus the same
Gini coefficient, but one of them could be far richer and its citizens enjoying greater consumption
and welfare.
13Deaton (1997, p.135) provides a useful definition of the social welfare function: ”[The social
welfare function] should be seen as a statistical ‘aggregator’ that turns distribution into a single
number that provides overall judgment on that distribution and that forces us to think coherently
about welfare and its distribution. Whatever our view of the policy making process, it is always
useful to think about policy in terms of its effects on efficiency and equity, and the social welfare
function should be thought of as a tool for organizing our thoughts in a coherent way.”
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poorer people, I use an iso-elastic utility function, which assigns weights to different
levels of income:
ui =

y1−εi − 1
1− ε if ε 6= 1
logyi if ε = 1
(2.4)
where ε is the parameter of inequality aversion, or the negative elasticity of marginal
income (Layard, 2008). Conceptually this function is equivalent to a constant relative
risk aversion function (CRRA). When ε = 0 (zero inequality aversion), then the social
welfare function collapses to:
W =
1
n
∑
ui(yi)→ Utilitarian. (2.5)
In this case society does not care about inequality at all, and social welfare is deter-
mined only by the level of average income. There is no trade-off between the size of
the cake and how it is sliced. Both rich and poor receive the same utility from an
additional dollar. This particular functional form is often referred to as “utilitarian”
because the only thing that matters is maximizing total consumption and as long as
consumption increases it does not really matter who receives the largest share.
On the other hand, when ε→∞ the social welfare function turns into:
W = min(ui(yi))→ Rawlsian. (2.6)
Since society is infinitely averse to inequality, social welfare now is equivalent with
the welfare of the poorest. There is a maximum trade-off between the size of the cake
and how it is sliced. The optimal world is one in which income is divided equally and
the primary goal of social policy should be to improve the condition of the poorest.
This functional form is known as “Rawlsian” because in his Theory of Justice (1971),
John Rawls argues that inequality is acceptable only if it is to the advantage of those
41
who are worst-off.
Finally, when the value of ε is between these two polar cases, the social welfare
function has an iso-elastic form:
W =
1
n
∑ y1−εi − 1
1− ε → Iso− elastic. (2.7)
This function is increasing with income:
∂W
∂yi
=
y−εi
n
> 0 (2.8)
but at a decreasing rate:
∂2W
∂y2i
= −εy
−ε−1
i
n
< 0 (2.9)
so that as ε increases, lower incomes are given relatively more weight in producing
social welfare, i.e., the welfare (and utility) function is concave. A nice property is
that the ratio of the marginal social utilities of two individuals is equal to:
∂W/∂yA
∂W/∂yB
=
(
yB
yA
)ε
. (2.10)
Thus, when ε = 1, and ui = logyi, the marginal utilities are inversely proportional
so that somebody with an income of $10,000 will derive ten times more utility from
an additional dollar than someone with an income of $100,000. Most studies in the
happiness economics literature use the log-linear specification and thus make the
implicit assumption that ε = 1, i.e., the marginal utilities are inversely proportional.
Fig. 2.16 in the Appendix shows the strong fit between life satisfaction and log of
GDP per capita for a pooled sample of countries from the World Value Survey from
1981-2010, which suggests that that this modeling choice is reasonable.
Within this framework of analysis, the Atkinson (1970) index of inequality is
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defined as:
A(ε) = 1−
(
1
n
∑
(yi/µ)
1−ε
)1/1−ε
(2.11)
where µ is the mean level of income. When ε = 1, the Atkinson index has the
multiplicative form:
A(ε) = 1−
∏
(yi/µ)
1/n . (2.12)
The core idea of the Atkinson index is that there exists a level of income, ξ, which
is received by all members of society, such that W (ξ) = W (yi). Intuitively, this index
tells us how much society is willing to give up in terms of the size of the cake in order
to achieve an egalitarian distribution of income.
Figure 2.17 demonstrates this concept for a society of two individuals. The x
axis shows the income of person A, and the y axis shows the income of person B.
Let’s assume that the income distribution is at point A where yA < yB. If ε = 0
(zero inequality aversion), then the social welfare function (SFW) will be utilitarian
(a straight line between A, B ,and C). Thus, anywhere along the straight line social
welfare will be maximized regardless of the distribution of income. Any reduction of
the overall level of income, however, will make society worse off (even if the cake is
divided more equally).
When 0 < ε < ∞, then the SWF will be convex reflecting a trade-off between
equality and income. Thus, there is a point E where incomes are equally divided
with both A and B receiving ξ, such that the welfare of society is unchanged, i.e.,
W (ξ) = W (yi). This level of income is known as the equally distributed equivalent
(EDE). Due to the convexity of the SWF, ξ < µ is always true. Even though total
income is lower at E compared to A, the social welfare that is lost due to a decline of
total income is compensated for by the gain in equality. This is to say that society is
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willing to pay a price to achieve a more equal distribution of total income.
Since equality is measured by the ratio OC/OE, or equivalently between ξ/µ, then
a society with an egalitarian distribution will have ξ/µ = 1. The Atkinson index of
inequality then can be expressed as:
A(ε) = 1− ξ
µ
. (2.13)
In order to find an expression for ξ, we observe that by virtue of (2.4):
u(ξ) =
ξ1−ε − 1
1− ε (2.14)
and from (2.7) we get:
W =
1
n
∑ y1−εi − 1
1− ε =
1
n
n
ξ1−ε − 1
1− ε . (2.15)
Thus, from the definition of ξ we can directly express it as:
ξ(yi) =
1
n
(∑
y1−εi
)1/1−ε
. (2.16)
Given any income distribution, then, we can calculate ξ. Of course ξ will depend
on the level of inequality aversion, ε. For ε = 0, ξ will simply be the the average level
of income. For ε > 0, ξ will be lower than the average income, µ, and will decrease as
ε grows larger, reflecting a greater cost of inequality. Finally, we can derive a social
welfare function in abbreviated terms by solving equation (2.4) for ξ (2.16):
W (µ,A(ξ)) = µ(1− A(ξ)). (2.17)
Since social welfare increases with µ, it is possible to have an increase in welfare
and an increase in inequality simultaneously when µ increases. Fig. 2.18 presents
a possible scenario in which economic growth has been sufficient to offset the neg-
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ative effect on welfare from an increase in inequality (although this is not a Pareto
improvement since some groups have been made worse off). The overall change in
social welfare will ultimately depend on the concavity of the social welfare function
which is determined by the level of inequality aversion, or the the value of ε. Usually,
determining ε is a value judgment. The Census Bureau, for example, reports ε for
arbitrary values of 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75.
Thus, the first goal of this analysis is to estimate parametrically the value of ε
using subjective well-being data from the GSS (the exact procedure is outlined in
section 3.2). Once I estimate the value of ε, I then calculate the value of A(ε), ξ(ε),
and W (ε) to determine whether economic growth in the US has been sufficient to
compensate for the growing level of income inequality.
2.4.2 Estimating the Parameter of Inequality Aversion ε
There is a large literature that estimates the parameter on inequality aversion, ε.
Since ε is conceptually the same as the risk-aversion parameter in a CRRA utility
function, the majority of previous estimates are based on the behavioral theory of
choice under uncertainty. As Layard et al. (2008) point out, however, these estimates
have been highly inconsistent, ranging from 0 to 10.14 One problem is that previous
studies rely on indirect measures of utility and involve a large number of extraneous
assumptions. A second problem is that these estimates are based on expected utility,
not experienced utility. Yet, as Kahneman (1999) points out, most of the time people
make erroneous forecasts about their true utility. In this study, I am interested in
estimating ε based on a direct measurement of experienced utility.
I start the analysis by estimating the parameter on inequality aversion, ε, with
14For a survey of the literature see Lanot et al. (2006).
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the following specification:
ui = α
(
y1−εi − 1
1− ε
)
+
∑
β′X + νi (2.18)
where yi is individual income, X is a vector of personal characteristics that includes
age, age squared, sex, race, marital status, and level of education, and νi is random
error. In this specification, ε captures the concavity of the utility function with respect
to income or the negative elasticity of the marginal utility of income. The coefficient
α is assumed to be the same for all people. I use a Box-Cox transformation on the
income variable so that:
ui = α
(
yλi − 1
λ
)
+
∑
β′X + νi (2.19)
where λ = 1− ε.
Since true utility is not observed, I follow Layard et al. (2008) and make the
following assumptions:
1. Reported happiness, hi, is linked to true utility, ui via a fixed transformation
such that:
hi = fi(ui) = f(ui) + µi (2.20)
so that fi is common to all individuals up to a random additive term µi, which is
independent of the circumstances affecting true utility.
2. In addition, the transformation is assumed to be linear:
hi = ui + µi (2.21)
Thus, my final model is given by:
hi = α
(
yλi − 1
λ
)
+
∑
β′X + i (2.22)
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where  = νi + µi
A significant body of literature exists to justify the assumptions above. First,
reports on happiness tend to be consistent with other measures of well-being. For ex-
ample, Diener & Suh (1999) show that the level of self-reported happiness is correlated
with reports made by a third-party (e.g., a friend of the subject). Second, happiness
data tends to move in a predictable way with external factors such as unemployment
and marriage. For example, income increases predicted happiness, unemployment
decreases it, etc. (Kahneman, 1999). Finally, studies in neuropsychology suggest
that answers to happiness reports are correlated in a consistent manner with the
activity in different areas of the brain associated with positive and negative experi-
ences (Davidson, 1992, 2000). For a more thorough discussion see Section 1.5 of this
dissertation.
Table 2.4 presents the main results from the Box-Cox regressions. The inequality
aversion parameter, ε, is found to be 0.50 for the overall sample. I further estimate
ε for a variety of subgroups and over time. The parameter shows consistency across
groups with values ranging from 0.29 (strong Republicans) to 0.97 (people with grad-
uate degrees). Interestingly, ε increased over time from 0.19 in the 1970s to 0.65 in
the 2000s. This is consistent with the growing public resentment over the increasing
gap between the rich and the poor which culminated with the Occupy Wall Street
movement in recent years. As Figure 2.3 points out the number of books on the topic
of income inequality has quadrupled since the 1970s. These observations are also
consistent with economic and social theory. Republicans, for instance, share more
conservative values that emphasize the importance of personal independence, hard
work and meritocracy. Thus, they are less inclined to believe that society has an
obligation to reduce social inequalities.
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2.4.3 Calculating A(ε), ξ(ε), and W(ε), 1974-2010
Next, I calculate the Atkinson index of inequality, A(ε), the equivalently dis-
tributed income, ξ(ε), and social welfare, W(ε), based on the value of ε = 0.5 found
in the previous section. Since ε has increased over time and differs across subgroups
of the population, I also include the same calculations for ε = 1. I use this value of
the inequality aversion parameter because it corresponds to the log-linear form of the
utility function that is a standard assumption in the happiness literature.
The main results are presented in Table 2.5 and cover the period from 1974 to
2012. In 1974, for example, mean income in the GSS sample was $29,852 (column 2)
and the Gini coefficient was .43 percentage points (column 3). If we assume that the
value of ε = 0.5, then such levels and distribution of income correspond to an Atkinson
index of inequality of .16 percentage points (column 4). This number suggests that if
incomes were equally distributed, the same level of social welfare could be achieved
with only 84 percent of the national income in 1974, i.e., 16 percent of national
income can be sacrificed to achieved an egalitarian income distribution and at the
same time preserve the same level of national happiness. Column (5) shows that this
is equivalent to $24,977 – the equivalent distributed income, ξ. Finally, column (6)
calculates the welfare of society using equation 2.7. This number by itself does not
have any meaning. It is useful, however, in comparing different distributions to each
other and in this case to track the evolution of welfare over time. For instance, the
results in this column suggest that social welfare slightly increased from 316 in 1974
to 329 in 2012. The increasing value of the Atkinson index of inequality in column (4),
A(ε=0.5), however, indicates that society is willing to pay an increasing portion of
total income to divide the pie into more equal slices. In 1974 the same level of social
welfare could have been obtained if everybody received an income of $24,977 (the
equivalently distributed income, ξ(ε = 0.5)), i.e., this was equivalent to a reduction
of 16 percent of total income. By 2010, A(ε) increased by more than half, indicating
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that the same level of welfare could have been obtained if society gave up 26 percent
of total income to achieve an equal distribution of income where everybody earned
$27,060.
The results, of course, are sensitive to the value of ε. Thus, the last three columns
of Table 2.5 repeat the same exercise but for a value of the inequality aversion param-
eter of ε = 1. At this level of inequality aversion, society has experienced no gains in
social welfare since the 1974 (column 9). As expected, greater inequality aversion is
associated with a much higher trade-off between equity and efficiency. According to
the results in column (8), society could have achieved the same level of welfare in 2012
if everybody received an income of $19,399 (47 percent reduction in total income).
2.5 Estimating the Indirect Costs of Inequality
2.5.1 Empirical Model
Although some level of inequality can be productive and promote economic growth
through innovation and productivity, in the past 20 years a large literature has
emerged that shows that high levels of economic inequality impose large welfare loses
in addition to those associated with the concavity of the utility function. For example,
a high degree of economic inequality may affect well-being indirectly by encouraging
status consumption, negatively affecting mental and physical health, corroding so-
cial capital, and compromising the political and democratic institutions in a country.
One can think of these effects as a form of negative externality. Although economic
growth has been sufficient to improve social welfare even after we account for the di-
rect cost of inequality aversion, the negative externality from economic growth shifts
the welfare function downward, and may result in the stagnating levels of welfare.
The second part of this chapter, then, estimates the external cost of inequality
while accounting for the direct loses associated with the concavity of the utility func-
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tion. To estimate the external cost of the general level of inequality on SWB, I use
the following model which is a modification of model (2.22):
hi = α
(
yλi − 1
λ
)
+ γG+
∑
β′X + i (2.23)
where G is the measure of income inequality. In the case of the Gini coefficient, which
is used for the empirical portion of this study, G takes the following form:15
G =
n+ 1
n− 1 −
2
n(n− 1)µ(
n∑
i=1
Riyi) (2.24)
where µ is the average income in the GSS population and Ri is the income rank R of
person i who has income yi.
Since the parameter of inequality aversion has increased over time, to be more
conservative in my estimation, and for comparison purposes with previous studies, I
assume that ε = 1, so that:
hi = αlogyi + γG+
∑
β′X + i (2.25)
An implicit assumption is that the variable on the level of inequality will capture
the external cost as opposed to the direct cost. Since survey data shows that most
Americans significantly underestimate the level of inequality in the US (Norton and
Ariely, 2010), this assumption may be reasonable. It is also important to note that
the continuous variable happiness is not observed directly. Instead, what is observed
are three discrete responses: “very happy,” “pretty happy,” and “not too happy.” Due
to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable the model from the theoretical section
then requires estimation using an ordered probit technique. Although I use an ordered
probit estimation as a robustness test, I report the coefficients from OLS estimation in
the main analytical part of this paper. There are two reasons for this approach. First,
15The calculation of G is a simplified version proposed by Deaton (1997).
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Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) provide extensive evidence that the results from OLS and
ordered probit regressions hardly differ in the context of happiness research. Second, I
am interested in estimating the marginal effects on the interaction between inequality
and income on happiness. Ai and Norton (2003) show that the interaction terms in
ordered probit regressions are more difficult to interpret than commonly assumed.
2.5.2 Empirical Results
Table 2.6 presents the main results from the empirical estimation. Four differ-
ent variations of this model are presented each building from the previous one by
examining additional variables and relationships. The common variables to all four
models are the ones that describe the personal characteristics of the respondents: age
(and its quadratic), gender, race, marital status, employment status, and educational
level. Following Di Tella et al. (2003), an additional control variable on the general
level of unemployment is also included. The estimates on these core variables show
consistency across all four models, are sensible, statistically significant, and thus pro-
vide confidence about the foundation of the model. Furthermore, the results agree
with the findings of previous studies on happiness (e.g., see Di Tella et al., 2003, and
Alesina et al., 2004).
Model 1 is the most basic specification which explores the effect of the general
level of inequality and income on the self-reported level of happiness. This model
includes controls for age, sex, race, and marital status, and the rate of unemployment.
The results suggest that income inequality has a negative and significant effect on
subjective well-being even beyond the one associated with inequality aversion inherent
in the concavity of the utility function. The variable on personal income also has the
expected sign and is statistically significant. Similar results are found when the model
is expanded to include additional control variables on employment status (dummy
indicating if the person is unemployed) and educational attainment in Model (2).
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Model (3) tests for the interaction effect between inequality and the level of in-
come. In other words, the model tests the hypothesis that as personal income goes
up the negative external effect from income inequality diminishes. This hypothesis
is consistent with the discussion in section 2.2.2. Although income inequality may
negatively affect both rich and poor by encouraging wasteful positional consump-
tion, in some instances, economic inequality may be beneficial to the rich who may
use their wealth to extract rents from the political system. Both the coefficient on
income inequality and its interaction term have the expected signs and are statisti-
cally significant. The coefficients imply that that beyond $362,616 of annual income,
inequality has virtually no negative effect on the level of happiness. This level of
income, however, is even higher than the mean level of income for the top income
quintile in the US for 2010, which suggests that income inequality affects the welfare
of majority of the US population.
Finally, following Oishi et al. (2011) and Helliwell and Putnam (2004), I include
additional controls for the general level of trust and perception of fairness. My find-
ings, which are consistent with their results, suggest that lower levels of social trust
are associated with reduced happiness, and a greater sense of fairness increases the
subjective well-being of people. Unlike Oshi et al. (2011), however, who find that
once they control for social capital income inequality loses its significance, my results
suggest that the negative effect of inequality on happiness goes beyond the corrosion
of social capital. This is consistent with the theory reviewed in section 2.2.2.
Table 2.7 provides additional evidence on the relationship between income in-
equality and happiness. All models presented in this table are identical to Model
(2) in Table 2.6, but use different measure on income inequality to test if the results
are sensitive to the measure of income inequality. Model (1), for example, examines
the effect of the net gini coefficient obtained from the World Standardized Income
Inequality database (Solt, 2009). Model (2) and (3) use data on share of income to
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the top 1 and 10 percent of income earners from Picketty and Saez (2003). Finally,
model (4) looks at the ratio between the average income of the top five percent of
income earners and the bottom twenty percent using data on mean household income
from the U.S. Department of Commerce. The results are virtually the same as the
ones obtained in Table 2.6. All variables of interest are significant and have the ex-
pected signs. Interestingly, the concentration of income among the top one percent
of income earners has a negative effect on subjective well-being that is stronger than
the concentration of income among the top 10 percent of income earners. This is
consistent with the observation that higher concentration of economic power leads to
more political inequality, erosion of democratic institutions, and eventually to loss of
personal liberties, which people value.
Table 2.8 decomposes the effect of income inequality on happiness for several dif-
ferent subgroups in the population. The results are consistent with the findings so far
suggesting a negative and significant correlation between inequality and subjective
well-being in most cases. For example, although inequality tends to have a negative
effect on the well-being of both men and women, this adverse effect is almost four
time as strong for females. This is not a surprising result since women have been
traditionally discriminated against in the workplace and although the wage and ed-
ucational gap has almost disappeared in recent years, it has been present for most
of the study. Republicans tend to be less affected by the inequality than Democrats.
This could be due to ideological differences as suggested by Alesina et al. (2011). One,
perhaps, surprising result is that blacks do not seem to be affected by the general
level of income inequality since the coefficient on income inequality is insignificant.
This result, however, could be driven by the relatively small subsample.
The results reported so far are consistent with most previous findings in the lit-
erature (Graham and Felton, 2006; Smyth and Qian, 2008, and Oishi et al., 2011).
However, they come in contrast to those of Alesina et al. (2004) who find that al-
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though Europeans are sensitive to income inequality, Americans are not affected by
it. Table 2.9 further decomposes the effect of income inequality over time and sug-
gests one possible reason for this difference. The results suggest that the external
cost from inequality has sharply increased over time. In fact, relatively low levels of
income inequality in the 70s have been associated with a positive effect on subjec-
tive well-being. This is consistent with standard economic theory that up to some
point economic inequality serves an important role to promote effort and channel it
to productive market activities such as innovation. Yet, as income inequality grew
over time, the external effect became negative and the cost associated with it grew
even larger. In the case of the US, this external cost has almost quadrupled. The
insignificant coefficient on the variable of income inequality in Alesina et al. (2004)
could be due to the fact that their sample does not cover the past couple of decades
when the negative effect of inequality has been especially pronounced.
These results are also consistent with the change in reported attitudes over time
reported in Table 2.10. As income inequality has increased over time, a larger pro-
portion of the population has reported a lower level of social trust and perception of
fairness. In addition, more people today think that the rich should be paying higher
taxes although the GSS data reveals that fewer Americans today have confidence in
the US government as a means of redistributing income.
2.5.3 Robustness Test
Table 2.11 provides additional robustness tests for the main model in this study.
Four alternative specifications are considered. Model (1), for instance, uses an ordered
probit estimation. Model (2) uses robust regression with iteratively reweighted least
squares. This technique allows us to control for influential observations. Model (3) is
an OLS estimation with robust standard errors which also includes dummy variables
for each year. Finally, model (4) uses a maximum likelihood procedure and a Box-
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Cox transformation on the income variable. The results from all estimations are
consistent with the findings from our preferred specification of model. In all models,
the coefficient on income inequality has a negative sign and is significant at the .01
level. It appears, then, that the results are not sensitive to the choice of estimation
technique.
Table 2.12 reports one final robustness test in which two separate measures for
relative income are included in the estimation. Model (1) analyzes the effect of
relative income proposed in equation (1),
y
y∗ , where y* is the median income in the
sample for each year. Model (2) includes the relative position of a person in society
defined as (y − y∗)2. The squared term reflects the idea that the further is a person
from the median income, the stronger the effect of inequality aversion. An additional
interaction term with income is included to account for the possibility that as income
goes up, relative considerations diminish. Model (3) and (4) include a variable on
the general level of income inequality in addition to relative income. Again, the
results are consistent with the main hypothesis in this study – the negative effect of
income inequality goes beyond the inequality aversion associated with the concavity
of the utility function and one’s relative position in society. Relative income, however,
seems to also play an important role in determining one’s happiness with a positive
and significant coefficient at the .01 level in all four regressions.
2.6 Calculating the Net Benefit
2.6.1 Calculating the Marginal Rate of Substitution
If the level of self-reported happiness reflects true utility in a reliable and com-
parable way, then combining the marginal effects of income inequality and personal
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income will give an estimate of the marginal rate of substitution between the two:
MRSINEQ−Y =
γ
α
∗ y = ψ (2.26)
The marginal rate of substitution shows how much personal income would have to
go up so that there is no loss in happiness as a result of one unit increase in income
inequality.
Using Model (3) in Table 2.6, I next calculate the marginal rate of substitution
between income inequality and personal income in equation (2.26). While direct
interpretation of the individual marginal effects of market inequality and personal
income on happiness is straightforward, taking the ratio of the derivatives reveals the
trade-off between the two and provides an alternative way to evaluate this trade-off.
Column (3) in Table 2.13 (ψ) displays the marginal rate of substitution between the
two variables. This number shows how much personal income will have to increase
in order to offset a decrease in the level of happiness associated with a 1 percentage
point increase in the Gini coefficient. For example, the ψ in 1976 suggests that 1
percentage point increase in the Gini coefficient will require personal income (Y ) to
increase by $3788 dollars to keep happiness constant.
Table 2.13 calculates the net benefit from growth in income per capita since 1970
by accounting for the negative effect of the rising income inequality. This table
does not take into consideration the trade-off between economic growth and market
inequality. It simply looks at the actual change in the level of market inequality,
measured by the change in the Gini coefficient, which is reported in column (6) and
calculates the amount of personal income which is necessary to offset the adverse
effect associated with the increase in income inequality. This is reported offset GDP
in column (7). The net benefit for each year is calculated in column (8) and column
(9) reports the cumulative gain since 1970. For example, in 1984 the Gini coefficient
increased by 0.2 percentage points. Such an increase in the level of inequality could
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have been offset by $832 increase in the level of personal income. Since personal
income for the average American increased by $1625 in the same year, the net gain
in terms of subjective well-being was $794. Table 2.13 presents evidence that growth
in average income per capita in the US since 1970 has not been sufficient to offset the
undesirable effect from increases in market inequality. Indeed, the average American
has been made worse off. This is consistent with the observation that happiness levels
have stagnated since the 1970s. In fact, according to the data from the Gallup poll,
average life satisfaction actually decreased from 7.86 to 7.25 points which is more
consistent with the predictions of the model.
2.6.2 Accounting for the Trade-off
The rise of income inequality in the past three decades has not been the result
of economic growth alone. Rent-seeking, neo-liberal tax policies, globalization, im-
migration, the growing income gap between earners with higher education and those
who have never attended college, the rapid increase of the female labor force since the
1970’s, skill-based technological change, and the lack of corporate governance are all
factors identified in Section 2.2.3 as having contributed to the growing gap between
the rich and the poor.
Table 2.14 reports four different models, which estimate the trade-off between
economic growth and the level of income inequality. All models estimate the effect
of log GDP per capita, unemployment, female labor force participation, education,
the KOF index of globalization, and immigration on income inequality. Model (1)
uses an OLS with robust standard errors. Model (2) estimates the same model, but
uses an alternative dependent variable – the share of income that goes to the top
1 percent of income earners. Model (3) uses a three stage least squares estimation.
And, finally, model (4) transforms the Gini coefficient to its logarithmic form.
In all models, the log GDP per capita is significantly and positively correlated
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with income inequality (with the exception of model (1) where the variable has the
expected sign, but is not significant at the .1 level). The results are suggestive of a
small positive trade-off between economic growth and income inequality. For every
one percent increase in economic growth model (3) predicts that the Gini coefficient
will increase with .024 percentage points.
Instead of looking at the actual increase in the Gini coefficient, Table 2.15 calcu-
lates its expected change, shown in column (6), using the estimates from the second
stage of model (3) in Table 2.14. Thus, the offset income that is reported reflects
only the portion of inequality that is generated by the growth in the economy. The
results from Table 2.15 indicate that growth in per capita income has been sufficient
to compensate for the adverse effect of inequality on individual happiness for the
average American.
2.6.3 Decomposing the Effect by Each Income Quintile
Finally, Table 2.16 provides a summary of the same analysis for each income
quintile. The table reports the mean income for each quintile of income earners and
the cumulative gain experienced from economic growth since 1970 while discounting
the negative effect from the increase in the general level of inequality. The calculations
in the table suggest that the top two income quintiles have experienced a net benefit
from economic growth. However, the bottom two quintiles of income earners have
been made modestly worse off from the growing income inequality. The results imply
that a subsidy of $31 per year for the lowest income quintile and $42 per year for the
second lowest income quintile would be sufficient to compensate for the undesirable
effect of inequality growth. Since the data is gross income, the net effect from income
redistribution is not reflected in these calculations.
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2.7 Conclusion
Economic growth in the United State since the 1970’s has not benefited all income
classes equally. Most income gains have gone to the top income quintile while the real
wages of the majority of Americans have stagnated and, in the case of the poorest
40 percent, declined. This study shows that the rising level of income inequality can
explain the stagnating happiness of Americans in the past several decades.
A neo-utilitarian framework of analysis is used to evaluate the equality-efficiency
trade-off in the United States since the 1970s. Using SWB data from the GSS, the
parameter of inequality aversion, ε , is estimated, which allows the precise calculation
of the Atkinson index of inequality. Although the estimates suggest that Americans
have become increasingly more inequality averse over time, the results suggest that
the concavity of the utility function cannot alone explain the stagnating happiness of
Americans.
Yet, a large literature in the past 30 years suggests that the cost of inequality
goes beyond the direct negative effect from inequality aversion. High levels of income
inequality are associated with increase in the consumption of status goods, deteri-
oration of mental and physical health, corrosion of social capital, and the decay of
political and democratic structures each of which may cause a loss of personal and
economic freedom. The empirical estimation provides support for these observations,
i.e., inequality has an adverse effect on SWB even beyond the negative cost associated
with inequality aversion. This effect is diminishing with personal income which con-
firms the hypothesis that concentration of power allows the richest to extract rents
from the political system for their own benefit and to make sure that the legislature
will be highly sensitive to their welfare.
Once these negative external costs are taken into consideration, it is found that
economic growth in the United States over the past several decades has not been
sufficient to compensate for the loss of subjective well-being associated with the rising
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level of income inequality. This is consistent with the observation that happiness
levels in the United States have stagnated since the 1970s (and even declined by
some measures).
Finally, the trade-off between economic growth and market equality in the United
States is evaluated. I find that for every one percentage point increase in the rate
of growth of real GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient increases by 2.13 percentage
points. Such a trade-off indicates that the growth of average income per capita
has been sufficient to compensate for the loss in happiness associated with the more
unequal distribution of market income which was generated as a result of this growth.
However, while the top two income quintiles of the population have been made better
off from economic growth, the income gains experienced by the bottom two quintiles
of income earners have not been sufficient to offset the rising level of market inequality,
and the subjective well-being of middle class Americans has stagnated.
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2.8     Appendix 
 
Figure 2.1: Evolution of Top Income Shares in the US, 1970-2010 
Source: Picketty and Saez (2003). Updated data series covering the period 1920-2010 can be found on the website of Emanuel Saez, 
Table A.3. Website: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/#income 
 
Figure 2.2: Share of Income by Top 1 % of Income Earners, 1920-2010 
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Figure 2.3: Percent of Books on Income Inequality, 1970-2008 
Note: Data was obtained from google NGram viewer: http://books.google.com/ngrams/ 
 
 
Figure 2.4: The Gini Coefficient and the Log of GDP per capita, 1970-2010 
Note: Gini represents gross gini ratios for households (all races). Data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce: 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/ Table H-4). Data on GDP per capita was obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and represents constant 2011 dollars. I reverse the right vertical axis Gini (gross) to emphasize the trend 
that as economic equality has decreased average real incomes have kept raising. 
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Figure 2.5: Self-Reported Level of Happiness and GDP per capita in the US, 1970-2010 
Note: Data on self-reported level of happiness came from the General Social Survey (GSS variable: happy). Self-reported happiness 
represent yearly averages to the question: “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days would you say that you are 
very happy [3], pretty happy [2], or not too happy [1]?” Data on GDP per capita was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and represents constant 2011 dollars. 
  
Figure 2.6: Self-Reported Level of Happiness and Inequality in the US, 1970-2010 
Note: Data on self-reported level of happiness came from the General Social Survey (GSS variable: happy). Self-reported happiness 
represent yearly averages to the question: “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days would you say that you are 
very happy [3], pretty happy [2], or not too happy [1]?” Data on GDP per capita was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and represents constant 2011 dollars. Gini represents gross gini ratios for households (all races). Data was obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/ Table H-4).  
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Figure 2.7: Self-Reported Happiness by Income Quintile, GSS 
Note: Data on self-reported level of happiness came from the General Social Survey (GSS variable: happy). Self-reported happiness 
represents averages to the question: “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days would you say that you are very 
happy [3], pretty happy [2], or not too happy [1]?” for each income decile (GSS variable: conrinc) 
 
Figure 2.8: Life Satisfaction by Income Quintile, WVS 
Note: Data on life satisfaction was obtained from the World Value Survey and represents country  averages to the question: “All 
things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help with your answer.[range 
of 1-10 with 1 labelled ”Very dissatisfied” and 10 labelled ”Very Satisfied”]” The plot represents a pooled sample from the last three 
waves of the WVS from 2000-2010. Data on GDP per capita (2005 constant dollars) was used to divide countries by income quintile 
and was obtained from the Penn World Tables.  
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Figure 2.9: Life Satisfaction and Freedom of Choice 
 Note: The freedom of choice variable came from the World Value Survey survey and represents country averages to the question: 
“How much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.” [‘1’ means ‘none at all’ and ‘10’ 
means a ‘great deal’]. The plot represents a pooled sample from the five waves of the WVS from 1981-2010. 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Mean Income, Income Inequality and Social Welfare 
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Figure 2.11: Mean Household Income Received by Each Quintile and the Top Five 
Percent 
Note: “Income” represents mean quintile income. Data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce: 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/ Table H-3:All Races). 
 
Figure 2.12: Trust, Fairness and Happiness, 1970-2010 
Note: Data on all variables came from the General Social Survey (GSS). Fairness (GSS variable: fair) in the figure above represents 
the proportion of people that think other people are fair to them. Trust (GSS variable: trust) shows the proportion of subjects 
answering that people can be trusted. Happiness depicts the percent of people choosing the highest happiness category “very 
happy” to the question: “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days would you say that you are very happy, 
pretty happy, or not too happy?” 
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Figure 2.13: Economic Growth and the External Cost of Income Inequality 
 
Figure 2.14: Partial Correlation Plot: Gini vs Log GDP per capita 
Note: Gini represents gross gini ratios for households (all races). Data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce: 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/ Table H-4). Data on GDP per capita was obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and represents constant 2011 dollars. 
68 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Log Gini and Log GDP, 1970-2010 
 
Note: Gini represents gross gini ratios for households (all races). Data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce: 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/ Table H-4). Data on GDP per capita was obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and represents constant 2011 dollars. 
 
Figure 2.16: Life Satisfaction and Log GDP per capita 
Note: Data on life satisfaction and was obtained from the World Value Survey and represents averages to the question: “All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help with your answer.[range of 1-10 
with 1 labelled ”Very dissatisfied” and 10 labelled ”Very Satisfied”]” The plot represents a pooled sample from the last three waves 
of the WVS from 2000-2010. Data on GDP per capita (2005 constant dollars) was obtained from the Penn World Tables and was 
transformed to its logarithmic form. 
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Figure 2.17: The Trade-off between Equality and Mean Income                                    
 
Figure 2.18: Economic Growth and Income Inequality 
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Table 2.1: Description and Sources of Main Variables 
Macro Variables  Description Source 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita (billions of chained 2005 dollars) Penn World Tables 
https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/ 
Gini (Gross) Gini coefficient measured on a scale from 0 ‘perfect 
equality’ to 100 ‘perfect inequality’ 
U.S. Census, Historical Income Tables 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/ 
Table H-4 
Top Income Shares  
 
Concentration of Income to the top 10 (1) percent of income 
earners 
Picketty and Saez (2003) http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/#income 
Gini (Net) Gini coefficient measured on a scale from 0 ‘perfect 
equality’ to 100 ‘perfect inequality’ net of taxes 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt, 2009) 
http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html 
% Reduction Gini 
 
[Gini (Gross)-Gini(Net)]/Gini(Gross) Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt, 2009) 
http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html 
Quintile Income Mean income received by each fifth and top five percent of 
households 
U.S. Census, Historical Income Tables 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/ 
Table H-3:All Races 
Ratio Top/Bottom Ratio of mean income earned by the top 5 percent of income 
earners to mean income of the bottom 20 percent of income 
earners 
Own calculation based on quintile income above 
Government Size  
 
Total government current expenditures as a  
percentage of GDP. 
U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
Civilian unemployment rate: persons 16 years and older. U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Log Gross Capital  Logarithmic transformation of gross fixed capital Formation 
(in billions of 2005 dollars) 
OECD 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/na-data-en 
Education Percent of population (25 years of older) who have 
completed college 
U.S. Census, Historical Time Series Tables 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/historical/i
ndex.html 
Female Labor Force Civilian labor force: females in the US (in thousands of 
persons) 
US Department of Labor 
 
KOF Globalization Globalization index from 0 ‘least globalization’ to 100 ‘most 
globalization’ 
KOF Index of Globalization 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
Immigration Annual number of legal immigrants Migration Policy Institute 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/historicaltrends.cfm 
Micro Variables    
Happy 
 
Data was collected with the question: “Taken all together, 
how would you say things are these days would you say that 
you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” (1 ‘not 
too happy’, 2 ‘pretty happy’, 3 ‘very happy’) 
General Social Survey (GSS variable: happy) 
http://www3.norc.org/gss+website/ 
 
 
Income Respondent's income (in 2005 constant dollars) GSS variable: conrinc 
Relative Income yi/y* where y* is median income for sample (by year) Own calculations 
Relative Position Calculated using the following formula (yi-y*)2  where y* is Own calculations 
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median income for sample for each year 
Trust Data was collected with the question: “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
can't be too careful in dealing with people?” (0 ‘can trust’, 1 
‘cannot trust’) 
GSS variable: trust 
Fairness "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of 
you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? (0 ‘take 
advantage’ and 1 ‘fair’) 
GSS variable: fair 
Age Age in years GSS variable: age 
Sex  Gender dummy with 0 ‘male’ and 1 ‘female’ GSS variable: sex 
Race Race dummy with 0 ‘white’ and 1 ‘black’ GSS variable: race 
Marital Status Dummies for divorced, separated, and widowed (married is 
the base category) 
GSS variable: marital 
Educational Level Dummies for high school, college, graduate school (less 
than high school is the base category) 
GSS variable: degree 
Employment Status Dummy for unemployed GSS variable: wrkstat 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Macroeconomic Variables 
Macro Variables Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita 41 36381 8306 23585 49571 
Log GDP per capita 41 10.48 0.23 10.07 10.81 
Gini (Gross) 41 43.34 2.76 39.40 47.00 
Log Gini (Gross) 41 3.77 0.06 3.67 3.85 
Gini (Net) 41 33.96 2.55 30.10 37.20 
% Reduction Gini 36 22.40 1.12 20.54 25.92 
Share Top 10% 41 38.11 5.08 31.51 46.26 
Share Top 1% 41 12.15 3.75 7.74 18.33 
Ratio Top/Bottom 41 20.63 3.97 16.00 26.00 
Unemployment Rate 41 6.29 1.51 4.00 9.70 
Percent College 41 21.00 5.53 11.00 29.90 
KOF index 41 69.67 6.29 59.59 77.54 
Government Size 41 0.20 0.02 0.18 0.25 
Log Gross Capital 41 5.48 0.78 3.88 6.52 
Female Labor Force 41 54.81 5.49 43.40 60.00 
Immigration 41 770977 335371 370478 1826595 
 
 
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Microeconomic Variables 
Micro Variables Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Happiness 52321 2.19 0.64 1 3 
Income 33365 31770 32367 383 434612 
Log Income 33365 9.92 1.09 5.95 12.98 
Relative Income (y/y*) 33365 1.27 1.29 0.02 17.38 
Relative Position (y-y*)2 33365 1.09E+09 6.63E+09 0.00E+00 1.66E+11 
Age 56859 45.70 17.47 18.00 89.00 
Age squared 56859 2394 1761 324 7921 
Female (Male is base) 57061 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Black (White is base) 57061 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Marital (Married is base)      
Widowed 57041 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Divorced 57041 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Separated 57041 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Never Married 57041 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Education (Less than HS is base) 
     High School 56896 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Junior High 56896 0.05 0.23 0 1 
College 56896 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Graduate School 56896 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Trust 37493 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Fairness 35713 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Note: y* represents the median income in the sample by year. 
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Table 2.4: Estimates for ε using a Box-Cox transformation 
Subgroup λ     Observations ε 
All subjects 0.50 (.0791) *** 30398 0.50 
Women 0.49 (.0913) *** 15473 0.51 
Men 0.44 (.1783) ** 14925 0.56 
White 0.49 (.0791) *** 24882 0.51 
Black 0.60 (.3060) ** 3965 0.40 
Strong Democrats 0.50 (.1425) *** 6554 0.50 
Strong Republicans 0.71 (.2427) *** 444 0.29 
Age>40 0.47 (.1176) *** 13822 0.53 
Married 0.43 (.1074) *** 16687 0.57 
Divorced 0.59 (.1741) *** 4300 0.41 
Protestant 0.47 (.0767) *** 17216 0.53 
No Religion 0.65 (.1589) *** 3697 0.35 
High School 0.64 (.1137) *** 16366 0.36 
College 0.66 (.1753) *** 5139 0.34 
Graduate School 0.03 (.1991) *** 2549 0.97 
Year ≤1980 0.81 (.1917) *** 5293 0.19 
1980 <Year ≤1990 0.61 (.1306) *** 8782 0.39 
1990 <Year ≤2000 0.52 (.1297) *** 9427 0.48 
Year > 2000 0.35 (.0928) *** 6934 0.65 
 
Table 2.5: Atkinson Inequality, Equivalent Income, and Social Welfare for selected 
values of ε, 1974-2010 
(1) 
Year 
(2) 
Mean Income 
(3) 
Gini 
(4) 
A (ε=.5) 
(5) 
ξ (ε=.5) 
(6) 
W (ε=.5) 
(7) 
A (ε=1) 
(8) 
ξ (ε=1) 
(9) 
W (ε=1) 
1974 $29,852 0.43 0.16  $24,977  316 0.34  $19,757  9.89 
1975 $25,522 0.42 0.16  $21,407  293 0.34  $16,773  9.73 
1976 $27,567 0.42 0.16  $23,208  305 0.33  $18,489  9.82 
1977 $29,580 0.44 0.17  $24,492  313 0.34  $19,495  9.88 
1978 $27,927 0.45 0.18  $22,997  303 0.36  $17,773  9.79 
1980 $31,868 0.45 0.17  $26,317  324 0.35  $20,590  9.93 
1982 $26,095 0.43 0.16  $21,903  296 0.34  $17,290  9.76 
1983 $27,604 0.43 0.16  $23,175  304 0.34  $18,205  9.81 
1984 $27,528 0.44 0.17  $22,911  303 0.35  $17,850  9.79 
1985 $29,997 0.45 0.18  $24,727  314 0.36  $19,081  9.86 
1986 $28,475 0.43 0.17  $23,744  308 0.35  $18,505  9.83 
1987 $28,389 0.43 0.16  $23,757  308 0.35  $18,532  9.83 
1988 $29,001 0.42 0.16  $24,461  313 0.33  $19,287  9.87 
1989 $29,476 0.41 0.15  $24,987  316 0.33  $19,790  9.89 
1990 $29,386 0.43 0.16  $24,686  314 0.33  $19,613  9.88 
1991 $28,896 0.42 0.16  $24,242  311 0.34  $18,962  9.85 
1993 $32,663 0.44 0.17  $27,067  329 0.35  $21,237  9.96 
1994 $30,347 0.41 0.15  $25,776  321 0.32  $20,636  9.93 
1996 $31,592 0.41 0.15  $26,923  328 0.31  $21,787  9.99 
1998 $32,877 0.43 0.16  $27,633  332 0.33  $22,152  10.01 
2000 $33,188 0.43 0.16  $27,781  333 0.34  $22,016  10.00 
2002 $37,350 0.49 0.21  $29,345  343 0.41  $22,035  10.00 
2004 $37,610 0.46 0.18  $30,807  351 0.37  $23,681  10.07 
2006 $35,212 0.45 0.18  $28,889  340 0.36  $22,366  10.02 
2008 $41,897 0.55 0.27  $30,740  351 0.47  $22,389  10.02 
2010 $31,632 0.47 0.19  $25,523  320 0.40  $18,966  9.85 
2012 $36,692 0.55 0.26  $27,060  329 0.47  $19,399  9.87 
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Table 2.6: Main Results 
  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     
Log Income 0.0530 (.0036) *** 0.0365 (.0043) *** 0.0220 (.0066) *** 0.0322 (.0051) *** 
Gini -0.0033 (.0018) * -0.0054 (.0017) *** -0.0062 (.0017) *** -0.0063 (.0022) ** 
Gini*Income 
      
1.72E-08 (.0000) ** 
   Trust 
         
-0.0696 (.0070) *** 
Fairness 
         
0.0675 (.0066) *** 
Unemployment Rate -0.0138 (.0030) *** -0.0124 (.0030) *** -0.0125 (.0030) *** -0.0157 (.0036) *** 
Personal Characteristics 
            Age  -0.0183 (.0016) *** -0.0187 (.0016) *** -0.0186 (.0016) *** -0.0191 (.0017) *** 
Age squared 0.0002 (.0000) *** 0.0002 (.0000) *** 0.0002 (.0000) *** 0.0002 (.0000) *** 
Female 0.0784 (.0119) *** 0.0610 (.0114) *** 0.0641 (.0119) *** 0.0497 (.0108) *** 
Black -0.1318 (.0152) *** -0.1184 (.0154) *** -0.1175 (.0154) *** -0.0948 (.0185) *** 
Widowed -0.3402 (.0135) *** -0.3272 (.0139) *** -0.3255 (.0140) *** -0.3164 (.0229) *** 
Divorced -0.2854 (.0104) *** -0.2764 (.0104) *** -0.2747 (.0103) *** -0.2812 (.0153) *** 
Separated -0.3505 (.0216) *** -0.3365 (.0219) *** -0.3360 (.0219) *** -0.3251 (.0319) *** 
Never Married -0.2300 (.0187) *** -0.2308 (.0184) *** -0.2288 (.0186) *** -0.2456 (.0209) *** 
Unemployed 
   
-0.2126 (.0236) *** -0.2130 (.0235) *** -0.2157 (.0278) *** 
High School 
   
0.0482 (.0116) *** 0.0482 (.0117) *** 0.0272 (.0156) * 
Junior College 
   
0.0773 (.0192) *** 0.0770 (.0193) *** 0.0424 (.0223) * 
Bachelor Degree 
   
0.1215 (.0125) *** 0.1168 (.0129) *** 0.0754 (.0203) *** 
Graduate Degree       0.1235 (.0184) *** 0.1119 (.0191) *** 0.0580 (.0267) ** 
R-Squared 0.0687 
  
0.0767 
  
0.0773 
  
0.0869 
  Observations 29298     29260     29260     18783   
 
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Since the regressions include 
aggregated variables over time, the standard errors are clustered around year.  All estimates are pooled OLS. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, 
and ‘less than high school’ were omitted because they are used as a base in their respective category. 
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Table 2.7: Alternative Measures of Inequality 
  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     
Log Income 0.0366 (.0043) *** 0.0365 (.0043) *** 0.0365 (.0043) *** 0.0366 (.0043) *** 
Gini (Net) -0.0066 (.0017) *** 
         Top 1% 
   
-0.0038 (.0011) *** 
      Top 10% 
      
-0.0030 (.0008) *** 
   Ratio 
        
-0.0038 (.0011) *** 
Controls YES     YES     YES     YES     
R-Squared 0.0767 
  
0.0766 
  
0.0767 
  
0.0767 
  Observations 29260   29260   29260   29260   
 
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Since the regressions include aggregated 
variables over time, the standard errors are clustered around year.  All estimates are pooled OLS, and include controls for age, quadratic age, sex, race, 
marital status, unemployment rate, education level, and a dummy whether the person is unemployed. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, and ‘less 
than high school’ were omitted because they are used as the base in their respective category. Gini (net) came from the World Inequality Standardized 
Dataset (Solt, 2008). The variable Top 1% (10%) represents the share of income that goes to the top one (ten) percent of income earners, and was collected 
from Picketty & Saez (2003). Updated data series covering the period 1920-2010 can be found on the website of Emanuel Saez, Table A.3. Website: 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/#income. The variable Ratio measures the ratio between the average income of the top five percent of income earners and the 
bottom twenty percent. Data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce: 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/ Table H-3:All Races). 
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Table 2.8: The Effect of Inequality for Selected Subgroups 
 
Sex 
   
Race 
 
 
Male 
  
Female 
   
White 
  
Black 
 Log Income 0.0503 *** 
 
0.0272 *** 
  
0.0387 *** 
 
0.0388 *** 
 
(.0065) 
  
(.0060) 
   
(.0043) 
  
(.0127) 
 Gini -0.0020 
  
-0.0091 *** 
  
-0.0062 *** 
 
0.0098 
 
 
(.0033) 
  
(.0021) 
   
(.0021) 
  
(.0064) 
 
 
Education 
   
Political Affiliation 
 
 
Low 
Education 
  
High 
Education 
   
Democrats 
  
Republicans 
 Log Income 0.0342 *** 
 
0.0635 *** 
  
0.0347 *** 
 
0.0315 *** 
 
(.0045) 
  
(.0142) 
   
(.0091) 
  
(.0060) 
 Gini -0.0062 *** 
 
-0.0113 *** 
  
-0.0076 * 
 
-0.0047 * 
 
(.0020) 
  
(.0051) 
   
(.0042) 
  
(.0025) 
 Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.00(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Since 
the regressions include aggregated variables over time, the standard errors are clustered around year.  All estimates are 
pooled OLS, and include controls for age, quadratic age, sex, race, marital status, unemployment rate, education level, 
and a dummy whether the person is unemployed. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, and ‘less than high school’ 
were omitted because they are used as the base in their respective category. The regressions estimate the effect of 
inequality and income for various subsamples. ‘Low Education’ depicts subjects with high school degree or lower and 
‘High Education’ includes subjects with college degree or higher. ‘Democrats’ represents people who consider 
themselves ‘strong democrats’ (GSS variable: partyid), and ‘Republicans’ represent those who think of themselves as 
‘strong republicans.’    
Table 2.9: The Effect of Inequality over Time 
 
≤ 80 80 < Year ≤ 90 90 < Year ≤ 00 
 
Year > 00 
Log Income 0.0167 (.0082) * 0.0476 (.0092) *** 0.0301 (.0039) *** 0.0462 (.0071) *** 
Gini (Net) 0.0738 (.0033) *** -0.0495 (.0030) *** -0.0186 (.0008) *** -0.0466 (.0074) *** 
Controls YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  R-Squared 0.0799 
  
0.0716 
  
0.08 
  
0.0935 
  Observations 5286 
  
7905 
  
8493 
  
7576 
  Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Since the 
regressions include aggregated variables over time, the standard errors are clustered around year.  All estimates are pooled 
OLS, and include controls for age, quadratic age, sex, race, marital status, unemployment rate, education level, and a 
dummy whether the person is unemployed. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, and ‘less than high school’ were 
omitted because they are used as the base in their respective category. The regressions estimate the effect of inequality and 
income for four time periods in the sample: (1) ‘1974-1980’, (2) ‘1981-1990’, (3) ‘1991-2000’, and (4) ‘2001-present’. 
Table 2.10: Attitudes over Time, General Social Survey 
  < 80 80 < Year < 90 90 < Year < 00 Year > 00 
Most people ‘cannot be trusted' 0.15 0.22 0.20 0.22 
Most people ‘would take advantage of you' 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.15 
Taxes on rich are ‘too low' n/a 0.58 0.39 0.49 
‘Hardly any' confidence in government 0.26 0.29 0.34 0.36 
Government should 'reduce differences' 3.66 3.65 3.73 3.72 
Note: Data on all variables were obtained from the General Social Survey (GSS variables: trust, fair, taxrich, confed, and 
eqwlth). The first four rows represent proportion of respondents. The last row shows averages with 1 ‘strongly agree’ that 
government should reduce income difference, and 7 ‘no action’.   
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Table 2.11: Robustness Check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log Income 0.0710 (.0075) *** 0.0387 (.0043) *** 0.0366 (.0044) *** 0.0003 (126.08) *** 
Gini -0.0088 (.0032) *** -0.0063 (.0018) *** -0.0037 (.0007) *** -0.0057 (12.87) *** 
Unemployment Rate -0.0246 (.0049) *** -0.0137 (.0028) *** -0.0094 (.0003) *** -0.0124 (24.75) *** 
Personal Characteristics 
            Age  -0.0368 (.0033) *** -0.0221 (.0019) *** -0.0188 (.0016) *** -0.0190 (125.15) *** 
Age squared 0.0004 (.0000) *** 0.0003 (.0000) *** 0.0002 (.0000) *** 0.0002 (143.47) *** 
Female 0.1183 (.0146) *** 0.0687 (.0084) *** 0.0606 (.0114) *** 0.0677 (80.17) *** 
Black -0.2360 (.0206) *** -0.1197 (.0118) *** -0.1185 (.0156) *** -0.1171 (124.26) *** 
Widowed -0.6362 (.0379) *** -0.3613 (.0218) *** -0.3289 (.0143) *** -0.3247 (278.90) *** 
Divorced -0.5376 (.0206) *** -0.2975 (.0118) *** -0.2775 (.0105) *** -0.2744 (678.78) *** 
Separated -0.6485 (.0371) *** -0.3587 (.0214) *** -0.3367 (.0220) *** -0.3351 (308.66) *** 
Never Married -0.4483 (.0191) *** -0.2561 (.0109) *** -0.2306 (.0186) *** -0.2280 (545.79) *** 
Unemployed -0.4073 (.0363) *** -0.2299 (.0210) *** -0.2118 (.0236) *** -0.2117 (128.68) *** 
High School 0.0885 (.0207) *** 0.0420 (.0119) *** 0.0473 (.0116) *** -0.0464 (19.16) *** 
Junior College 0.1454 (.0331) *** 0.0716 (.0190) *** 0.0762 (.0194) *** 0.0279 (3.73) *** 
Bachelor Degree 0.2334 (.0260) *** 0.1136 (.0149) *** 0.1210 (.0125) *** 0.0658 (43.65) *** 
Graduate Degree 0.2390 (.0314) *** 0.1226 (.0180) *** 0.1231 (.0185) *** 0.0591 (18.70) *** 
λ 
         
0.5000 (0.08) *** 
/cut1 -1.9438 0.1707 
          /cut2 -0.1106 0.1704 
          Year dummies 
      
YES 
     R-Squared 0.0434 
  
0.0767 
  
0.0778 
  
0.0869 
  Observations 29260   29260   29260   18783   
 
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Since the regressions include 
aggregated variables over time, the standard errors are clustered around year.  Model (1) estimates an ordered probit model. Model (2) estimates robust 
regression using iteratively reweighted least squares. Model (3) is an OLS regression with robust standard errors and includes dummies for each year. 
Model (4) uses a maximum likelihood procedure and a Box-Cox transformation on the income variable (χ2 values are reported in parenthesis). The 
categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, and ‘less than high school’ were omitted because they are used as the base in their respective category. 
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Table 2.12: Additional Robustness, Relative Income 
  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     
Log Income 0.0255 0.0050 *** 0.0374 0.0040 *** 0.0369 0.0041 *** 0.0249 0.0052 *** 
Gini (Net) 
      
-0.0059 0.0016 *** -0.0061 0.0016 *** 
Relative Income (y/y*) 0.0200 0.0039 *** 
      
0.0198 0.0044 *** 
Relative Position 
   
8.68E-12 (2.09E-12) *** 8.31E-12 (2.34E-12) *** 
   Rel Position∗Income 
   
-2.05E-17 (5.19E-18) *** -1.97E-17 (5.59E-18) *** 
   Controls YES     YES     YES     YES     
R-Squared 0.0767 
  
0.0766 
  
0.0767 
  
0.0767 
  Observations 30398   30398   29260   29260   
 
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Since the regressions include 
aggregated variables over time, the standard errors are clustered around year.  Relative income is defined as yi/y* where y* is median income for 
each year. Relative position is defined as (yit- yt*)2  where y* is median income for each year. All estimates include controls for age, quadratic age, 
sex, race, marital status, unemployment rate, education level, and a dummy = 1 if the person is unemployed. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, 
‘married’, and ‘less than high school’ were omitted because they are used as the base in their respective category. 
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Table 2.13: Net Gain from Economic Growth, 1974-2010 
Year 
 
mean Y 
 
Ψ 
 
actual  
∆ ($) 
actual  
GINI 
actual  
∆ GINI 
Offset 
 GDP 
Net Gain 
 Year 
Cumulative 
 Gain 
1975 22433 3788 -267 32.7 0.1 379 -646 -646 
1976 23408 3876 975 32.8 0.1 388 587 -58 
1977 24239 3933 832 33.2 0.4 1573 -741 -799 
1978 25323 4021 1083 33.3 0.1 402 681 -118 
1979 25827 4053 504 33.5 0.2 811 -306 -425 
1980 25459 4042 -368 33.1 -0.4 -1617 1249 824 
1981 25847 4059 388 33.4 0.3 1218 -830 -6 
1982 25104 3969 -743 34 0.6 2382 -3125 -3131 
1983 26001 4043 897 34 0 0 897 -2234 
1984 27626 4158 1625 34.2 0.2 832 794 -1440 
1985 28514 4191 888 34.8 0.6 2514 -1626 -3066 
1986 29236 4203 722 35.5 0.7 2942 -2221 -5287 
1987 29903 4258 667 35.3 -0.2 -852 1519 -3768 
1988 30850 4307 947 35.5 0.2 861 86 -3682 
1989 31651 4317 801 36.2 0.7 3022 -2220 -5903 
1990 31886 4348 235 35.9 -0.3 -1304 1539 -4364 
1991 31391 4341 -495 35.5 -0.4 -1736 1241 -3123 
1992 32027 4350 637 36 0.5 2175 -1538 -4661 
1993 32515 4216 488 38.9 2.9 12227 -11739 -16400 
1994 33432 4230 917 39.5 0.6 2538 -1621 -18021 
1995 33871 4291 439 38.8 -0.7 -3003 3442 -14579 
1996 34730 4304 859 39.3 0.5 2152 -1293 -15872 
1997 35847 4349 1117 39.4 0.1 435 683 -15190 
1998 36975 4404 1128 39.3 -0.1 -440 1569 -13621 
1999 38319 4423 1344 39.9 0.6 2654 -1310 -14931 
2000 39469 4429 1150 40.5 0.6 2658 -1508 -16439 
2001 39487 4406 18 40.9 0.4 1762 -1744 -18183 
2002 39813 4442 326 40.5 -0.4 -1777 2103 -16081 
2003 40444 4489 631 40.1 -0.4 -1796 2427 -13654 
2004 41467 4498 1023 40.5 0.4 1799 -776 -14430 
2005 42347 4501 880 40.9 0.4 1801 -920 -15350 
2006 43063 4511 715 41.1 0.2 902 -187 -15537 
2007 43454 4634 391 39.4 -1.7 -7877 8269 -7268 
2008 42909 4557 -545 40.3 0.9 4102 -4647 -11915 
2009 41056 4491 -1853 40.4 0.1 449 -2302 -14217 
2010 41943 4565 886 39.7 -0.7 -3196 4082 -10135 
 
Note: ψ represents the marginal rate of substitution between personal income and the general level of 
inequality measured by the gross Gini coefficient. The calculations in this table are based on model (3) in 
Table 2.6 (Main Results). The table tests the hypothesis that ε=1, i.e., the relationship between happiness and 
income is log-linear, i.e. linear in u=log(y).  
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Table 2.14: Equality-Efficiency Trade-off in the US, 1970-2010 
  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     
Log GDP 2.6724 (3.6621) 
 
15.2132 (6.1006) ** 2.3657 (.2258) *** 0.3550 (.0066) *** 
Education 0.1736 (.1237) 
 
-0.0449 (.1916) 
 
0.1822 (.0539) *** -0.0060 (.0014) *** 
KOF index 0.3384 (.0756) *** 0.3422 (.1222) *** 0.3442 (.0524) *** 0.0033 (.0016) ** 
Female Labor Force -0.1604 (.0556) *** -0.3842 (.0785) *** -0.1625 (.0473) *** -0.0008 (.0014) 
 Immigration -5.11E-07 (2.60E-07) ** 8.81E-07 (5.53E-07)   -5.11E-07 (2.45E-07) ** -1.31E-08 (5.03E-09) *** 
Observations 40 
  
40 
  
40 
   
40 
 R squared 0.9692     0.9655     0.9692       0.9956   
 
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  Model (1) presents an OLS 
estimates with clustered errors around year. Model (2) uses the same specification as model (1) but for the dependent variable uses the concentration 
of income in the top 1 percent of income earners. Model (3) presents a two stage least squares estimate. Only the second stage is reported. In the 
first stage, log GDP per capita is regressed on gross fixed capital formation, mean years of schooling, share of total government expenditure (% of 
GDP) and its quadratic. Finally, model (4) uses a two stage least squares estimation but for the dependent variable log Gini. 
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Table 2.15: Net Gain from Economic Growth, 1974-2010 (accounting for trade-off) 
Year 
 
Mean Y 
 
Ψ 
 
Actual 
∆ ($) 
Actual 
GINI 
Exp. 
∆ GINI 
Offset 
GDP 
Net Gain 
Year 
Cumulative 
Gain 
1975 22433 3788 -267 32.7 -0.03 -107 -160 -160 
1976 23408 3876 975 32.8 0.10 382 593 433 
1977 24239 3933 832 33.2 0.08 319 513 945 
1978 25323 4021 1083 33.3 0.10 407 676 1622 
1979 25827 4053 504 33.5 0.05 187 317 1939 
1980 25459 4042 -368 33.1 -0.03 -138 -230 1709 
1981 25847 4059 388 33.4 0.04 144 244 1953 
1982 25104 3969 -743 34 -0.07 -278 -465 1488 
1983 26001 4043 897 34 0.08 330 567 2055 
1984 27626 4158 1625 34.2 0.14 579 1046 3101 
1985 28514 4191 888 34.8 0.07 309 579 3681 
1986 29236 4203 722 35.5 0.06 245 476 4157 
1987 29903 4258 667 35.3 0.05 225 442 4599 
1988 30850 4307 947 35.5 0.07 313 634 5233 
1989 31651 4317 801 36.2 0.06 259 543 5776 
1990 31886 4348 235 35.9 0.02 76 159 5935 
1991 31391 4341 -495 35.5 -0.04 -162 -333 5602 
1992 32027 4350 637 36 0.05 205 432 6034 
1993 32515 4216 488 38.9 0.04 150 338 6372 
1994 33432 4230 917 39.5 0.06 274 642 7015 
1995 33871 4291 439 38.8 0.03 131 307 7322 
1996 34730 4304 859 39.3 0.06 252 607 7929 
1997 35847 4349 1117 39.4 0.07 321 797 8726 
1998 36975 4404 1128 39.3 0.07 318 810 9536 
1999 38319 4423 1344 39.9 0.08 367 977 10513 
2000 39469 4429 1150 40.5 0.07 305 844 11357 
2001 39487 4406 18 40.9 0.00 5 13 11371 
2002 39813 4442 326 40.5 0.02 86 240 11610 
2003 40444 4489 631 40.1 0.04 166 465 12076 
2004 41467 4498 1023 40.5 0.06 263 761 12837 
2005 42347 4501 880 40.9 0.05 221 659 13496 
2006 43063 4511 715 41.1 0.04 177 538 14034 
2007 43454 4634 391 39.4 0.02 99 293 14326 
2008 42909 4557 -545 40.3 -0.03 -137 -408 13918 
2009 41056 4491 -1853 40.4 -0.11 -479 -1373 12545 
2010 41943 4565 886 39.7 0.05 228 658 13203 
Note: ψ represents the marginal rate of substitution between personal income and the general level of inequality 
measured by the gross Gini coefficient. The calculations in this table are based on model (3) in Table 2.6: Main 
Results. The table tests the hypothesis that ε=1, i.e., the relationship between happiness and income is log-linear.  
Expected ∆ GINI is estimated using the results from model (3) in Table 14: Equality and Efficiency Trade-off in 
the US, 1970-2010. 
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Table 2.16: Net Gain by Income Quintile, 1974-2010 (accounting for possible trade-off) 
Year q1 Gain q1 q2 Gain q2 q3  Gain q3 q4  Gain q4 q5 Gain q5 
1975 10553 -161 25924 -916 42532 -1149 61803 -1521 109117 -3345 
1976 10811 -16 26468 -573 43527 -431 63211 -411 111876 -917 
1977 10743 -79 26444 -588 43742 -276 64091 287 114293 1220 
1978 11029 75 27086 -179 44724 439 65516 1422 116968 3595 
1979 10777 -120 26806 -358 44196 55 64857 898 116394 3085 
1980 10216 -396 25426 -1219 41956 -1548 61811 -1497 110209 -2351 
1981 9882 -561 24617 -1720 40781 -2385 60790 -2298 108588 -3773 
1982 9689 -734 24518 -1782 40585 -2524 60360 -2635 110706 -1905 
1983 9908 -591 24889 -1550 41150 -2119 61751 -1537 113374 457 
1984 10213 -399 25439 -1204 42156 -1394 63473 -168 116712 3426 
1985 10188 -500 25818 -964 42855 -885 64464 624 120414 6741 
1986 10279 -532 26440 -564 44245 138 66654 2394 126160 11929 
1987 10539 -340 26783 -344 44779 531 67685 3229 128721 14246 
1988 10673 -236 26939 -244 45056 736 68109 3573 130028 15431 
1989 11019 15 27415 66 45570 1119 68932 4244 134748 19739 
1990 10710 -202 26946 -237 44507 333 67104 2763 130225 15633 
1991 10362 -364 26028 -824 43233 -599 65904 1795 126376 12157 
1992 10098 -481 25303 -1285 42629 -1040 65439 1421 126798 12538 
1993 9946 -616 25215 -1341 42266 -1309 65685 1621 136850 21777 
1994 10162 -422 25325 -1270 42663 -1014 66389 2199 139569 24285 
1995 10693 -54 26137 -739 43704 -237 67184 2851 140202 24868 
1996 10700 -73 26263 -657 44175 117 68370 3830 143799 28197 
1997 10752 -141 26881 -249 45223 908 70044 5217 149333 33342 
1998 11048 -40 27897 429 46679 2014 72193 7007 152767 36541 
1999 11622 410 28537 860 47767 2848 74344 8812 158539 41947 
2000 11518 263 28760 1011 47893 2945 74451 8903 161334 44572 
2001 11179 52 28090 559 47017 2273 73720 8287 160996 44255 
2002 10845 -184 27575 214 46467 1853 73090 7760 156050 39626 
2003 10608 -360 27250 -2 46257 1693 73219 7867 156084 39658 
2004 10589 -349 27094 -106 45906 1426 72383 7168 156536 40081 
2005 10655 -333 27357 70 46301 1728 72825 7539 159583 42941 
2006 10998 -89 27879 422 46718 2048 73947 8483 162921 46081 
2007 10878 -179 27727 321 47058 2306 74503 8950 158187 41652 
2008 10574 -300 26776 -310 45477 1107 72354 7152 155173 38834 
2009 10513 -332 26626 -410 45079 805 71616 6536 155478 39119 
2010 9880 -776 25640 -1054 44150 107 70770 5833 151884 35771 
∆ Y -6.38% 
 
-1.10% 
 
3.80% 
 
14.51% 
 
39.19% 
 Gain per Year -31 
 
-42 
 
4 
 
233 
 
1431 
The calculations in this table are based on model (3) in Table 2.6: Main Results. The table tests the hypothesis that ε=1, 
i.e., the relationship between happiness and income is log-linear, u=log(y).  Expected ∆ GINI is estimated using the 
results from model (3) in Table 14: Equality and Efficiency Trade-off in the US, 1970-2010. Data on mean quintile 
income was obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce: 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/ Table H-3:All Races). 
Chapter 3
Estimating the Non-monetary
Returns from Higher Education
3.1 Introduction
Education is widely acknowledged by economists as one of the most important in-
vestments in human capital that helps individuals acquire knowledge, cognitive skills,
intellectual disposition, and practical competences that allow them to participate
actively and more productively in social and economic life. Hundreds of academic
studies show that more educated people have better job opportunities, greater labor
force flexibility, are less likely to be affected by unemployment trends, live longer and
healthier lives, and ultimately receive higher salaries and lifetime earnings. Over the
last century, massive public and private investment has transformed the educational
system in the United States from an institution serving the privileged elite to an
institution that is universally available. In 1940, for example, less than five percent
of the US population had a bachelor’s degree and less than a quarter of all Ameri-
cans finished high school. Today more than a third of all Americans are university
educated, and high school is considered a minimum credential to find a job.
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In the past few years, however, the value of higher education has been increasingly
questioned. One of the reasons for this skepticism is the unprecedented increase in
college tuition.1 The popular press attributes this dynamic growth in the price of
higher education to a speculative bubble.2 More and more students are taking on an
increasing amount of debt to pay inflated tuition because of the belief that education
will provide them with a better life. Yet, amidst the worst economic crisis since the
1930s, many Americans find themselves without the jobs and salaries necessary to
justify paying the ever increasing price of college tuition (Vedder, 2011).3
Research in happiness economics has also produced mixed results on the relation-
ship between higher education and subjective well-being with some studies suggesting
that the relationship is strictly negative. One possible explanation is that education
makes people more ambitious which might reduce life satisfaction since higher as-
pirations are more difficult to fulfill. College graduates, for instance, are known to
experience higher levels of stress related to unemployment than their less educated
counterparts.
In the past several decades, however, a countless number of studies in psychology,
sociology, economics, and even epidemiology have recognized that education helps
students develop a multitude of skills that provide many tangible and intangible ben-
efits that go beyond the higher earning capacity of individuals. The list of these
non-monetary benefits is generally related to greater enjoyment from learning and
1Just in the past three decades the cost to attend a private university has climbed by more than
650 percent. This number is even more staggering for public institutions – a rise of 850 percent. As
a comparison, the average sales price of a new home increased by 280 percent between 1980 and the
peak of the housing bubble in 2007.
2For example, see Schumpeter (2010), Harris (2011), Vedder (2010), and French (2011).
3For the first time in history, student loan debt has now surpassed credit card debt reaching
close to $1 trillion. And while more than 45 percent of all students that start college never graduate,
the ones that do have on average $24,000 in student loans. This is more than twice the amount of
debt in 1992 when the Higher Education Act increased access to federal funding. In addition, of the
3.6 million borrowers who began repaying their loans in the fiscal year 2009, 8.8 percent defaulted
within 2 years.
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working, better health, marriage, and parenting outcomes, higher quality of interper-
sonal relationships, a stronger social network, and greater engagement in community
and civic life. Throughout this chapter, I refer to these effects as the indirect non-
monetary returns to higher education. I call the financial return from a higher degree
the indirect monetary return.
Although this literature is vast, it is rather scattered and fragmented and at best
most studies only suggest possible relationships and outcomes. The results are always
uncertain because it is difficult to isolate the effect of education from other factors such
as socioeconomic background, native ability, or the natural process of maturation. In
addition, an important question that is often neglected is how large are the non-
monetary returns from education and at what level of educational attainment they
are realized. Usually studies report the outcomes in terms of standard deviations or
probabilities, which is less intuitive for policy analysis.4
My goal in this study is to provide some rough estimates of the magnitude of
the direct and indirect non-monetary benefits from education and to suggest some
possible channels through which higher education may improve the quality of life
of individuals beyond higher earning potential. My approach differs from previous
studies in several ways. First, the backbone of my analysis is based on subjective
well-being data which has become more accepted in the economic literature in recent
years (see Chapter 1 for a thorough discussion). Second, I estimate the effect for four
different levels of educational attainment – less than high school, high school, college,
and graduate school. Since an increasing number of Americans pursue advanced de-
grees today (beyond a college diploma), it is important to understand the incremental
4For example a typical study on the effect of educational attainment on life satisfaction reports
the beta coefficients from an ordered probit (or logit) model which are interpreted as the change in
the probability of “the event” (e.g. reporting oneself in the highest happiness category “very happy”)
for every 1-unit increase in X (e.g. additional year of schooling) where the probability is determined
by a z-score for a cumulative normal distribution (e.g., Pr(z < 1.645) = .55). While such results
are informative about the general relationship, they provide little advice to policy makers who may
want to compare different policy alternatives using more straightforward measures.
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non-monetary benefits associated with each level of educational attainment and not
just the return from a college degree as in most previous studies. Third, instead
of concentrating on particular outcomes, I take a more holistic approach and try to
present a large amount of evidence that, in its totality, will hopefully be convincing.
Fourth, I investigate how the relative strengths of these indirect effects vary across
different subgroups of the population (e.g., between males and females) and over
time. Finally, my goal is to suggest some possible ways in which education works.
That is, not only to show what education achieves, but also to suggest how such out-
comes are reached. For example, education leads to greater job satisfaction, perhaps
by changing students’ attitudes toward work, making them more goal oriented or
hard working. Such questions are largely under researched in the economic literature
which often treats education as a black box: “individuals enter, something happens,
and productivity (usually one dimensional skill) increases” (Oreopoulos and Salvanes,
2011, p.1).
As I argue in this paper, an important way in which education works is to equip
students with critical thinking, congitive disposition, and interpersonal skills that
help them adapt faster to the ever changing environment around them and to build a
strong social network. Education changes people’s values and interests in a way that
makes them more open-minded for alternative ideas and lifestyles, more moderate in
their expectations, and less likely to engage in damaging personal habits. Education
may also change individuals’ values in a way that helps people get greater satisfaction
from friendships, hobbies, accomplishment at work, and participating in community
life.
Using subjective well-being data from the General Social Survey (GSS), I first
confirm that higher education is associated with large non-monetary benefits that
go beyond the financial return from a better paid job. In fact, more education is
positively and significantly correlated with happiness even after controlling for a large
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set of individual characteristics including condition of health, marital status, and
personal unemployment. I argue that the remaining portion of the non-pecuniary
return is associated with improvement of social networks – from volunteering and
trusting others to hosting a dinner party and having more hobbies.
The monetary equivalent of these non-pecuniary returns in terms of higher subjec-
tive well-being is substantial and, in many cases, is much larger than the financial one.
A person with only a high-school degree, for instance, would have to earn $41,683
more a year to be equally as happy as a person with a college degree that has a
similar socioeconomic background. These returns vary across the different subgroups
of the population. For example, the effect of education on subjective well-being is
three times as strong for women as it is for men. The evidence also suggests that the
non-monetary return has increased over the past several decades, which may explain,
at least partially, the rapid increase in the demand for college education that has
driven college tuition up to unprecedented levels.
The lion’s share of these large non-monetary benefits is earned in college while
most of the return from attending graduate school is associated with higher income.
In fact, the empirical analysis suggests that pursuing a graduate degree, and earning
a potentially higher salary, may come at the expense of some non-monetary benefits,
especially those associated with stronger community ties – greater civic engagement
and balancing social and work life.
Previous criticisms that education lowers subjective well-being by raising aspira-
tional levels and expectations for future job outcomes are found to be controversial.
Although a direct measure of aspirations is difficult to find, I show that a more op-
timistic outlook toward life is positively correlated with happiness. Further, survey
data show that more educated people tend to be less pessimistic and more moderate
when answering questions about their future. This is consistent with the results of
previous studies which find that more educated people tend to display less myopic
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behavior.
To provide additional evidence, I estimate non-parametrically the concavity of
the utility function for different levels of educational attainment. This allows me to
make inferences about the marginal value of an additional dollar of income and the
measures of inequality and risk aversion of people with different levels of educational
attainment. I find that more educated people tend to value income less, and are more
inequality and risk averse than are less educated people. In particular, people with
graduate degrees tend to show extreme risk and inequality aversion. This is consistent
with survey data which shows that people with higher educational attainment are
willing to sacrifice a higher share of their income to create a more equal society, are
less likely to engage in risky behaviors such as smoking, and value friends, hobbies,
and achievement at work more than monetary rewards.
A structural equation model provides further confidence in the results from the
main analytical part of this study and confirms that the direct effect of higher educa-
tion on subjective well-being is positive, although statistically insignificant, while the
indirect effect of education through better health, more stable marriages, lower like-
lihoods of unemployment, more enjoyable jobs, and stronger social networks is much
larger and significant. This indirect effect of education on happiness is found to be
thirteen times larger than the direct one and should not be neglected by economists.
It is also larger than the combined direct and indirect effect of higher earnings associ-
ated with a higher degree that allow people to live a more productive, healthier, and
happier life through maximizing free choice in many realms of life.
I further investigate the effects of social mobility on happiness. I find that edu-
cation is a strong predictor of social mobility although social mobility, once I control
for the current level of income, does not seem to be significantly correlated with
subjective well-being. People who start from a lower social class tend to benefit far
more from formal education than those with a better start in life. In addition, rela-
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tive income and socioeconomic status, which are strongly correlated with educational
attainment, tend to be an important determinant of subjective well-being.
Finally, I compare the effect of educational attainment on subjective well-being
between the United States and Europe. Although similar patterns are discovered, the
non-monetary benefits from education are found to be much smaller in Europe. Higher
educational attainment in Europe tends to have a stronger direct effect on subjective
well-being and an almost negligent indirect effect. On the contrary, higher education
in the United States is associated with large non-pecuniary benefits in and outside of
the labor market and a positive but insignificant direct effect. A possible explanation
of this result is the larger welfare state in the majority of European countries which
narrows the income and educational gap between individuals. Moreover, schools and
universities in the United States function more as centers for building stronger social
networks than do those in Europe.
3.2 Theoretical Considerations
The role of education in promoting individual well-being has been extensively
investigated in the academic literature. Most of the earlier studies examine the in-
direct effect of education on happiness through the income channel. Starting with
Becker (1964), the emphasis of economic analysis has been on the financial return
from schooling.5 The basic assumption is that higher income leads to greater con-
sumption which increases individual utility. A large number of studies using different
estimation techniques and considering factors such as intelligence, ability, and family
background find that, on average, an additional year of schooling increases personal
income from 7 to 12 percent (Card, 1999). Figure 3.1 in the Appendix to this chap-
ter shows that, on average, people with college degrees earn almost twice as much
5Almost all of these studies are indebted in the human capital earnings model first developed
by Mincer (1974). For a review of this literature, see Card (1999).
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as people with only a high school degree. The differences are even more staggering
between those with less than a high school education and people who finish graduate
school.
Not surprisingly, more educated people tend to report higher levels of happiness
than do their less educated counterparts, but much of this effect is also due to their
financial success of which college education is a strong determinant. Panel A of Figure
3.2 in the Appendix shows that as income goes up, self-reported happiness increases.
Panel B of the same figure also shows that better educated people are more likely to
report higher level of happiness.
More recently, economists have started investigating the effect of education on
a variety of other, non-pecuniary outcomes, such as enjoyment from work, health,
marriage, and parenting decisions that are also linked to subjective well-being. In
a recent study, Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011) conclude that these non-pecuniary
returns from education are as large as the pecuniary ones. In this section, I review the
literature on the non-pecuniary benefits which are realized directly by the student.6
3.2.1 Non-monetary Returns in the Labor Force
An obvious benefit of education is that it facilitates students in the process of
self-discovery and helps them find careers that are a better match for their talents,
interests, and aspirations. Another form of non-pecuniary benefit in the labor force is
that education provides individuals with the option to obtain even higher education.
Higher educational credentials usually come with more employment choices. A third
6In this study, I discuss the private return from education. There is a large literature that is
dedicated to the external benefits of education to society. Higher education, for example, is positively
correlated with economic growth and development (Brist & Caplan, 1999; Barro, 1991) which are also
known to promote higher levels of individual happiness (Inglehart et al. 2008, Sacks et al. 2010).
Educated communities are also less likely to experience violent conflicts, and better education is
linked with less violent criminal behavior (Witte, 1997; Yamada, 1991). Finally, educated people
tend to do more volunteer work for their communities and make more charitable donations than do
less educated people, which, in the long run, also contributes to reduce social inequalities (Dee, 2004;
Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009). All of these macroeconomic factors are also known to determine the
level of self-reported happiness (for example, see a seminal study by Di Tella et al., 2003).
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benefit is the increased ability to adjust to changing job opportunities (for example,
due to rapid technological change).7 In this case, adaptability is seen as an output
from obtaining a higher degree.
Having a good education, then, increases the likelihood of finding a job and earning
higher income and decreases the reliance on social assistance. The long-term and
negative effect of unemployment on subjective well-being is well-established in the
economic literature (e.g., see Di Tella et al., 2003, and Sheeran et al., 1995). But
more education can also increase the likelihood of finding not just a job, but a job
that is more interesting, less stressful, safer, more prestigious, and ultimately more
enjoyable. Lower relative income, for example, is associated with higher levels of
stress and deterioration of mental and physical health (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2011).
Panels A, B, and C in Figure 3.3 suggest that people with more education are less
vulnerable to unemployment trends, experience less stress at work, and are treated
with more respect in their workplace. And although better educated people work, on
average, more hours (Panel D, Fig.3.3), they ultimately report much higher satisfac-
tion with their job (Panel E, Fig.3.3). Panels E and F of Figure 3.2 further show that
job satisfaction and stress at work tend to be strongly correlated to overall happiness
from life. Several recent studies find that people with more education are also more
likely to find a more meaningful and satisfying job (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994,
Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011; Rivera-Batiz, 1992), and have greater autonomy and
independence at work (Albert and Davia, 2005). Similarly, Oreopoulos and Salvanes
(2011) show that workers with similar backgrounds, but more schooling, have jobs
that offer a greater sense of accomplishment and are more prestigious.
These observations may also be a reflection of the fact that more educated people
have different attitudes towards working. An important aspect of education is to help
students realize that learning and work are intrinsically valuable and to help them
7See Weisbrod (1962) for a more detailed discussion of these non-monetary benefits
91
find a career path that will be more enjoyable and rewarding in the future. Figure 3.3
provides evidence that more educated people consider “interesting job” and “feeling
a sense of accomplishment at work” to be more important than monetary rewards
(Panels G and H). Furthermore, better educated people are less likely to put forth
the “minimum amount of effort” at work (Panel F, Figure 3.3). Virtually no one with
a graduate degree displays such behavior while close to one fifth of all workers with
less than a high school education do. Finally, a greater proportion of the respondents
with higher degrees report that even if they become rich, they will continue working
(Panel I, Figure 3.3).
These observations suggest that a crucial way in which education may increase
life satisfaction is not only by providing more educated people with an opportunity to
find a better job that pays more, but also, and perhaps more importantly, by allowing
them to enjoy their work more – by having more autonomy and feeling a greater sense
of accomplishment and purpose. As an added economic benefit, mastery, autonomy,
and a sense of purpose at work are known to lead to greater productivity, especially
for tasks that involve more sophisticated cognitive skills (for a summary see Pink,
2010).
3.2.2 Non-monetary Returns Outside of the Labor Force
So far we have discussed the private benefits of education in terms of better em-
ployment conditions and attitudes toward work. But some of the value of education
is realized in terms of better choices and opportunities outside of the labor market.
Again, an important way in which education works is by teaching students criti-
cal thinking 8 and social skills that allow them to respond more effectively to new
8Critical thinking has been defined in many different ways. Richard Paul (1988, 49), for example,
describes it as the ability to reach sound conclusions based on the available information. Barry Beyer
(1983) relates it to assessing the authenticity, accuracy and worth of knowledge claims, beliefs, or
arguments. Stephen Norris (1985, 40-45) says it helps students to “apply everything they already
know and feel, to evaluate their own thinking, and especially to change their behavior.”
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information and problems in all spheres of social and economic life.
Although the education literature has not yet provided conclusive explanations
of how students acquire critical thinking skills, there are good reasons to believe
that such skills are not something that necessarily develops with maturity and could
be taught. In other words, unlike intelligence that can be genetically determined,
critical thinking is a skill that can be improved over time (Walsh and Paul, 1988).
Since more schooling tends to be strongly correlated with critical thinking and social
skills, college may provide a necessary platform for the development of such skills
(Cascio and Lewis, 2006; Heckman, 2006; Green and Riddell, 2003).
A more technical explanation of how education may improve performance comes
from Grossman (2006) who outlines two separate models to describe how cognitive
development generates returns to students through productive and allocative effi-
ciency. For example, the productive efficiency model suggests that education teaches
students time and resource management skills that allow them to achieve better out-
comes with less resources – more educated people are able to do more with less. On
the other hand, the allocative efficiency model suggests that education helps people
make better choices which allows them to achieve superior outcomes with the same
level of resources.
3.2.2.1 Health
A key non-monetary benefit from additional education is improvement in physical
and mental health. For example, respondents in the GSS with less than a high school
degree report twice as many days of poor mental and physical health when asked to
evaluate their health condition in the past month. On the contrary, almost half of
those with graduate and undergraduate degrees describe their health as “excellent”
compared to less than one fifth of the least educated. Health is one of the strongest
determinants of subjective well-being (Fig 3.2, Panel D).
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Good health has many benefits, the most obvious one is reduced health care costs
and longer life which may translate into higher productivity and lifetime earnings. But
good health can also increase access to education, jobs, and improve social relations
which may also enhance economic opportunities. Panels A through C in Figure 3.4
further show that better educated people are far more likely to report better health.
Although the positive association between higher education and health is well-
established in the literature (e.g., see Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006; Mirowsky and
Ross, 2003), the explanations for this relationship differ. Some studies suggest that
higher education affects health indirectly through better work and economic condi-
tions. Compared to the poorly educated, well educated respondents are more likely to
earn higher incomes and have more fulfilling jobs and less likely to be unemployed and
experience economic hardship which in turn can significantly improve their health.
But even beyond the effect of higher income and better jobs, people with higher
education are still more likely to have a strong social network and to experience a
greater sense of control over their life which is associated with better health. More
importantly, the better educated are less likely to engage in risky personal habits
such as smoking and drinking and are more likely to exercise and get a regular health
check-up (Ross and Wu, 1995).
3.2.2.2 Marriage
Another non-pecuniary benefit from higher education is that well-educated people,
perhaps due to their higher earning potential and higher socio-economic ranking, are
more attractive on the competitive marriage market (Chiappori et al. 2009; Becker,
1973). Some economists have even concluded that the sole purpose of going to college
for women in the mid-twentieth century has been to attract more educated husbands
(Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). Panel D of Figure 3.4 shows that more educated
people are more likely to have partners with higher education. This relationship is
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also well-established in the economic literature (Rockwell, 1976; Chadwick and Solon,
2002).
In addition, education may lead to more stable marriages. Panels E and F in
Figure 3.4 show that people with higher education are more likely to be married
and far less likely to be separated or divorced. Panel C of Figure 3.2 further shows
that marital status tends to be a strong determinant of self-reported happiness with
those who are ‘separated’ or ‘divorced’ reporting significantly lower subjective well-
being than do married couples. Qari (2010), for example, argues that individuals do
not fully adapt to the positive spike in happiness from marriage. He estimates the
monetary equivalent of these long-term non-pecuniary benefits to be 85,000 Euros
per year for men.
3.2.2.3 Parenting Decisions
There is also abundant evidence that women with more education have fewer
children (see Jones and Tertilt, 2008). Fewer children are associated with higher
life satisfaction. This negative correlation is often explained by differences in family
structure (see White et al., 1986). For example, having more children is often asso-
ciated with lower interaction, more financial dissatisfaction, and more traditionalism
in the division of labor. More importantly, educated people tend to be better parents
(Leigh, 1998; Grogger, 1997) and parental education is one of the strongest deter-
minants of child development. Recent research, for example, suggests that parental
education is correlated with a myriad of positive outcomes – from children’s cognitive
development in early life to their educational attainment and job prospects later in
life (e.g., see Cunha and Heckman, 2009).
One explanation of these findings is that more educated people differ in their
parenting styles. For example, better educated parents not only spend more time
with their children, but they are also less likely to discipline them and more likely
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to encourage them to pursue new knowledge and to think independently. Data from
the GSS point to similar conclusions: well educated people are less likely to favor
spanking to discipline their children (Panel G, Figure 3.4), more likely to be in favor
of their kids learning a second language in high school (Panel H, Figure 3.4), and less
likely to agree that obedience and respect for authority are important virtues that
children should learn (Panel I, Figure 3.4). Finally, the higher socio-economic status
of more educated people and their better work ethic and personal habits may teach
their children similar virtues by example and motivate them to excel even further.
3.2.2.4 Social Capital and Civic Engagement
Education is often described as one of the most robust predictors of social capital
and civic engagement (Helliwell and Putnam, 2007). Social capital reflects the idea
that social connections – friendships, volunteering, and other relationships – generate
value beyond the intrinsic pleasure that people derive from interacting with others.9
Although definitions vary, most sociologists agree that social capital consists of the
social networks and the shared values and norms they generate such as interpersonal
trust, tolerance of diversity, reciprocity, and mutual support.
Figure 3.5 presents several different indicators of social capital from the GSS and
how they relate with educational attainment. First, well educated people tend to
place more importance on friendships and hobbies, and to report, on average, having
more close friends (Panels A through C, Figure 3.5). Similar patterns are also revealed
in panels D through L which show that respondents with better education are also
more likely to influence the decisions of others and less likely to be influenced by
network TV. They are also more likely to share the belief that helping others who are
worse off in the rest of the world is important as is protecting the rights of minorities.
9The Organization of Economic Development and Cooperation(OECD), for example, defines
social capital as the “networks together with shared norms, values, and understandings that facilitate
cooperation within and across groups” (OECD, 2001).
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Higher education also tends to be strongly correlated with social trust (Panel G)
and perception of fairness (Panel H). Almost twice as many of the respondents with
a college degree, for example, report that other people ‘can be trusted’ compared
to the respondents with the lowest educational attainment. Finally, more educated
people place greater importance on understanding the reasoning of others (Panel D)
which reveals that they are more open-minded. Tolerance for alternative ideologies
and lifestyles is an important virtue that higher education promotes. Such personal
traits also makes individuals more approachable and friendly.
Recent studies show that spending time with family, friends, and colleagues is
associated with higher average levels of positive feelings (Kahneman and Krueger,
2006). But even beyond the intrinsic pleasure that people derive from spending time
with others, social connections have a positive external effect on individuals and
society. Social networks, for example, provide both material and emotional support
in good and bad times. As a consequence, people with strong social networks tend
to report better mental and physical health (Veenstra, 2000), are more likely to be
employed and earn a higher salary (Goldthorpe et al., 1987), more successfully recover
from health shocks such as heart attacks (Case et al., 1992), are less affected by
stress (Williams et al.,1981), and ultimately report higher levels of life satisfaction.
Helliwell and Putnam (2004) find that social capital (measured by the strength of
family, neighborhood, religious, and community ties) is independently and robustly
positively correlated with life satisfaction, both directly and through their impact on
health. On the other hand, people with weak social networks have limited contact
with others, less economic opportunities, and are more likely to feel socially isolated.
People also derive pleasure from helping others. There is a large literature in
experimental economics, for example, on trust and ultimatum games that finds that
people are surprisingly altruistic and often willing to sacrifice some of their payoffs to
achieve a more equal distribution of outcomes. Well educated people are also more
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likely to volunteer and people who volunteer are more satisfied with their life than are
non-volunteers (Meier and Stutzer, 2007). Time spent volunteering also helps create
a more healthy civil society. Figure 3.6 shows that more educated people volunteer
more than do their less educated counterparts. The data, however, suggests that
people with graduate degrees are less likely to volunteer than college graduates in
several different areas.
Thus, an important non-pecuniary benefit from education may come from the
effect of education on social capital – improving the quality of personal relationships,
strengthening social networks, and increasing social interaction such as civic engage-
ment and volunteering. This effect may be increasing but at a decreasing rate with
educational attainment.
3.2.3 Negative Returns from Education
Of course education comes with some negative non-pecuniary returns. For ex-
ample, better paid jobs also come with more responsibilities and expectations for
improved performance which may lead to longer work hours and more stress at work.
Figure 3.3, however, shows that although people with higher degrees work, on aver-
age, more hours than people with lower education (Panel D), they also experience
less stress at work (Panel B), have safer jobs (Panel L), feel a greater sense of ac-
complishment at work (Panel H), and are more likely to enjoy their job (Panel E).
Several studies in epidemiology find that better education and higher occupational
status are associated with lower levels of stress hormones such as cortisol (see Cohen
et al., 2006; and Steptoe et al., 2003). Socio-economic status has been recognized
as one of the most important determinants of stress in numerous other studies as
well (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010). This observation is also consistent with Panel J
of Figure 3.3 which shows that a smaller proportion of people with higher degrees
report ‘I always feel rushed’ compared to those who are less well educated.
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Employees that work longer hours, however, may find it challenging to balance
their work and daily living. Using data from the GSS, Oreopoulos and Salvanes
(2011) point out the tendency for college graduates to report wanting to spend more
time with friends and family. Yet, this result could be because more educated people
value family, friendships, and hobbies more than those who are less educated (Fig
3.5, Panels A and B). Panel K of Figure 3.3 shows that people with higher degrees
are more likely to also derive higher satisfaction from family life.
Another negative effect from higher education is the price of unemployment. Peo-
ple with higher degrees have better jobs and earn higher incomes and obviously losing
a job has a higher economic cost to them. Not surprisingly, Clark and Oswald (1994)
find that better educated people tend to cope with unemployment less successfully
than do those who have lower degrees.
Unlike the numerous studies that find a positive association between education
and happiness,10 Clark and Oswald (1996) show that more educated people report
lower levels of life satisfaction. One possible explanation of their findings is that edu-
cation raises job expectations, which are more difficult to fulfill. Another explanation
is that inequality of income increases with social class, and relative income tends to
play an important role in determining individual happiness.11 Although the authors
provide these explanations for their findings, explanations that have become com-
monly accepted among economists, even they urge that these results be taken with
caution (Clark and Oswald, 1996, p.14). Perhaps, these findings are unique to the
limited data sample of 5000 British workers in the early 1990s. Thus, the relationship
between education, aspirations, and happiness is not as clear.
10See Cun˜ado and de Garcia (2011) for a summary of this literature.
11Several other studies also find a negative association between education and life satisfaction or
the absence of a significant relationship between the two (e.g., see Klein and Maher, 1966; Warr,
1992; and Blanchflower and Oswald, 1992)
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3.2.4 Direct Relationship between Education and Happiness
Several studies explore the direct link between education and happiness and find
a positive correlation between the two even after accounting for some of the indirect
channels through which better education may positively affect well-being such as
income, marriage, and health. For example, Cun˜ado and de Garcia (2011) study
the impact of education on happiness in Spain using individual level data from the
European Social Survey and discover that education has a positive (and direct) effect
on happiness. The authors attribute this result to greater self-confidence and self-
estimation which, as they argue, is a result from acquiring knowledge.
Oreopoulous and Salvanes (2011) find that more schooling leads individuals to
make better decisions about health, marriage, and parenting. The authors argue
that an important way in which school works is to make individuals more patient,
goal-oriented, and less likely to engage in more risky behaviors.
Using individual data on more than 118,000 individuals from the World Bank’s
World Value Survey, Castriota (2006) reports a similar effect of education on hap-
piness. The author argues that low education not only reduces the chances that an
individual will acquire a high-paying job, but also to have a culturally stimulating
life. Other studies also report a positive link between educational attainment and
happiness (for example, see Layard, 2005; Albert and Davia, 2005, and Di Tella et
al., 2003).
3.2.5 Summary of the Relationship
To summarize, education is not only intrinsically valuable because it fulfills one
of the most basic human needs, the need to learn, but also because it improves the
material and emotional well-being of humans through a variety of indirect and direct
channels. Higher education provides the platform for students to acquire new skills
and knowledge that allows them to manage their time and resources more efficiently.
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It helps students develop critical thinking skills and practical competencies that help
them adapt faster to the ever changing world around them. It also influences students’
preferences and values. College educated people, for example, tend to live healthier
lifestyles and engage in less risky behaviors – they exercise more and smoke less. They
also tend to value learning and work for their own sake – they are less likely to see their
job as a burden and are more likely to work with a sense of purpose, which can provide
them with a greater sense of accomplishment and enjoyment. Finally, education has
an effect on the formation of personal identity – better educated people are more
open minded towards new ideas and lifestyles, less swayed by tradition and societal
dogmas, more autonomous, less authoritative, and more tolerant toward minorities.
They are also more likely to show sympathy toward fellow human beings.
All of this can lead to large non-monetary returns in and outside of the labor
market. For example, better educated people are more likely to be employed and to
report higher satisfaction from their work although they tend to work longer hours
and hold more responsible positions. Higher education is also associated with better
health, marriage and parenting outcomes. Finally, more educated people tend to have
stronger social networks and participate more in community life.
3.3 Data
Data for the main analytical part of this study were collected from the nation-
ally representative General Social Survey (GSS) conducted by the National Opinion
Research Center at the University of Chicago. The GSS is a cross-national survey
that covers the period from 1972-2010 and with more than 5,000 variables and 65,000
observations, it is often regarded as the single best source of data on societal trends.
Table 3.1 in the Appendix provides descriptions and sources for the main variables in
this study. Table 3.2 shows summary statistics. Additional data for the estimations
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in section 3.5.12 were obtained from the European Value Study (EVS) which is a
large-scale, cross national, and longitudinal survey on how Europeans think about
family, work, politics and society. The EVS includes four waves from 1981 to 2008 in
49 countries and regions.12
3.3.1 Subjective Well-being
While traditionally data on the self-reported level of happiness (or subjective well-
being) has been viewed with suspicion by economists, in the past two decades such
data has become more widely accepted in economic research.13 Thus, the dependent
variable in this study is the self-reported level of happiness which came from the GSS
(GSS variable: happy) and was collected using the following question: “Taken all
together, how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very
happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”14 The data was then recoded so that the
answers correspond to the following numerical values: (1) ‘not too happy’, (2) ‘pretty
happy’, and (3) ‘very happy’.
3.3.2 Educational Attainment
The variable on educational attainment (GSS variable: degree) is a categorical one
that measures the highest level of education attained by the respondent: ‘less than
high school’, ‘high school’, ‘college’, and ‘graduate school’. Each level of educational
attainment enters the regression as a dummy variable (‘less than high school’ is used
as the base).
12I use the longitudinal data file 1981-2008, which is available at: http://zacat.gesis.org/
13For justification of using subjective well-being data see: Frey & Stutzer (2002), Kahneman &
Kruger (2006), and Di Tella & McCulloch (2003). These studies argue that subjective well-being
data passes different validation tests and moves predictably with other external variables (such as
income or growth in GDP) and is thus valid, reliable, and comparable.
14A small fraction of responses “Don’t know” and ”No answer” are ignored by the analysis.
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3.3.3 Personal Income
The independent variable on income (GSS variable: conrinc), is constructed from
categorical data and represents inflation adjusted annual personal income before taxes
(in constant 2005 dollars).15 This variable has been widely used in the social sciences
and previous research, for example, has successfully applied it in estimating the re-
turn from college education with results that do not deviate significantly from what
hundreds of other studies on this topic discover (see Card, 1999).
3.3.4 Job Satisfaction and Socio-economic Status
The measure of job satisfaction (GSS variable: satjob) is a straightforward one.
Respondents were asked to answer the question: “On the whole, how satisfied are you
with the work you do?” Responses were evaluated on a scale from 0 ‘very dissatisfied’
to 10 ‘very satisfied’. To evaluate the relative position of a person in society, I create
a dummy variable on ‘relative income’ which indicates whether individual income
is lower than the median income in the sample for any given year (0) or higher
(1). The GSS also provides a measure of socio-economic status (GSS variable: sei),
which is derived from prestige scores based on levels of income and education within
occupations.16
3.3.5 Marital Status, Subjective Health, and Social Capital
Marital status (GSS variable: marital) was obtained with the following question:
“Are you currently – married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been
married?” Data on self-reported health (GSS variable: health) were collected with
15For details refer to GSS Methodological Report No. 101 (Holt, 2004)
16See Nakao, Keiko and Treas, Judith, “The 1989 Socioeconomic Index of Occupations: Construc-
tion from the 1989 Occupational Prestige Scores,” GSS Methodological Report No. 74. Chicago:
NORC, 1992.
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the question: “Would you say your own health, in general, is excellent, good, fair, or
poor?”
Although a universal measure of social capital is difficult to find, most sociologists
and economists agree that measures of interpersonal trust and norms of reciprocity
can be used as a reliable proxy. Helliwell and Putnam (2004), for example, argue that
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness are a nearly universal concomitant of dense
social networks so that the belief that others around you can be trusted is one of the
strongest predictors of social capital at the aggregate level. High levels of social trust
in the context of dense social networks provide the crucial mechanism through which
social capital affects aggregate outcomes.
Thus, the main variable used to measure social capital in this study is social trust,
which was collected with the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (0 ‘can
trust’, 1 ‘cannot trust’). In addition, to evaluate the strength of social networks I use
variables that measure the importance of friendships and non-work activities. The
former is collected with the question: “[H]ow much satisfaction you get from your
friendships?” (0 ‘none’ to 7 ‘very great deal’). And the latter comes from responses
to the question: “[H]ow much satisfaction do you get from non-work activities? ’ (0
‘none’ to 7 ‘very great deal’)
3.3.6 Optimism and Aspirations
Even though direct measures of aspirations do not exist, I use several different
variables in different specifications which evaluate the attitudes and expectations of
people about their future. The first variable, optimism (GSS variable:optimist), is
constructed from responses to the statement: “I’m always optimistic about my future”
(from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 4 ‘strongly agree’). The second variable, pessimism
(GSS variable: pessimst), is collected from responses to the statement: ”I hardly ever
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expect things to go my way” (from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 4 ‘strongly agree’). One
can also view this variable as an indirect measure of the sense of control that people
have over their lives.
3.3.7 Background Variables
The GSS dataset also provides a number of background variables on the individual
level. The ones that are used as controls in this study are well known to affect the
individual level of happiness and include: age, gender, race, marital status, personal
unemployment, number of children, intelligence, and number of siblings.
To test the robustness of the model, and to make my case stronger, I also refer
to several other variables from the GSS. These variables are described either in the
footnotes or in the Appendix to Chapter 3. I provide the original GSS labels of the
variables in parenthesis to facilitate replication of my results.17
3.4 Empirical Model
To examine the relationship between educational attainment, personal income,
and happiness, I use a reduced form model which is common in the happiness litera-
ture (e.g., see Di Tella et al., 2003):18
ui = αlogyi +
j∑
βjEducationalAttainmenti + γ
′X + νi (3.1)
17The GSS dataset can be downloaded at: http://www3.norc.org/gss+website/.
18One can think of this model as a Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function such that:
ui =
 y
1−ε
i − 1
1− ε if ε 6= 1
logyi if ε = 1
In this specification, ε is the parameter of risk aversion, or the negative elasticity of marginal income
(Layard, 2008). As shown in Chapter 2, ε is closer to .5, in this study I make the assumption
that ε=1, so that the relationship between income and happiness takes the log-liner form. This is
a common assumption in the happiness literature and allows for easier comparison with previous
studies.
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where yi is individual income (before taxes and measured in 2005 constant dollars),
19
X is a vector of personal characteristics that includes age, age squared, sex, race,
marital status, and condition of health. Other variables such as job satisfaction and
social capital are also included as controls in various stages of the study. Educational
attainment is a vector of dummy variables that measure four levels of educational
attainment – ‘less than high school’, ‘high school’, ‘college’, and ‘graduate school’.
‘Less than high school’ is used as a base category. Finally, νi is the idiosyncratic
error.
Since true utility is not observed, I follow Layard et al. (2008) and make the
following assumptions:
1. Reported happiness, hi, is linked to true utility, ui via a fixed transformation
such that:
hi = fi(ui) = f(ui) + µi (3.2)
2. In addition, the transformation is assumed to be linear:
hi = ui + µi (3.3)
Thus, my final model estimates:
hi = αlogyi +
j∑
βjEducationalAttainmenti + γ
′X + i (3.4)
where  = νi + µi
A significant body of literature exists to justify the assumptions above. First,
reports on happiness tend to be consistent with other measures of well-being. For ex-
ample, Diener & Suh (1995) show that the level of self-reported happiness is correlated
with reports made by a third-party (e.g., a friend of the subject). Second, happiness
19For details on how the income variable was calculated refer to GSS Methodological Report No.
101 (Holt, 2004).
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data tends to move in a predictable way with external factors such as unemployment
and marriage. For example, income increases predicted happiness, unemployment de-
creases it, etc. (Kahneman, 1999). Finally, studies in neuropsychology suggest that
answers to happiness reports are correlated in a consistent manner with the activ-
ity in different areas of the brain associated with positive and negative experiences
(Davidson, 1992, 2000). This literature is thoroughly described in Chapter 1 of this
dissertation.
It is expected that higher educational attainment will contribute to one’s subjec-
tive well-being not only indirectly by affecting income, health, marriage, parenting
outcomes, job satisfaction, and social networks, but also directly by providing indi-
viduals with more meaningful goals, enriching their cultural and social experience,
and creating a sense of control over future events. Consequently, people with college
degrees may have a more optimistic outlook and less stressful life.20
I report the coefficients from an OLS estimation in the main analytical part of this
Chapter. There are two reasons for this approach. First, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004)
provide extensive evidence that the results from OLS and ordered probit regressions
hardly differ in the context of happiness research. I find that this is true in the context
of this study too. Second, I am interested in estimating the marginal effects on the
interaction between inequality and income on happiness. Ai and Norton (2003) show
that the interaction terms in ordered probit regressions are more difficult to interpret
than commonly assumed. Thus, using an OLS approach better fits the goals of my
line of inquiry.
20Such rationale comes from Michalos (1991, pp. 20-28) who provides a summary of a profile of a
happy person: “A happy person is likely to have low levels of fear, high level of self-esteem, and an
emotionally stable personality; a strong social orientation; healthy satisfying, warm love and social
relationships; an active lifestyle with meaningful work; and to be relatively optimistic, worry free,
present-oriented, and well-directed.”
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3.5 Estimation Results
3.5.1 Main Results
Table 3.3 presents the results from four different OLS models. Each model builds
from the previous one by including additional control variables and examining the cor-
responding changes in the magnitude and significance of the variable on educational
attainment. Models 2 and 3 include variables on marital and health status (respec-
tively). Model 4 adds additional microeconomic controls such as intelligence which is
used as a proxy for ability. In the absence of a structural model, such an approach
allows one to estimate the overall effect of educational attainment on subjective well-
being and to more clearly assess the direct and indirect channels through which this
relationship works. For example, if higher education is associated with better health
and marriage decision which also affect one’s level of subjective well-being, then in
the absence of these controls the coefficients on educational attainment should cap-
ture both the direct and indirect effect of education on subjective well-being through
these channels. On the other hand, once the model controls for health and marital
status, the effect of education on happiness will diminish.
Model 1 in Table 3.3 presents the most basic specification that includes controls
for age, age squared, sex, race, and personal unemployment. The base for all dummies
is an employed white male with less than high school education and who is married.
All of the coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant which
provides confidence in the foundations of the theoretical model. First, the coefficient
on the log of personal income is statistically significant and indicates that money
can buy happiness, but at a diminishing rate. Next, as expected, the relationship
between happiness and age is found to be non-linear with the least happy years
occurring around the age of 40. The coefficient of gender and race confirms the
findings of previous studies: women report themselves happier than men and blacks
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report themselves less happy than whites. The level of self-reported happiness is also
found to be inversely associated with personal unemployment.
The coefficients on the dummy variables of educational attainment reveal that
after controlling for income and some personal characteristics, people with a higher
degree, on average, report higher levels of happiness than people with lower degrees.
A college degree, for instance, is associated with approximately 0.06 points higher
happiness score (on a scale from 1-3) relative to a high school degree. This corre-
sponds to approximately one tenth of a standard deviation in happiness. Obtaining
a graduate degree, however, is associated with only .02 points happiness premium
relative to a college degree. This suggests that most of the non-monetary benefits
are obtained in college while the marginal benefit from obtaining a graduate degree,
once we control for the level of personal income, is significantly lower.
3.5.2 Accounting for Marriage and Health
Following Becker (1973) and Chiappori et al. (2009), Model 2 in Table 3.3 adds
additional controls for marital status and the number of children. Marriage appears
to be one of the strongest determinants of happiness. Married people, for instance,
report .3 points higher happiness relative to divorced and separated couples and the
coefficients on educational attainment remain almost unchanged. The only change is
in the variable on ‘graduate school’ which slightly decreases in magnitude indicating
that a very small portion of the happiness premium associated with obtaining a
graduate degree is linked to better marriage choices.
Based on the findings of Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006) and Mirowsky and Ross
(2003), Model 3 adds variables to control for the effect of health. As expected, health
is one of strongest determinants of happiness. People with ‘excellent health’, for
instance, report, on average, .5 points higher happiness than people with ‘poor health’
which is equal to almost one standard deviation (.64) in the happiness variable. This
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effect is almost ten times stronger than the effect of obtaining even the highest level of
education possible and about twice as large as the effect associated with marriage. In
addition, including health in the happiness regression decreases the magnitude on the
coefficient of college degree and graduate degree by more than a half. These results
suggest that a large portion of the the happiness gains associated with a higher degree
are because of better health. Perhaps, this result is a reflection of the observation
that more educated people have healthier lifestyles and engage in less risky personal
habits – they smoke less, drink alcohol less often, and are more likely to exercise
regularly.
Finally, Model 4 in Table 3.3 examines the effect of intelligence and the number
of siblings on happiness. Although good measures of intelligence and ability are
difficult to find, I use the variable wordsum from the GSS, which is a ten word
vocabulary subtest from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). While the
wordsum subtest is not a direct test of intelligence, but rather a test of knowledge,
vocabulary knowledge correlates very highly with tests of general intelligence (Zhu &
Weiss, 2005, Alwin, 1991). The results suggest that more intelligent people are also
less happy, perhaps providing evidence for the popular saying that “ignorance is bliss.”
Controlling for intelligence makes the coefficient on graduate degree smaller than the
coefficient on college degree. This suggests that some of the non-monetary effects
associated with better health and marriage choices as a result of better education
could be because of the knowledge that is acquired in graduate school.
3.5.3 Job Satisfaction and Prestige
Next, I examine the effect of job satisfaction and socio-economic status on subjec-
tive well-being. I conjecture that much of the non-pecuniary benefits from educational
attainment are related to better job opportunities, and more flexibility in the labor
market which allow well-educated people to find more fulfilling and prestigious jobs.
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Table 3.4 presents the estimations from four different models. All models include the
basic controls used in model 4 of Table 3.3.
Model 1 starts by estimating the effect of hours worked on subjective well-being.
More time spent at work comes at the expense of time spent with family, friends, and
non-work activities such as hobbies which people also value. Surprisingly, however,
the number of hours worked is found to be positively correlated with subjective well-
being although the coefficient is statistically insignificant. One possible explanation
for this result is that what matters to people is not how much they work, but what
kind of work they do, and how fulfilling their job is.
Model 2 controls for job satisfaction. As expected, job satisfaction is strongly and
positively correlated with happiness. People that are more satisfied with their work
are also far more likely to be happier in general. But even beyond the effect of a more
fulfilling job, education has a positive and substantial effect on subjective well-being.
Interestingly, however, the marginal effect from obtaining a graduate degree (beyond
a college one) is negative (column 4 of Table 3.4). This suggests that the majority
of the non-pecuniary benefits from attending a graduate school are associated with a
better job.
Model 3 adds an additional variable on relative income which is used as a proxy
for economic status. The results do not change substantially. In fact, the coefficient
on graduate school remains the same while the coefficients on college and high school
degree increase slightly in magnitude. This suggests that more educated people from
the same social class tend to experience higher levels of happiness.
Finally, Model 4 uses an alternative measure of socio-economic status which comes
directly from the GSS. This variable accounts not only for the economic position of
a person in society, but also for the prestige of their job. Once this additional re-
gressor is included, the coefficients on educational attainment decrease substantially
in magnitude and lose their significance with only the coefficient on college degree
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significant at the .1 level. This result, however, could be driven by the fact that the
variable on socio-economic status is highly correlated with personal income, educa-
tional attainment, and job prestige – variables that are used to create it in the first
place.
3.5.4 Social Capital
I next turn to analyzing the effect of social capital on subjective well-being. Table
3.5 reports four models which add several control variables that measure the strength
of social networks and the shared values and norms they generate such as interpersonal
trust and sense of fairness. All models include the standard personal variables, marital
and health status, and also control for job satisfaction.
I start by including a variable that measures the satisfaction that respondents get
from friendships on a scale from ‘1’(none) to ‘10’(very great deal). I use this variable
as a proxy for the strength of social networks. Although the satisfaction that one de-
rives from friendships is not a perfect measure of social networks, this variable tends
to be strongly correlated with the number of close friends that respondents report
as well as the number of people that respondents can call for advice when making
important decisions. As expected, satisfaction from friendships has a strong positive
and significant effect on happiness – people that derive more pleasure from interact-
ing with their friends are happier. Adding this additional variable does not change
significantly the strength of the coefficients on educational attainment, although the
variable on graduate degree becomes insignificant.
Model 2 uses an alternative measure of social trust – whether the respondent
owns a gun. Owning a gun may represent general sense of trust and feeling of safety
in society. Again, the results do not change the magnitude and significance of the
variables on educational attainment. Owning a gun, on the other hand, is associated
with a higher level of happiness. Perhaps, owning a gun provides a sense of security,
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which then translates into higher subjective well-being.
Model 3 further examines the effect of satisfaction that people derive from activi-
ties outside of their work on subjective well-being. Interestingly, the direct effect from
satisfaction with hobbies tends to be stronger than the effect associated with friend-
ships. Once I control for hobbies, the strength of the coefficient on college declines
significantly relative to the coefficient on graduate school. This may indicate that a
large non-pecuniary benefit from pursuing a college degree is related to developing a
sense for the importance of non-work activities and civic engagement. For example,
people with college degrees are far more likely to volunteer, and in many cases, they
engage in more civic activities than even those with graduate degrees.
Model 4 examines how shared norms such as social trust and a sense of fairness
affect subjective well-being. As expected, both of these variables have a positive
effect on the self-reported level of happiness – people that trust those around them
and perceive the world as more fair are also more likely to be happier. Including
these controls in the regression, however, substantially decreases the magnitude and
significance of the coefficients on educational attainment. The coefficient on college,
for instance, declines by more than 70 percent and the one on graduate school decrease
by a little less than 25 percent. Neither of the coefficients on educational attainment
remain significant. These results suggest that a large share of the non-pecuniary
returns from attending college are associated with social capital – stronger social
networks and developing a sense of trust and fairness.
Finally, Table 3.6 provides preliminary evidence that educational attainment is a
strong determinant of social capital. I report the results from OLS and ordered probit
estimations of educational attainment on the four measures used as a proxy for social
capital in Table 3.5–the importance of friendships, social trust, the importance of
hobbies and owning a gun.21 The results confirm that higher education is a strong
21A detailed description of the dependent variables is provided in the footnote to the table.
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determinant of social capital. Model 1, for example, suggests that better educated
people are more likely to place higher importance on friendships than less educated
people. Model 2 shows that obtaining a higher education also increases the sense of
trust that one has towards other members of society. Model 3 further suggests that
people with higher education tend to value non-work activities more. Finally, model
4 shows that education is correlated with the likelihood that one will own a gun.
3.5.5 Optimism and Aspirations
A common explanation for the negative effect of education on subjective well-being
is that more educated people have higher aspirations which are more difficult to fulfill.
This is the reason why, for instance, the negative effect of personal unemployment
on subjective well-being tends to be much stronger for the well-educated. Panel
B of Figure 3.8 further suggests that more educated people are less likely to be
pessimistic about their future. An important role of education is to improve students’
knowledge and skills that allow them to understand and master the world around
them. This leads to economic and social opportunities that improve the sense of
control that people feel over their lives. Such a relationship is also suggested by
Panel I of Figure 3.8 which shows that better educated people are more likely to
disagree with the statement: “I have little control over the bad things that happen
to me.” The results for optimism, however, are mixed. Panel A of Figure 3.8 shows
that a smaller proportion of the better educated people ‘strongly agree’ with the
statement “I am always optimistic about the future”. But a lot fewer people with
higher degrees also disagree with this statement. This suggests that more educated
people are more moderate when it comes to their expectations about the future.
Perhaps the multi-disciplinary curriculum at most universities provides students with
a broader perspective about the world and teaches them to be more skeptical and
moderate in their expectations about future events.
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In this section, I address these arguments by providing evidence that a more op-
timistic outlook on life generally increases subjective well-being. Table 3.7 presents
the basic results from four different models which include several proxies for expecta-
tions about the future. Data on these variables is available for 2004 and came from a
special topical module on “Genes” from the General Social Survey. Thus, the models
include only the basic variables – age, age squared, sex, race, and personal income –
and are far less robust than the evidence presented so far.
Model 1 includes a variable that measures responses to the statement: “I am al-
ways optimistic about my future” from ‘1’ (strongly disagree) to ‘4’ (strongly agree).
The results suggest that people with similar income who have a more optimistic
outlook about the future also tend to be happier. Although the coefficients on educa-
tional attainment show the same pattern as before – better educated people are more
likely to report higher levels of happiness – they are no longer statistically significant.
These results, of course, could be driven by the smaller sample size.
Models 2 and 3 present the results from the same regressions using two alternative
proxies for aspirations. Model 2, for example, examines the effect of pessimism. This
variable was collected using responses to the statement “I hardly ever expect things
to go my way” from ‘1’ (strongly disagree) to ‘4’ (strongly agree). And model 3
examines whether the main results change if optimism is measured with the statement:
“Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad” from ‘1’ (strongly
disagree) to ‘4’ (strongly agree). Both models show that less pessimistic people and
more optimistic ones are more likely to be happier.
Finally, in model 4, I use an alternative measure collected with the question: “How
much confidence do you have in the scientific community” from ‘1’ (hardly any) to
‘3’ (a great deal). This variable is strongly correlated with the other three variables
used so far and at the same allows me to expand the data set to more than 20,000
observations. I obtain similar results: people that have greater confidence in science,
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and hence are more optimistic about the future, are also more likely to be happier.
In addition, all of the coefficients on educational attainment have the expected signs
and are statistically significant.
3.5.6 Estimating the Monetary Equivalent
To be able to obtain a more intuitive interpretation of these results, I combine
the coefficients on income and educational attainment to obtain the marginal rate of
substitution between educational attainment and income, so that:
MRSEducation,Income =
MUeducation
MUincome
=
βj
α
∗ y = ψj (3.5)
where βj is the coefficient on the dummy variable for each educational attainment.
One difficulty in doing this is that income is subject to diminishing marginal returns.
Since more educated people are more likely to earn higher salaries, they are also
more likely to value an additional dollar of income less. One way to produce more
comparable and meaningful results is to calculate the marginal rate of substitution
for the different educational levels while holding income constant. One can think of
a situation in which a recent college graduate is not able to find a high paying job,
but starts at the level of income similar to a person with a high school degree. The
model predicts that even though the person with a college degree will be earning a
similar salary to that of a high-school graduate, the person with the higher degree
will have a significant happiness premium. The marginal rate of substitution in this
case elicits the monetary equivalent of this higher level of subjective well-being. Table
3.8 presents one such possible scenario evaluating the mean income for high school
graduates in the sample which is reported in column 2. Column 3 shows the marginal
rate of substitution between educational attainment and income, ψ. This number is
calculated using the coefficients on log of income and educational attainments from
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model (3) in Table 3.3. Column 4 presents the marginal non-monetary benefit from
an additional level of educational attainment. Finally, column (5) reports the present
value of the lifetime premium calculated for a hypothetical 40-year working life and
discounted at a rate of 7 percent. A typical work-life is defined by the Census Bureau
as the period between 25 and 65.
The calculations in Table 3.8 suggest a number of interesting observations. First,
the difference in the marginal non-monetary benefit between a person with “less than
high school” degree and a “high school” diploma is substantial. Next, it seems that
most of the non-pecuniary returns are obtained in college. A person with a high
school degree, for instance, will have to earn $41,683 more per year to be equally as
happy as a person with a college degree with the same socio-economic background
(column 4). A person with a college degree, however, will have to earn only $1,600
more a year to be equally as happy as someone with a graduate degree that has similar
personal characteristics. In addition, Column 5 of Table 3.8 calculates the lifetime
happiness premium (in dollar terms) associated with different levels of education. The
calculations show that the happiness premium alone is sufficient to pay for the cost
of a college education that students at both the undergraduate and graduate levels
incur. For example, the lifetime monetary equivalent associated with a college degree
is close to $1.66 million relative to a high school degree, and the lifetime happiness
premium for graduate school is slightly higher, $1.73 million.
Table 3.9 reports the marginal rate of substitution at the mean level of income for
the four different levels of educational attainment. One must be careful in comparing
the results from Table 3.8 with the results from Table 3.9. Since income is allowed to
vary in the second case, the marginal rate of substitution does not reveal how much
more income per year a person with a high school degree would have to earn to be
equally as happy as a person with a higher degree. Instead it shows the happiness
premium (in dollar terms) that the typical person from the four different educational
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groups will receive. For example, the happiness premium associated with a college
degree (relative to a high school diploma) is approximately $88,772 (column 4). The
additional happiness premium for obtaining a graduate degree is $51,598. This result
is driven by the diminishing marginal returns from income. In other words, as income
increases, the value of additional dollar goes down and it becomes increasingly costly
for individuals (in terms of the opportunity cost associated with the non-pecuniary
benefits from education) not to pursue a higher degree.
Table 3.10 calculates the marginal rate of substitution using the results from Model
3 in Table 3.3. As expected, the happiness premium from a college degree decreases,
although even after controlling for health and marital status, the non-monetary return
is substantial. Finally, Table 3.11 shows the marginal rate of substitution between
educational attainment and income once the model takes into account the positive
effect of social capital. As expected, the monetary equivalent from higher education
substantially decreases. The steepest decline is associated with the return from ob-
taining a graduate degree. It appears that once the model accounts for social capital
there is a large negative return associated with pursuing a graduate degree. Interest-
ingly, the monetary equivalent of the loss in non-pecuniary benefits associated with a
graduate degree is very close to the mean difference in earnings between people with
college and graduate degrees, which is close to $18,000.22
3.5.7 Robustness Test
Table 3.12 estimates the same models but using an ordered probit model as a
robustness test. The main conclusions from the previous table are virtually the same
which provides confidence in the strategy to use an OLS procedure for the main
analytical part of the study. In all of the regressions educational attainment has the
expected sign and is statistically significant. However, interpretation of the marginal
22See Table 3.5 which reports the mean income in the sample at different levels of educational
attainment.
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effects is not as straightforward. For example, the coefficient on “college,” 0.22,
implies that the probability of a college graduate reporting themselves in the top
happiness category,“very happy,” will be close to 5 percentage points higher compared
to a person with only a high school diploma.23 Similarly, obtaining a graduate degree
increases the likelihood that a person will report themselves in the top happiness
category by 6 percentage points relative to a person with a high school degree. The
likelihood that the same person will report themselves in the bottom category goes
down by 2.7 percentage points. Additional support for the validity of the results in
this study comes from the different specifications used throughout this section, which
test the effect of a large number of variables.
3.5.8 Inequality and Risk Aversion
There are many possible ways in which education might affect the moral, social,
family, and work values of individuals. One important way is by making people more
patient, risk-averse, open-minded, tolerant, and more altruistic. Well educated peo-
ple, for instance, are less likely to engage in risky behaviors such as smoking, drinking,
and crime, and more likely to be tolerant of alternative lifestyles and minorities. Bet-
ter educated people also tend to believe that helping others who are worse off is
important, to volunteer more often, and to be willing to pay higher taxes to reduce
social inequalities (Panels G through I, Figure 3.7).
In this section I estimate non-parametrically the coefficient on inequality (risk)
aversion for different subgroups of the sample that are based on the level of educational
attainment. I follow Chapter 2 and use a neo-utilitarian framework of social welfare
23This is calculated using the following formula: 4Prob(veryhapy) = F (H +4H − c2)F (H −
c2) where the change in the probability of someone reporting themselves in the highest happiness
category “very happy” is determined by the change in the happiness score of the individual, H,
due to the change in one of the determinants of happiness in the regression, and where F (.) is the
cumulative standard normal distribution and c2 is the cut-off point that the happiness score has to
pass in order for someone to call themselves “very happy.” Cut-off points are reported in the bottom
of Table 3.12
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analysis which was developed by Atkinson (1970). Consider the following additive
social welfare function:
W =
1
n
∑
ui(yi) (3.6)
where social welfare, W , is determined by average utility, which is a function of
personal income, yi.
24 To incorporate the idea that additional income may bring
greater utility to poorer people, I employ an iso-elastic utility function which assigns
weights to different levels of income:
ui =

y1−εi − 1
1− ε if ε 6= 1
logyi if ε = 1
(3.7)
In this specification, ε is the parameter of inequality (risk) aversion or the negative
elasticity of marginal income (Layard, 2008). Conceptually this function is equivalent
to a constant relative risk aversion function (CRRA). When ε = 0, individuals show
no inequality and risk aversion. On the other hand, when ε→∞ then individuals are
infinitely averse to inequality. Section 2.4.1 of chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion
of the theoretical model.
To estimate, ε, I use a Box-Cox transformation on the income variable so that:
ui = α
(
yλi − 1
λ
)
+
∑
β′X + νi (3.8)
where λ = 1− ε
Table 3.13 presents the main results from a maximum likelihood procedure. As
expected, the inequality (risk) aversion parameter, ε, is found to be increasing with
24Deaton (1997) provides a useful definition of the social welfare function: “The social welfare
function should be seen as a statistical ‘aggregator’ that turns distribution into a single number that
provides overall judgment on that distribution and that forces us to think coherently about welfare
and its distribution. Whatever out view of the policy making process, it is always useful to think
about policy in terms of its effects on efficiency and equity, and the social welfare function should
be though of as a tool for organizing our thoughts in a coherent way.”
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educational attainment. People with graduate degrees, for instance, are found to be
extremely inequality and risk averse. These results are consistent with the patterns
suggested in Figure 3.7. Interestingly, the parameter of inequality (risk) aversion has
also significantly increased over time for all levels of educational attainment. This
might be a reflection of the growing public resentment over inequality that has recently
culminated with the Occupy Wall Street movement. Finally, although interpretation
of ε as a parameter of risk or inequality aversion is debatable, in reality the concavity
of the utility function is determined by both.
3.5.9 The Interaction of Education and Income
In this section, I test for possible interaction between the variables of income
and educational attainment. This allows me to answer questions such as: Are richer
people more likely to value higher educational attainment and do well-educated people
enjoy an additional dollar of income more than their less educated counterparts?
Figure 3.9 in the Appendix provides some preliminary evidence that people with the
same income tend to report higher levels of happiness if they are college educated.
Moreover, income seems to have the greatest incremental effect on happiness for the
least educated.
I modify the main model by including an interaction term between income and
educational attainment, so that:
hi = αlogyi +
j∑
βjEducationi +
j∑
δj(Educationi ∗ yi) + γ′X + i (3.9)
Table 3.14 presents the main results. The interaction terms in all models have a
positive sign suggesting that people with the same socio-economic status but more
education will derive greater satisfaction from additional income. Similarly, as income
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goes up, the value of obtaining additional education increases too. These results are
consistent with economic theory. First, the value of additional education should go
up as income increases and becomes subject to diminishing returns. In addition,
education may also be seen as a status good (Veblen, 1899; Frank, 2001) so that
people with higher income rank would be increasingly willing to pay a higher price
to obtain it.
We have seen that, on average, individuals with higher education engage in less
risky behaviors and have more healthy personal habits. Their consumption patterns,
then, will reflect this behavior. More income will be spent on products and services
that maximize their long-run happiness such as membership in a gym, and less in-
come will be spent on destructive personal habits such as smoking and drinking. One
explanation comes from Becker and Mulligan (1997, pp.735-736) who note: “School-
ing focuses students attention on the future. Schooling can communicate images of
the situations and difficulties of adult life, which are the future of childhood and ado-
lescence. In addition, through repeated practice at problem solving, schooling helps
children learn the art of scenario simulation. Thus educated people should be more
productive at reducing the remoteness of future pleasures.” In other words, educa-
tion reduces myopia (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). People who are myopic are
more likely to engage in immediate gratification and underestimate the future cost of
their action, and are thus more likely to make behavioral mistakes at the expense of
their lifetime happiness. Figure 3.7, for instance, shows that respondents in the GSS
who have higher degrees are less likely to report that they smoke (Panel A), have a
drinking problem (Panel B), exercise more (Panel C), have been arrested in the past
(Panel D), are more prone to violence (Panel E), and have used illegal drugs such as
cocaine and marijuana in the past year (Panel F). Finally, educated people are also
more likely to negotiate prices so they can extract higher personal benefit from trade
transactions.
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3.5.10 The Non-Monetary Returns for Different Sub-Groups
In this section, I return to the basic model in Table 3.3 and estimate the non-
pecuniary returns for different subgroups of the population. Table 3.15 presents the
basic results for four different groups based on sex, race, marital status, and political
affiliation. All models include the controls used in the basic model in this study and
are thus comparable to the results from Table 3.3.
The results suggest that the non-pecuniary benefits from education are more than
three times larger for women than for men. This observation might help explain
the difference in educational attainment between genders that has shifted over the
past few decades. In 1980, for example, there was virtually no difference in the
high school completion rate between females (86 percent) and males (86 percent),
but in 2011 the percentage of females with a high school diploma (91 percent) was
higher by four percentage points than males (87 percent). Similarly, in 1980 the
percentage of females (21 percent) with a college degree was three percentage points
lower than males (24 percent), but by 2011 significantly more females (36 percent)
were graduating college than males (28 percent). Across the OECD countries, for
examples, women with university level degrees are also twice as likely to find a job as
are men. (OECD Factbook, 2011)
The non-pecuniary benefits from education are also found to be larger for white
people relative to African Americans. This is not a surprising result since African
Americans have traditionally been discriminated in and outside of the labor market.
The effect of educational attainment is also larger for never married people than for
married ones. This is also an expected result since education might provide single
people with an outlet to expand and strengthen their social network which may
naturally be better developed for people who are married and have families. The last
model in Table 3.15 suggests that the effect of education on subjective well-being is
much stronger for people who identify as Republicans than for those who think of
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themselves as Democrats. Perhaps, this difference can be explained by the typical
values associated with democratic beliefs which are based on community and social
responsibility. Even without formal education, Democrats may already have stronger
social networks and share community values to a greater extent than do Republicans.
Table 3.16 presents one more estimation by separating the sample into two time
periods – prior to 1995 and after 1995. The results show that the effect of education
on subjective well-being was much stronger after 1995. This is especially pronounced
in the case of a college degree – the coefficient increases in magnitude by more than
a half. This might be an indication that the non-pecuniary return from a college
degree has substantially increased over time. This could explain, at least partially, the
growing demand for college education, which has lead to an unprecedented increase
in the price of college tuition over the past several decades. It can also mean that
college education has gradually become the educational norm in the US.
3.5.11 The Direct and Indirect Effects of Education
So far the analysis has relied primarily on the estimation of reduced form mod-
els. In this section, I present additional evidence by estimating a structural equation
model (SEM) using a maximum likelihood procedure. This allows me to more clearly
distinguish between the direct and indirect channels through which education affects
subjective well-being and to make inferences about the strength of the relationship.
A map of the structural model is presented in Figure 3.10. Higher educational attain-
ment is assumed to affect subjective well-being directly but also indirectly through
(1) increasing income, (2) decreasing the likelihood of unemployment, (3) decreasing
the likelihood of divorce and separation, (4) improving health, (5) by enhancing so-
cial trust, and (6) increasing job-satisfaction. Table 3.17 presents the main findings.
Part 1 of the table decomposes the total effect of educational attainment on subjec-
tive well-being into direct and indirect effects. Part 2 of the table provides auxiliary
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regressions that show how educational attainment affects happiness through the in-
direct channels. For example, educational attainment increases the log of income by
.4557 points (model 1 in part 2) and the log of income then is associated with increase
in happiness of .0155 points. Thus, the indirect effect of educational attainment on
happiness through the income channel is .0071 (.4557∗.0155) which is the product of
the direct effect of education on income and the direct effect of income on subjective
well-being.
All coefficients in the regression which estimates the direct effect of educational
attainment on subjective well-being in Part 1 of Table 3.17 have the expected signs
and are statistically significant at the .01 level. The only exception is the variable
on educational attainment, which has the expected sign but is statistically insignifi-
cant. This suggests that education does not affect happiness directly. This result is
consistent with the most complete model in Table 3.9, which controls for a large num-
ber of personal characteristics, including health and marital status, job satisfaction,
personal unemployment, and social capital.
The indirect effect of education on subjective well-being, however, is substantial.
It is 13 times larger than the direct effec, and is slightly larger than the overall
(direct and indirect) effect of income. The non-pecuniary benefits outside of the labor
market associated with better health, marriage, and higher level of social trust are
estimated to be three times larger than the non-pecuniary benefits associated with
higher income, lower likelihood of being unemployed, and greater job satisfaction.
About half of the non-pecuniary benefits are related to better health and about one
fifth comes from greater social capital. In fact, the indirect effect through the income
channel corresponds to only one tenth of the total indirect effect. This suggests that
the majority of the non-pecuniary benefits from education lies outside of a better
paid job.
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3.5.12 Are Europeans Different from Americans?
As a final test, I compare the effect of higher education on subjective well-being
in the United States to that in Europe. Subjective well-being data for Europe were
collected from the European Value Study (EVS) using a similar question to that of
the GSS and was recoded into the following scale: ‘not at all happy’ (1), ‘not very
happy’ (2), ‘quite happy’ (3), and ‘very happy’(4). The income variable from the EVS
was constructed from categorical data 25 and represents inflation adjusted household
income in 2005 dollars.
The EVS, however, does not have a variable for educational attainment that is
comparable to the GSS variable. Since data on education attainment is collected using
the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) system, I recode the
data into four separate categories: ‘less than high school’ (primary education or
lower, ISCED codes 0 and 1), ‘high school’(lower and upper secondary education,
ISCED code 3), ‘technical school’(post-secondary, but not tertiary education such as
vocational and technical schools beyond high school education, ISCED code 4), and
‘bachelor degree or higher’(tertiary education, ISCED codes 5 and 6). Comparable
data on personal characteristics, unemployment, health and marital status, as well as
social trust and fairness are also used. Table 3.18 presents the main findings.
The results are consistent with the findings for the United States – better educated
people are also more likely to report higher levels of happiness. This effect is increasing
with the level of educational attainment, but appears to be much weaker than in
the United States. On the other hand, this effect is still positive and statistically
25To construct a linear income variable I follow the methodology used in the EVS: The mid-points
of the country specific categories were taken; for the first category, the mid-point is its upper bound
minus half the range of the second category, e.g., if (1) < 500 Euro and (2) 500-800 Euro, then the
mid-point of the first category is: 500-(800-500)/2=350 Euro. To compute the mid-point of the last
category, an equal range for the last and the penultimate category was assumed, e.g., if (one but
last category) 7.500-10.000 Euro and (last category) >10,000 Euro, then the mid-point of the last
category is: 10,000+(2,500/2)=11,250 Euro. The variable was then multiplied by 12 and converted
to US dollars using exchange rates taken from OANDA-Forex Trading and Exchange Rates Services.
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significant even after controlling for job satisfaction, marital and health status, and
social capital. In fact, including many of these additional variables has almost no
effect on the coefficient of educational attainment. This suggests that the direct effect
of higher education in Europe is much stronger than the indirect one. Interestingly,
obtaining a technical education tends to have a negative effect on happiness. Perhaps
this is related to the more mechanical nature of the jobs that people with vocational
training do.
In Table 3.19 I calculate the marginal rate of substitution, ψ, between educational
attainment and income for Europe using the results obtained in Model 1 of Table
3.18. Column 4 shows that the monetary equivalent of the non-pecuniary benefits
from higher education is only $1,629 compared to $41,683 for the United States. This
premium almost entirely comes from the direct effect of educational attainment on
happiness and is almost as strong even after controlling for possible indirect non-
pecuniary benefits of education in and outside of the labor market.
To obtain more comparable results, I rerun the regressions for the US using total
family income from the GSS and combining the categories ‘college degree’ and ‘grad-
uate degree’ into a single one. Table 3.20 reports the coefficients on the educational
variables from the new regressions and compares them to the coefficients for Europe.
While the educational variables in the United States lose their significance and be-
come negative once I control for social capital, the educational variables in Europe
are positively related to subjective well-being and statistically significant at .01 level
after controls are added. The findings suggest that educational attainment in Europe
tends to have a stronger direct effect on subjective well-being and almost negligent
indirect effects contrary to higher education in the United States which is associated
with large non-pecuniary benefits in and outside of the labor market and a positive
but insignificant direct effect.
Figure 3.11 suggests some possible explanations for these observations. Although
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higher educational attainment in Europe is associated with higher self-reported hap-
piness, the relationship between educational attainment and other personal outcomes
does not appear as strong as the one in the United States. For example, an average
American with a university degree or higher earns more than twice as much as an
American with a high school diploma. In Europe the mean household income for the
college educated is only 20 percent higher than the income of the less educated (Panel
A, Fig. 3.11). And while people with higher degrees in the United States are less
likely to experience personal unemployment, this is not so in Europe (Panel B). For
example, people with less than high school degrees are less likely to be unemployed
than both people with high school and vocational degrees. Similarly, while people
with higher education are more likely to be married in the United States, this rela-
tionship runs in the opposite direction in Europe (Panel C). Overall, the differences
between respondents with college degrees and lower degrees are much less pronounced
in Europe than in the United States when it comes to other variables such as social
trust, subjective health, importance of work, and one’s sense of control over their life.
In general, higher education tends to have a much stronger and positive effect on a
variety of personal outcomes in the United States than it does in Europe.
What can explain these differences between the United States and Europe is a
potential topic for future research. One possible explanation however, might be that
most countries in Europe have larger welfare states than does the United States
which narrows educational and income differences and make the impact of educational
attainment less valuable on the individual level. Another possible explanation is that
universities in the United States might play a more important role in helping social
networks to develop.
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
This study argues that formal education has large individual benefits that go
beyond the monetary return from a better paid job. Using data from the General
Social Survey from 1974-2010, we found that educational attainment is positively
correlated with the level of happiness that individuals report even after controlling
for a large set of personal variables such as income, personal unemployment, job
satisfaction, health and marital status. The effect is strong, statistically significant,
and increasing, although at a decreasing rate with the level of educational attainment.
We conjecture that the remaining portion of the non-pecuniary return from a higher
degree is associated with improved social capital – stronger interpersonal networks,
a greater sense of trust and fairness, and more civic engagement. The monetary
equivalent of these non-pecuniary returns is found to be substantial and slightly higher
than the financial one. Most of these non-pecuniary benefits are earned in college
while the majority of the return from attending a graduate school is purely financial.
In fact, pursuing a graduate degree may come at the expense of some non-monetary
benefits, especially those related to stronger social networks and civic engagement.
These non-monetary returns vary across the different subgroups of the population.
It is three times as strong for women as it is for men. Blacks benefit less from higher
education than whites. More importantly, the non-monetary returns have increased
over the past several decades which may help to explain the rapid increase in the
demand for college education.
Previous criticisms that education lowers subjective well-being by raising ambition
are found to be questionable. A more optimistic (and less pessimistic) outlook on life
is found to be positively correlated with happiness. The results further suggest that
more educated people tend to be less pessimistic than their less educated counterparts.
This is consistent with the results of previous studies which find that more educated
people tend to be less myopic.
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A structural equation model provides further confidence in the results from the
main analytical part of this study and confirms that there are large indirect effects of
better education on well-being through better health, more stable marriages, lower
likelihood of unemployment, a more enjoyable job, and stronger social networks. This
indirect effect is found to be thirteen times larger than the direct one and slightly
larger than the combined direct and indirect effect of higher income associated with
better education. The direct effect of higher education on subjective well-being,
however, is found to be statistically insignificant in the structural equation model.
As an additional robustness test, the concavity of the utility function is estimated
non-parametrically for different levels of educational attainment which reveals behav-
ioral patterns related to inequality and risk aversion. It is found that more educated
people are more inequality and risk averse. People with graduate degrees are found
to display extreme inequality and risk aversion.
Finally, the effect of education on subjective well-being in the United States is
compared to that in Europe. Similar patterns are discovered – educational attainment
tends to be significantly and positively correlated with subjective well-being even after
controlling for a large set of variables. Nevertheless, the non-monetary benefits from
education in Europe tend to be much smaller than the non-monetary benefits in the
United States.
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3.7     Appendix 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Educational Attainment, Personal and Family Income 
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Figure 3.2: Happiness by Income and Educational Attainment 
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Figure 3.3: Labor Force Outcomes by Educational Attainment 
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Figure 3.4: Marriage, Health, and Parenting Outcomes by Educational Attainment 
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Figure 3.5: Social Capital Outcomes by Educational Attainment 
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Figure 3.6: Types of Volunteering and Educational Attainment 
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Figure 3.7: Risk and Inequality Aversion by Educational Attainment 
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Figure 3.8: Optimism, Educational Attainment and Self-Reported Happiness 
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Figure 3.9: Happiness by Income and Educational Attainment 
 
Note: ‘Happiness’ represents averages to the question: “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days would you 
say that you are very happy [3], pretty happy [2], or not too happy [1]? The categories ‘1’ to ‘5’ represent income quintiles, with ‘1’ 
standing for the bottom 25 percent of income earners and ‘5’ for the top 25 percent of income earners.  
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Figure 3.10: Indirect and Direct Effects of Educational Attainment on Happiness 
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Figure 3.11: Educational Attainment and Subjective Well-Being in Europe 
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Table 3.1: Description and Sources of Main Variables 
Micro Variables    
Happy 
 
Data were collected with the question: “Taken all 
together, how would you say things are these days would 
you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too 
happy?” (1 ‘not too happy’, 2 ‘pretty happy’, 3 ‘very 
happy’) 
General Social Survey (GSS 
variable: happy) 
http://www3.norc.org/gss+website 
 
 
Education Dummy variables for ‘high school’, ‘college’, ‘graduate 
school’ (‘less than high school’ is the base category) 
GSS variable: degree 
Income Respondent's income (in 2005 constant dollars) GSS variable: conrinc 
Relative Income yi/y* where y* is median income for sample (by year) Own calculations 
SEI Prestige and socio-economic index GSS variable: sei 
Trust Data was collected with the question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” 
(0 ‘can trust’, 1 ‘cannot trust’) 
GSS variable: trust 
Fairness "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of 
you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? (0 
‘take advantage’ and 1 ‘fair’) 
GSS variable: fair 
Job Satisfaction Answers to the question: “On the whole, how satisfied 
are you with the work you do?” (0 ‘very dissatisfied’ to 
10 ‘very satisfied’) 
GSS variable: satjob 
Friendships Answers to the question: “[H]ow much satisfaction do 
you get from … your friendships?” (0 ‘none’ and 7’very 
great deal’) 
GSS variable: satfrnd 
Hobbies Answers to the question: “[H]ow much satisfaction do 
you get from … non-work activities?” (0 ‘none’ and 
7’very great deal’) 
GSS variable: sathobby 
Own a Gun Dummy if person owns a gun (0 ‘does not’ 1 ‘owns’) GSS variable: owngun 
Optimistic Responses to the statement: “I'm always optimistic 
about my future” (from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 4 
‘strongly agree’) 
GSS variable: optimism 
Pessimistic Responses to the statement: “I hardly ever expect things 
to go my way.” (from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 4 ‘strongly 
agree’) 
GSS variable: pessimst 
More good things Responses to the statement: “Overall, I expect more good 
things to happen to me than bad.” (from 1 ‘strongly 
disagree’ to 4 ‘strongly agree’) 
GSS variable: moregood 
Confidence 
Science 
Responses to “confidence in … scientific community” 
(from 1 ‘hardly any to 4 ‘a great deal’) 
GSS variable: consci 
Age Age in years GSS variable: age 
Sex  Dummy variable for gender (0 ‘male’, 1 ‘female’) GSS variable: sex 
Race Dummy variable for race (0: White, 1: Black) GSS variable: race 
Marital Status Dummy variables for ‘divorced’, ‘separated’, and 
‘widowed’ (‘married’ is the base category) 
GSS variable: marital 
Health Dummy variables for ‘poor’, ‘fair’, ‘good’, and 
‘excellent’ health 
GSS variable: health 
 (‘poor’ is used as a base)   
Children Number of children GSS variable: childs 
Employment 
Status 
Dummy variable for unemployed GSS variable: wrkstat 
Knowledge Score on knowledge test (0 ‘lowest’ 10’highest’) GSS variable: wordsum 
Siblings Number of brothers and sisters GSS variable: sibs 
Hours worked Number of hours worked last week GSS variable: hrs1  
Note: All variables were obtained from the General Social Survey. http://www3.norc.org/gss+website/ 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Microeconomic Variables 
Micro Variables Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Happy 52321 2.19 0.64 1 3 
Degree 56896 1.05 0.80 0 3 
Log Income 33365 9.92 1.09 5.95 12.98 
Relative Income 33365 1.27 1.29 0.02 16.10 
SEI 31277 48.42 19.18 17.1 97.2 
Job Satisfaction 41277 3.30 0.81 1 4 
Trust 37493 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Fairness 35713 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Friendships 24128 5.76 1.24 1 7 
Hobbies 24034 5.29 1.57 1 7 
Own a gun 34459 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Optimistic 2367 3.11 0.72 1 4 
Pessimistic 2368 2.05 0.74 1 4 
More good things 2371 1.77 0.67 1 4 
Confidence Science 35771 1.64 0.61 1 3 
Age 56859 45.70 17.47 18 89 
Female 57061 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Black 57061 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Married 57041 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Widowed  57041 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Divorced 57041 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Separated 57041 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Never Married 57041 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Poor Health 42426 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Fair Health 42426 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Good Health 42426 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Excellent Health 42426 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Children 56880 1.95 1.79 0 8 
Unemployed 57047 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Knowledge 26916 6.00 2.14 0 10 
Siblings 55382 3.94 3.19 0 68 
Hours Worked 33051 41.23 14.20 0 89 
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Table 3.3: Basic Results 
  Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4     
Log Income 0.0410 (.0039) *** 0.0375 (.0038) *** 0.0267 (.0044) *** 0.0305 (.0061) *** 
Education 
            High School 0.0489 (.0113) *** 0.0504 (.0111) *** 0.0124 (.0126) 
 
0.0073 (.0179) 
 College 0.1132 (.0135) *** 0.1151 (.0135) *** 0.0487 (.0154) *** 0.0606 (.0227) *** 
Grad School 0.1157 (.0162) *** 0.1128 (.0161) *** 0.0499 (.0184) *** 0.0534 (.0272) ** 
Personal Characteristics 
            Age -0.0101 (.0016) *** -0.0185 (.0017) *** -0.0142 (.0020) *** -0.0155 (.0028) *** 
Age squared 0.0001 (.0000) *** 0.0002 (.0000) *** 0.0002 (.0000) *** 0.0002 (.0000) *** 
Female 0.0342 (.0074) *** 0.0608 (.0073) *** 0.0633 (.0084) *** 0.0924 (.0117) *** 
Black -0.1719 (.0108) *** -0.1188 (.0108) *** -0.1098 (.0123) *** -0.1334 (.0167) *** 
Unemployed -0.2576 (.0202) *** -0.2135 (.0200) *** -0.2044 (.0225) *** -0.2169 (.0316) *** 
Marriage 
            Widowed  
   
-0.3234 (.0201) *** -0.3194 (.0231) *** -0.3240 (.0322) *** 
Divorced 
   
-0.2791 (.0102) *** -0.2740 (.0116) *** -0.2591 (.0162) *** 
Separated 
   
-0.3442 (.0199) *** -0.3431 (.0226) *** -0.2972 (.0318) *** 
Never married 
   
-0.2405 (.0100) *** -0.2327 (.0114) *** -0.2289 (.0159) *** 
Number of Children 
   
-0.0035 (.0027) *** -0.0038 (.0030) 
 
-0.0076 (.0042) ** 
Health 
            Fair 
      
0.1723 (.0323) *** 0.1607 (.0478) *** 
Good 
      
0.3572 (.0312) *** 0.3511 (.0461) *** 
Excellent 
      
0.5522 (.0316) *** 0.5535 (.0466) *** 
Other 
            Knowledge 
         
-0.0064 (.0031) ** 
Number of siblings          0.0004 (.0020)   
R-Squared 0.0318 
  
0.0764 
  
0.1321 
  
0.1357 
  Observations 30401   30334   22409   11159   
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All estimates are pooled 
OLS. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, and ‘poor health’ were omitted because they are used as a base category. 
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Table 3.4: Job Satisfaction and Prestige 
  Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4     
Log Income 0.0286 (.0054) *** 0.0178 (.0045) *** 0.0112 (.0058) *** 0.0224 (.0060) *** 
Education 
            High School 0.0068 (.0140) 
 
0.0110 (.0128) 
 
0.0142 (.0119) 
 
0.0034 (.0189) 
 College 0.0416 (.0166) *** 0.0475 (.0154) *** 0.0516 (.0149) *** 0.0360 (.0229) * 
Grad School 0.0461 (.0196) ** 0.0345 (.0183) ** 0.0345 (.0180) ** 0.0122 (.0275) 
 Hours worked (last week) 0.0006 (.0003) 
          Job Satisfaction 
            a little dissatisfied 
   
0.0549 (.0249) *** 0.0557 (.0230) *** 0.0609 (.0340) *** 
mod. satisfied 
   
0.1952 (.0226) *** 0.1957 (.0206) *** 0.2248 (.0310) *** 
very satisfied 
   
0.3994 (.0228) *** 0.3992 (.0206) *** 0.4311 (.0313) *** 
Relative Position 
            Relative Income 
      
0.0087 (.0046) ** 
   Socio-Economic Status                   0.0004 (.0003)   
Controls Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  R-Squared 0.1217 
  
0.1751 
  
0.1742 
  
0.1827 
  Observations 19219     21160     21206     12430     
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All estimates are 
pooled OLS, and include controls for age, age squared, sex, race, marital status, health, and a dummy variable if the person is 
unemployed. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, ‘poor health’ and ‘less than high school’ were omitted because they are 
used as a base category. Job satisfaction (GSS variable: satjob) represents answers to the question: “On the whole, how satisfied 
are you with the work you do?” Relative income is defined as yi/y* where y* is median income for each year. Socioeconomic 
status (GSS variable: SEI) represents respondent’s prestige and socioeconomic index (see GSS Methodological Report No. 74, 
Nakao and Treas, 1992) 
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Table 3.5: Social Capital  
 Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4     
Log Income 0.0187 (.0072) *** 0.0202 (.0047) *** 0.0197 (.0072) *** 0.0190 (.0063) *** 
Education 
            High School 0.0109 (.0174) 
 
0.0130 (.0134) 
 
0.0025 (.0175) 
 
0.0042 (.0179) 
 College 0.0512 (.0222) ** 0.0507 (.0160) *** 0.0314 (.0224) 
 
0.0271 (.0213) 
 Grad School 0.0458 (.0274) * 0.0464 (.0191) ** 0.0272 (.0278) 
 
0.0094 (.0261) 
 Job Satisfaction 0.1340 (.0080) *** 0.1602 (.0055) *** 0.1396 (.0079) *** 0.1607 (.0072) *** 
Social Capital 
            Friendships 0.0999 (.0055) *** 
         Own a gun 
   
0.0233 (.0086) *** 
      Non-work activities 
      
0.0680 (.0046) *** 
   Social Trust  
         
0.0645 (.0120) *** 
Fairness                   0.0736 (.0120) *** 
Controls Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  R-Squared 0.1958 
  
0.1717 
  
0.1642 
  
0.1806 
  Observations 8705     19207     9238     11389     
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All estimates are 
pooled OLS, and include controls for age, age squared, sex, race, marital status, self-reported health, job satisfaction, and a dummy 
variable if the person is unemployed. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, ‘poor health’ and ‘less than high school’ were omitted 
because they are used as a base category. Friendships (GSS variable: satfrnd) represents answers to the question “how much 
satisfaction [respondent] gets from friendships” on a scale from ‘1’ (none) to ‘10’ (very great deal). Hobbies (GSS variable: sathobby) 
represents answers to the question “how much satisfaction [respondent] gets from non-work activities” on a scale from ‘1’ (none) to 
‘10’ (very great deal). Trust (GSS variable: trust) is a dummy variable with ‘1’ if the respondent answered that most people can be 
‘trusted.’ Fairness (GSS variable: fair) is a dummy variable with ‘1’ if the respondent answered that most people are ‘fair.’ Own a gun 
(GSS variable: owngun) is a dummy with ‘1’ if the respondent owns a gun.  
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Table 3.6: Education and Social Capital 
Dependent Variable  Friendships (1)     Trust (2)   Hobbies (3)   Own a Gun (4)   
Log Income 0.0426 (.0110) *** 0.0347 (.0099) *** -0.0567 (.0136) *** -0.0333 (.0096) *** 
Education 
            High School 0.1378 (.0273) *** 0.4528 (.0298) *** -0.3533 (.0337) *** -0.0785 (.0267) *** 
College 0.2410 (.0364) *** 0.8720 (.0353) *** -0.6225 (.0450) *** 0.2751 (.0334) *** 
Grad School 0.2602 (.0461) *** 1.0058 (.0423) *** -0.6030 (.0570) *** 0.3899 (.0398) *** 
Controls Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  R-Squared 0.0389 
  
0.0759 
  
0.0350 
  
0.0394 
  Observations 13861     21295     13840     20393     
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Since the regressions 
include aggregated variables over time, the standard errors are clustered around year.  Model (1) and (3) are pooled OLS regressions 
and models (2) and (4) provide estimates from an ordered probit procedure. All models include controls for age, age squared, sex, and 
race. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, and ‘less than high school’ were omitted because they are used as a base category. The 
dependent variables are the following: Friendships (GSS variable: satfrnd) represents answers to the question “how much satisfaction 
[respondent] gets from friendships” on a scale from ‘1’ (none) to ‘10’ (very great deal). Hobbies (GSS variable: sathobby) represents 
answers to the question “how much satisfaction [respondent] gets from non-work activities” on a scale from ‘1’ (none) to ‘10’ (very 
great deal). Trust (GSS variable: trust) is a dummy variable with ‘1’ if the respondent answered that most people can be ‘trusted.’ 
Fairness (GSS variable: fair) is a dummy variable with ‘1’ if the respondent answered that most people are ‘fair.’ Own a gun (GSS 
variable: owngun) is a dummy with ‘1’ if the respondent owns a gun. 
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Table 3.7: Optimism and Aspirations 
  Model 1     Model  2     Model 3     Model 4     
Log Income 0.0383 (.0237) 
 
0.0390 (.0240) 
 
0.0326 (.0239) 
 
0.0361 (.0045) *** 
Education 
            High School 0.0514 (.0938) 
 
0.0252 (.0955) 
 
0.0567 (.0939) 
 
0.0385 (.0126) *** 
College 0.1306 (.1047) 
 
0.0669 (.1079) 
 
0.1212 (.1049) 
 
0.0943 (.0156) *** 
Grad School 0.1614 (.1132) 
 
0.1136 (.1162) 
 
0.1762 (.1134) 
 
0.0815 (.0191) *** 
             Optimism 
Optimistic 0.3136 (.0630) *** 
         Pessimistic 
   
0.2097 (.0606) *** 
      Good things 
      
0.3908 (.0808) *** 
   Confidence Science                   0.0504 (.0085) *** 
Controls Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  R-Squared 0.0610 
  
0.0431 
  
0.0597 
  
0.0325 
  Observations 669     669     668     21685     
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Since the 
regressions include aggregated variables over time, the standard errors are clustered around year.  All estimates are from pooled 
OLS regressions, and include controls for age, age squared, sex, race, marital status, unemployment rate, education level, and a 
dummy whether the person is unemployed. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, and ‘less than high school’ were omitted 
because they are used as a base category. 
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Table 3.8: The Marginal Rate of Substitution (at Mean High School Income) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Educational Level Mean Income ψ Marginal Benefit Lifetime Premium 
Less Than High School $26,625 base base base 
High School (Base) $26,625 $31,734 $31,734 $1,269,350 
College $26,625 $73,417 $41,683 $2,936,686 
Graduate School $26,625 $75,017 $1,600 $3,000,678 
Note: ψ  represents marginal  rate of substitution between educational attainment and income. Coefficients 
on log of income and educational attainments from model 3 in Table 3.3 were used to calculate ψ.. Mean 
income represents mean income for high school graduates in 2010. Lifetime premium calculated for a 
hypothetical 40-year working life and is discounted at a rate of 7 percent. A typical work-life is defined by 
the Census Bureau as the period between 25 and 65.  
 
 
 
Table 3.9: The Marginal Rate of Substitution (at Mean Level of Income by Educational 
Attainment) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Educational Level Mean Income* ψ Marginal Benefit Lifetime Premium 
Less Than High School $26,625 base base Base 
High School (Base) $26,625 $31,734 $31,734 $1,269,350 
College $43,702 $120,506 $88,772 $4,820,246 
Graduate School $61,083 $172,104 $51,598 $6,884,147 
Note: ψ  represents marginal  rate of substitution between educational attainment and income. Coefficients 
on log of income and educational attainments from model 3 in Table 3.3 were used to calculate ψ.. Mean 
income represents mean income for high school graduates in 2010. Lifetime premium calculated for a 
hypothetical 40-year working life and discounted at a rate of 7 percent. A typical work-life is defined by the 
Census Bureau as the period between 25 and 65.  
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Table 3.10: The Marginal Rate of Substitution – Accounting for Marriage and Health 
1 2 3 4 5 
Educational Level Mean Income ψ Marginal Benefit Lifetime Premium 
Less Than High School $26,625 base base Base 
High School (Base) $26,625 $6,385 $6,385 $255,417 
College $26,625 $52,949 $46,563 $2,117,957 
Graduate School $26,625 $46,651 -$6,298 $1,866,044 
Note: ψ  represents marginal  rate of substitution between educational attainment and income. Coefficients on 
log of income and educational attainments from model 3 in Table 3.3 were used to calculate ψ. Mean income 
represents mean income for high school graduates in 2010. Lifetime premium calculated for a hypothetical 
40-year working life and discounted at a rate of 7 percent per year. A typical work-life is defined by the 
Census Bureau as the period between 25 and 65.  
 
Table 3.11: The Marginal Rate of Substitution – Accounting for Job Satisfaction and Social 
Capital 
1 2 3 4 5 
Educational Level Mean Income* ψ Marginal Benefit Lifetime Premium 
Less Than High School $26,625 base base base 
High School (Base) $26,625 $5,903 $5,903 $236,132 
College $26,625 $37,935 $32,032 $1,517,408 
Graduate School $26,625 $13,125 -$24,810 $525,015 
Note: ψ  represents marginal  rate of substitution between educational attainment and income. Coefficients on 
log of income and educational attainments from model 4 in Table 3.9 were used to calculate ψ. Mean income 
represents mean income for high school graduates in 2010. Lifetime premium calculated for a hypothetical 40-
year working life and is discounted at a rate of 7 percent per year. A typical work-life is defined by the Census 
Bureau as the period between 25 and 65.  
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Table 3.12: Basic Results, Ordered Probit 
  Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4     
Log Income 0.0779 (.0074) *** 0.0733 (.0075) *** 0.0538 (.0089) *** 0.0625 (.0126) *** 
Education 
            High School 0.0925 (.0212) *** 0.0985 (.0215) *** 0.0256 (.0252) 
 
0.0150 (.0366) 
 College 0.2155 (.0256) *** 0.2262 (.0263) *** 0.0998 (.0310) *** 0.1257 (.0467) *** 
Grad School 0.2210 (.0309) *** 0.2221 (.0317) *** 0.1023 (.0375) *** 0.1108 (.0562) ** 
Personal Characteristics 
            Age -0.0193 (.0031) *** -0.0364 (.0034) *** -0.0288 (.0040) *** -0.6625 (.0655) *** 
Age squared 0.0002 (.0000) *** 0.0004 (.0000) *** 0.0004 (.0000) *** -0.5278 (.0331) *** 
Female 0.0646 (.0141) *** 0.1184 (.0144) *** 0.1274 (.0169) *** -0.6023 (.0643) *** 
Black -0.3225 (.0202) *** -0.2295 (.0209) *** -0.2186 (.0243) *** -0.4674 (.0326) *** 
Unemployed -0.4810 (.0379) *** -0.4098 (.0386) *** -0.4046 (.0448) *** -0.0157 (.0087) *** 
Marriage 
            Widowed  
   
-0.6285 (.0388) *** -0.6406 (.0459) *** -0.3240 (.0322) *** 
Divorced 
   
-0.5410 (.0198) *** -0.5468 (.0233) *** -0.2591 (.0162) *** 
Separated 
   
-0.6639 (.0383) *** -0.6813 (.0448) *** -0.2972 (.0318) *** 
Never married 
   
-0.4674 (.0196) *** -0.4654 (.0230) *** -0.2289 (.0159) *** 
Number of Children 
   
-0.0068 (.0052) *** -0.0077 (.0061) 
 
-0.0076 (.0042) ** 
Health 
            Poor 
      
0.3416 (.0650) *** 0.3253 (.0976) *** 
Good 
      
0.7052 (.0630) *** 0.7076 (.0946) *** 
Excellent 
      
1.0993 (.0642) *** 1.1236 (.0961) *** 
Other 
            Knowledge 
         
-0.0131 (.0065) ** 
Number of siblings          0.0007 (.0041)   
R-Squared 0.0318 
  
0.0764 
  
0.1321 
  
0.1357 
  Observations 30401 
  
30334 
  
22409 
  
11159 
  /cut1 -0.7400 (.0796) *** -1.3836 (.0881) *** -0.6865 (.1187) *** -0.7667 (.1732) *** 
/cut2 1.0354 (.0796) *** 0.4478 (.0877) *** 1.1940 (.1189) *** 1.1606 (.1735) *** 
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All estimates are 
ordered probit. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, and ‘poor health’ were omitted. 
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Table 3.13: Inequality and Risk Aversion 
Subgroup λ     Observations ε 
All subjects 0.50 (.0555) *** 30439 0.50 
Less than High School 0.72 (.2303) *** 4360 0.28 
High School 0.67 (.1000) *** 18350 0.33 
College 0.64 (.1467) *** 5139 0.36 
Graduate School 0.03 (.2017) *** 2549 0.97 
Year <1980 0.81 (.1920) *** 5293 0.19 
1980 <Year <1990 0.61 (.1303) *** 8782 0.39 
1990 <Year <2000 0.51 (.1301) *** 9427 0.49 
Year > 2000 0.36 (.0945) *** 6934 0.64 
Year <1995 
     Low Education 0.83 (.1314) *** 13950 0.17 
High Education 0.70 (.2649) *** 3997 0.30 
Year >1995 
     Low Education 0.49 (.1338) *** 8760 0.51 
High Education 0.34 (.1629) ** 3729 0.66 
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis.  All coefficients are estimated using maximum likelihood procedure with a Box-Cox 
transformation on the independent variable income. All regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
sex, race, marital status. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, and ‘less than high school’ were omitted 
because they are used as a base category. 
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Table 3.14: Interaction between Income and Educational Attainment 
  Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     
Log Income 0.0220 (.0051) *** 0.0136 (.0057) ** 0.0081 (.0058) *** 
Education 
         High School 0.0154 (.0126) 
 
-0.0100 (.0141) 
 
-0.0042 (.0143) 
 College 0.0996 (.0159) *** 0.0389 (.0183) ** 0.0407 (.0182) ** 
Grad School 0.1148 (.0206) *** 0.0453 (.0236) ** 0.0281 (.0233) 
 Y*High School 1.49E-06 (2.40E-07) *** 9.80E-07 (2.66E-07) *** 6.60E-07 (2.61E-07) ** 
Y*College 6.91E-07 (2.17E-07) *** 4.81E-07 (2.53E-07) ** 3.32E-07 (2.49E-07) 
 Y*Grad School 4.20E-07 (2.20E-07) ** 3.53E-07 (2.52E-07) 
 
3.28E-07 (2.45E-07) 
 Job Satisfaction             0.1608 (.0052) *** 
Controls YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  R-Squared 0.0331 
  
0.1751 
  
0.1733 
  Observations 30401     21160     21160     
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All 
estimates are pooled OLS regressions, and include controls for age, age squared, sex, race, marital status, health, 
number of children, and a dummy whether the person is unemployed. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, 
‘poor health’ and ‘less than high school’ were omitted because they are used as a base category. Model (1) is the 
basic model. Model (2) includes additional controls for marriage and health. Model (3) also includes a variable that 
measures job satisfaction. 
 
 
Table 3.15: Non-Monetary Returns by Subgroups 
  Sex   Race 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
White 
 
Black 
High School 0.0191 
  
0.0856 *** 
 
0.0558 *** 
 
0.0252 *** 
 (.0149)   
(.0173) 
  
(.0128) 
  
(.0285) 
 College 0.0594 *** 
 
0.1742 *** 
 
0.1222 *** 
 
0.0845 
 
 
(.0180) 
  
(.0205) 
  
(.0150) 
  
(.0407) 
 Grad School 0.0593 *** 
 
0.1810 *** 
 
0.1300 *** 
 
0.0870 * 
 (.0213)     (.0249)    
(.0213)     (.0249)   
Observations 15474 
  
14927 
  
24882 
  
3967 
 R-Squared 0.0394     0.0305   
 
0.0220     0.0355   
              
 
Marital Status 
 
Political Affiliation 
 
Married 
 
Never Married 
 
Democrat 
 
Republican 
High School 0.0493 * 
 
0.0460 * 
 
0.0283 
  
0.1304 *** 
 (.0148)   
(.0247) 
  
(.0179) 
  
(.0463) 
 College 0.1002 ** 
 
0.1485 *** 
 
0.0947 *** 
 
0.1318 *** 
 
(.0176) 
  
(.0288) 
  
(.0226) 
  
(.0503) 
 Grad School 0.0830 *** 
 
0.1754 *** 
 
0.1135 *** 
 
0.1476 ** 
 (.0203)     (.0361)    
(.0258)     (.0591)   
Observations 16687 
  
7188 
  
10812 
  
2683 
 R-Squared 0.0215     0.0406     0.0307     0.0355   
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. All estimates are from pooled OLS regressions, and include controls for age, age squared, sex, 
race, marital status, number of children, health, and a dummy whether the person is unemployed. The 
categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, ‘poor health’ and ‘less than high school’ were omitted because they 
are used as a base category. 
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Table 3.16: The Non-Monetary Return from Education over Time 
  <1995 >1995 
Log Income 0.0362 (.0061) *** 0.0494 (.0060) **** 
Education 
      High School 0.0494 (.0153) *** 0.0745 (.0210) **** 
College 0.0998 (.0197) *** 0.1527 (.0237) **** 
Grad School 0.1277 (.0241) *** 0.1341 (.0273) **** 
Controls Yes 
  
Yes 
  R-Squared 0.0366 
  
0.0308 
  Observations 13192     12475     
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. All estimates are from pooled OLS regressions, and include controls for age, age squared, sex, 
race, marital status, number of children, health, and a dummy whether the person is unemployed. The 
categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, ‘poor health’ and ‘less than high school’ were omitted because they 
are used as a base category. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.17: Structural Equation Model – Direct and Indirect Effect from Education 
Part 1  Direct Effects Indirect Effect Total Effect 
Log Income 0.0155 (.0061) *** 0.0321 (.0021) *** 0.0476 (.0066) *** 
Education 0.0055 (.0076) 
 
0.0727 (.0042) *** 0.0782 (.0075) *** 
Job Satisfaction 0.1680 (.0071) *** 
   
-0.0031 (.0026) *** 
Unemployed -0.2216 (.0355) *** 
   
-0.2216 (.0355) *** 
Health 0.1612 (.0079) *** 
   
0.1612 (.0079) *** 
Marriage  -0.2525 (.0297) *** 
   
-0.2525 (.0297) *** 
Social Trust 0.0984 (.0111) ***       0.0984 (.0111) *** 
 
Part 2                                        Log Income (1)  
  
Unemployed (2) 
Education 0.4557 (.0111) *** 
  
Log Income -0.0158 (.0020) *** 
      
Education -0.0064 (.0017) *** 
          Divorced or Separated (3)
  
Health (4)  
Log Income -0.0033 (.0017) *** 
  
Log Income 0.0497 (.0069) *** 
Education -0.0103 (.0022) *** 
  
Education 0.1792 (.0089) *** 
          Social Capital (5)  
  
Job Satisfaction (6) 
Log Income 0.0351 (.0044) *** 
  
Log Income 0.0969 (.0078) *** 
Education 0.1282 (.0059) ***     Education 0.0325 (.0098) *** 
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
The structural model is estimated with a maximum likelihood procedure. All models include controls for age, 
age squared, sex, and race. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, ‘poor health’ and ‘less than high school’ 
were omitted because they are used as a base category. 
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 Model 1 
  
Model 2   Model 3    Model 4   
log Income 0.1351 (.0039) *** 0.0941 (.0054) *** 0.0053 (7.8300) *** 0.0400 (.0054) *** 
Education 
            High School 0.0291 (.0077) *** 0.0380 (.0103) *** 0.0378 (.0097) *** 0.0354 (.0100) *** 
Technical 0.0313 (.0167) * 0.0200 (.0197) 
 
0.0263 (.0187) 
 
0.0248 (.0191) 
 College 0.0396 (.0108) *** 0.0388 (.0132) *** 0.0404 (.0125) *** 0.0364 (.0128) *** 
Personal 
            Age -0.0108 (.0009) *** -0.0117 (.0017) *** -0.0161 (.0018) *** -0.0164 (.0019) *** 
Age squared 0.0001 (.0000) *** 0.0001 (.0000) *** 0.0001 (.0000) *** 0.0001 (.0000) *** 
Female 0.0118 (.0058) ** 0.0048 (.0073) 
 
0.0319 (.0070) *** 0.0258 (.0072) *** 
Unemployed -0.1047 (.0102) *** -0.0511 (.0674) 
 
-0.0599 (.0647) 
 
-0.0582 (.0656) 
 Job 
            Job Satisfaction 
   
0.0612 (.0018) *** 0.0467 (.0017) *** 0.0451 (.0017) *** 
Marriage 
            Cohabiting 
      
-0.0366 (.0220) * -0.0333 (.0224) * 
Divorced 
      
-0.2110 (.0129) *** -0.2079 (.0133) *** 
Separated 
      
-0.3310 (.0278) *** -0.3219 (.0285) *** 
Widowed 
      
-0.2688 (.0205) *** -0.2679 (.0209) *** 
Never Married 
      
-0.1591 (.0109) *** -0.1621 (.0112) *** 
Children 
      
0.0090 (.0037) *** 0.0094 (.0038) *** 
Health 
            Poor 
      
0.3805 (.0548) *** 0.3637 (.0556) *** 
Fair 
      
0.6254 (.0523) *** 0.6050 (.0530) *** 
Good 
      
0.8214 (.0522) *** 0.7940 (.0529) *** 
Very Good 
      
1.0806 (.0526) *** 1.0461 (.0533) *** 
Social Capital 
            Trust 
         
0.0304 (.0085) *** 
Fairness 
         
0.0139 (.0017) *** 
Control 
            Control over Life                         
R-Squared 0.1520 
  
0.1786 
  
0.2745 
  
0.2786 
  Country x Year Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  Observations 50272     25434     25100     23985     
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All 
estimates are from pooled OLS regressions. The categories ‘male’, ‘married’, ‘very poor health’ and ‘less than high 
school’ were omitted because they are used as a base category.  
 
Table 3.19: The Marginal Rate of Substitution -- Europe 
1 2 3 4 5 
Educational Level Mean Income* ψ Marginal Benefit Lifetime Premium 
Less Than High 
School $26,625 base base base 
High School $26,625 $5,743 $5,743 $229,726 
Technical $26,625 $6,174 $431 $246,974 
College $26,625 $7,803 $1,629 $312,122 
Note: ψ  represents marginal  rate of substitution between educational attainment and income. Coefficients on log of 
income and educational attainments from model 1 in Table 3.17 were used to calculate ψ. Mean income represents 
mean income for high school graduates in 2010. Lifetime premium calculated for a hypothetical 40-year working life 
and discounted at 7 percent. A typical work-life is defined by the Census Bureau as the period between 25 and 65.  
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Table 3.20: Educational Attainment and Subjective Well-being in Europe and United States 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4 
 EU USA  
EU USA 
 
EU USA 
 
EU USA 
log Income 0.1351 *** 0.1149 *** 
 
0.0941 *** 0.0979 *** 
 
0.0053 *** 0.0328 *** 
 
0.0053 *** 0.0281 *** 
 (.0039)  
(.0036) 
  
(.0054) 
 
(.0040) 
  
(7.8300) 
 
(.0048) 
  
(7.8300) 
 
(.0065) 
 Education 
                   High School 0.0291 *** 0.0224 *** 
 
0.0380 *** 0.0181 ** 
 
0.0378 *** 0.0081
  
0.0378 *** -0.0055
  (.0077)  
(.0080) 
  
(.0103) 
 
(.0091) 
  
(.0097) 
 
(.0102) 
  
(.0097) 
 
(.0137) 
 Technical 0.0313 * 
   
0.0200 
    
0.0263 
    
0.0263 
    (.0167)     
(.0197) 
    
(.0187) 
    
(.0187) 
   College 0.0396 *** 0.0582 *** 
 
0.0388 *** 0.0475 *** 
 
0.0404 *** 0.0322 *** 
 
0.0404 *** -0.0008
   (.0108)   (.0098)    (.0132)   (.0108)    (.0125)   (.0122)    (.0125)   (.0165)  
Note: ***(**)[*] indicate significance at p<.01(p<.05)[p<.1]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All estimates are from pooled OLS 
regressions, and include controls for age, age squared, sex, race, marital status, self-reported health, job satisfaction, a dummy whether the person is 
unemployed, social trust, and perception of fairness. The categories ‘male’, ‘white’, ‘married’, ‘poor health’, ‘less than high school’, ‘cannot trust 
other’, and ‘people try to take advantage’ were omitted because they are used as a base category.  
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